In the history of Croatian-Serbian relations, it is difficult to find a phenomenon that has gone from media fascination to complete moral sobering in such a short time as the so-called Porfirije circles. Between 2014 and 2021, while the current Patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church, Porfirije, was the Metropolitan of Zagreb and Ljubljana, his Zagreb salons turned into an informal social parliament. The participants of these circles were politicians, university professors, theologians, journalists and artists. Among them, Ivo Josipović, Milorad Pupovac, Anna Gruenfelder, Tvrtko Barun, Moše Prelević, Vili Matula, Tvrtko Jakovina, Hrvoje Klasić, Dejan Jović, Drago Pilsel, Vlatko Silobrčić, Peter Kuzmič, Don Anton Šuljić and others are most often mentioned. At that stage, Porfirije had the image of a rock'n'roll metropolitan who listens to Azra and gathers liberals. He was a peacemaker and bridge builder, a man of dialogue, a modern theologian and cosmopolitan, a friend who won the hearts and souls of many intellectuals in Croatia. This reputation secured him immense support in key Croatian media. Anyone who doubted his intentions was labeled a right-winger and nationalist. The crowning glory of the idyll was the book “Zagreb and I Love Each Other Publicly”.
This picture changes dramatically after Porfiry's election as Patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church. He then takes off the mask of dialogue and begins to implement a far from peaceful state and church policy, which is especially evident in Montenegro. In April 2025, in Moscow, he shows himself as a condescending church vassal who openly offers himself to Vladimir Putin as an operative for the future "Russian world" in the Balkans. The complete collapse of the myth occurred in recent days when he led the drunken war criminal Ratko Mladić. Sociologist Dražen Lalić summed up this shocking contrast with the sentence: "Porfiry hid in Zagreb under a lambskin that hid his Chetnik fangs."
What was the real purpose of the Porphyry Circles and how can this phenomenon be explained today? The answers are offered by scientific works that analyze how the Serbian Orthodox Church acts as a political actor and an instrument of state policy in the Balkans. Harun Karčić’s study “The Not-So-Soft Power of Faith”, published in 2023 as part of the “Geopolitics of Religious Soft Power” project by Georgetown University and the US Institute of Peace, analyzes the Serbian Orthodox Church as a key geopolitical actor and an extended arm of Belgrade’s state policy in the Western Balkans. The goal is to homogenize the region and promote the concept of a “Serbian world”. He distinguishes between two models of action. In countries with a large Serbian majority, such as Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Serbian Orthodox Church uses more aggressive methods – from street marches to direct political pressure – and applies the soft model where it does not have political or demographic power. Thus, in Croatia, it uses cultural diplomacy, ecumenism and intellectual enlightenment.
The mechanism of cooperation between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Serbian state leadership in foreign policy is also revealed in the work of Dr. Miloš Todorović, “Orthodoxy in Diplomacy: An Overview of the Serbian Orthodox Church's Religious Diplomacy and Role in International Relations”, published in 2024. Todorović dispels the misconception about the separation of the church from politics and describes the strong ties between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the state in achieving foreign policy goals. This partnership was particularly pronounced after Vučić's SNS came to power in 2012, with the state generously paying for the Serbian Orthodox Church's projects. Todorović also explains the role of religious leaders in “Track II diplomacy” – second-track diplomacy, which indirectly strengthens the diplomatic positions of the state through informal contacts, interfaith dialogue and public action.
It is in this light that we should view Porfiry's circles. The Porfirians were a textbook example of a soft model of action. The "modern metropolitan", who was part of a system with a solid Belgrade hinterland, created an influential circle of public defenders and thus repaired the damaged image of the Serbian Orthodox Church from the 1990s. Any questioning of his role was declared right-wing radicalism, nationalism and religious intolerance. The Porfirians, therefore, were the media shield of the Serbian Orthodox Church. This does not mean that they were paid propagandists, but their social role was real. Probably completely unintentionally, they acted as Porfiry's informal ambassadors and a kind of PR. They helped separate Porfiry from the heavy historical burden of the institution he represented. He became "ours" - a man with whom it is pleasant to have dinner and whom people trust. His personal reputation became a bridge to the Serbian Orthodox Church, which in Croatia bore the stigma of Greater Serbia politics. Believing that they represent an exceptional individual to Croatian society, they inadvertently made acceptable a man who implements the rigid national program of the state of Serbia.
The dramatic epilogue shows that the Zagreb circle of Porphyrians was deeply mistaken. They sincerely believed that historical and national traumas could be overcome through personal friendship with a charismatic individual. In doing so, they lost sight of the fact that the Serbian Orthodox Church functions as a key pillar of the Serbian state and national ideology, and that Porphyry, as the head of the church, is a faithful implementer of this policy. Porphyry in Zagreb and Porphyry in Belgrade are not two different people, but the same person who, in different contexts, carried out different tasks of his institution. The Porphyrians, therefore, allowed themselves to be instrumentalized in order to smooth the image of an institution that had never changed its strategic goals.
Therefore, the present-day disappointment of the salon left cannot be explained by the fact that one man suddenly betrayed his friends. Porfiry's circles show that the modern "Serbian world" is not built only by political and military force, but also by ecumenism, intellectual contacts and other informal channels. And the doors to this hegemonic ideology are sometimes opened, often without any bad intention, by those who believe that they are building bridges.
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