The "demographic alarm" is ringing for everyone

(portalnovosti.com)

If we consult the Croatian Encyclopedia, we will get a clear definition that says: "Demography is a social science that encompasses the study of the number and spatial distribution of the population, the natural and mechanical (migratory) movement of the population, and changes in the demographic, socio-economic and other structures of the population."

However, the public and political use of the term itself deviates significantly from the strict textbook definition. This is not unusual, a whole range of concepts and terms live their social lives outside the orbit of official regulations. But there are differences in the political dimensions of these deviations or diversions. Sometimes these dimensions are benign and remain at the level of social folklore, and sometimes they point to “deeper” political processes and ideological tectonics.

Demography also falls into the latter group. While the Encyclopedia classifies it among the social sciences, public debates and political projects treat it as a kind of social traffic light. Demography shows us the result. And it is primarily the result of a national project. Are there enough of us? Are women giving birth to too few? Are there too many people of a different skin color? What can be done to change the result? And who, ultimately, is to blame for such a result?

We have not turned too soon to national issues. In fact, demography itself as a term and discipline arose from concerns about a national project. It was a French project in the 19th century and the recognized lower fertility rate compared to Germany and Great Britain at the time. The anxiety of the French elites was quite pronounced and two questions had to be answered: why are French women giving birth less often? And what can the government do about it?

In the words of historian Nils Gilman, an entire research field or scientific discipline emerged as part of a specific political project. It is obvious that the discipline is still haunted by this “original sin”. Far from it, within demography as a separate discipline or at the intersection of some broader ones, such as sociology and economics, very socially valuable insights were not developed, without which it is impossible to conduct systematic and rational policies: industrial, urban, pension and many others.

However, its public use is also marked by a certain amount of normativity: society or, more precisely, the nation should look as it is conceived. The basic criterion is seemingly objective: the fertility rate, which is treated as the “replacement rate”, is 2,1 children per woman. And thus the obstacles to reaching that rate are treated as subjective or, in everyday language, selfish.

Failure to reach this rate from “one’s own ranks” is considered a political apocalypse. In such a context, conspiracy theories easily get involved, and today the prevailing one is about the “great replacement” of the European white population with non-European and non-white ones. Even those who are extremely opposed to this theory continue to play on its turf, as long as they focus on the nation as a universal social form.

Research shows that the fertility rate in the last fifteen years in the so-called West has been lower among the lower and less educated classes. And that the notion of spoiled liberal women who don't want to have children explains nothing except the (latent) misogyny of those who promote them.

But the popular “demographic alarm” is no longer reserved only for richer and more developed countries. According to an extensive study by John Burn-Murdoch in the Financial Times, in as many as two-thirds of the countries in the world the fertility rate is below the “replacement rate”. The sheer number of countries clearly suggests that there are significant differences in levels of development and cultures among them.

The research shows that a steady “pace” of fertility decline, regardless of previous differences, has been occurring for approximately the last fifteen years. More significant differences in fertility rates can be observed only in sub-Saharan African countries, but even there the rate recently predicted has not been maintained.

As Murdoch, but also other researchers such as Alice Evans from Stanford University, note, based on the data collected and surveys conducted, the usual explanations that attribute the decline in fertility to the ideological carelessness and political luxury of the urban middle classes and the proverbial woman choosing a dog "instead of" a child are quite wrong.

Research shows that the fertility rate in the so-called West during this period is lower among the lower and less educated classes. And that the notion of spoiled liberal women who don't want to have children explains nothing except the (latent) misogyny of those who promote them.

New trends are once again challenging the theories of demographic transition that have been prevalent throughout the past century. Simply put, it was a theory according to which societies, in accordance with economic development, go through phases of high fertility and birth rates to those low at the “replacement rate” level. Behind this theory stood a more general one about the modernization and convergence of all countries of the world towards liberal-capitalist ones.

This story failed, but no convincing theory emerged that could explain similar trends in such different economies and cultures. Theories about the "great exchange," the woman with the dog or cats, and the universal historical trajectory are often, in addition to ideological sediments, symptoms of the lack of more coherent theories of contemporary social movements.

Among researchers such as the aforementioned Murdoch and Evans, a draft theory has emerged that could serve as a starting point. Namely, there should be something that links the Nordic countries and the poorer Asian and South American ones when it comes to the social circumstances of lower fertility rates. Especially since it is obvious that these social circumstances cannot be reduced to economics: various incentives and stimuli such as accessible and efficient social services and housing can somewhat “fix” the rates, but their lack of “full” effectiveness suggests that economic and social measures are not enough.

What has been observed as a common denominator among countries that are fundamentally incompatible is the decreasing number of couples. So, it is not a question of an increasing number of couples who do not want to have children, but of an increasing number of men and women who do not want to or cannot find a long-term partner. The reasons and forms of single life vary, of course, between countries, but the statistical indicators are sufficiently indicative.

In more conservative countries, Evans states, gender segregation remained quite pronounced, but the kinship networks of arranged marriages weakened, resulting in a rather unique situation: gender segregation combined with the principled selection of partners based on emotional compatibility.

Therefore, the degrees of women's autonomy vary, which certainly explains part of the lower number of long-term relationships. Namely, more pronounced economic independence and weaker cultural pressures give an increasing number of women the opportunity to be guided by somewhat higher criteria when choosing a partner.

But there has to be something more. It sounds banal, but it's getting easier to be alone. Not necessarily emotionally, but just in terms of spending time. The level of, as Evans says, personalized, has grown dramatically. online entertainment. From your room you can enjoy and participate in intimate and parasocial activities: binge-watching series, watching sports, playing video games, communicating in chat groups, listen to podcasts, order food, hold meetings, and gamble.

A much lower level of social effort is required for accessible content. This increases the attractiveness of single life, but also leads to the loss of skills for developing community and intimate connections. The technological availability of such content does not fundamentally care about differences in the previous levels of industrial and economic development of individual countries. Hence the prevalence of the same symptoms in extremely different countries.

Personalized online The fun and the increasing attractiveness of single life are merely a correlation with the latest fertility trends. And they cannot be the main or only explanatory factor. But they should certainly be taken into account before ideas about what women should do or how much other races threaten us. Because this is not demographics, however we understand it, but chauvinism.