When Donald Trump - a politician whose election campaign legitimized and promoted white supremacist discourses, and used the rhetoric of protectionism, xenophobia, sexism and racism - won the US presidential election, many Americans were shocked because they were convinced that this was the outcome of the election. impossible.
The inability of the champions of the American Democratic Party to recognize clear signals of a change in political course was partly due to the fact that they lived in a liberal soap bubble that had fewer and fewer points of contact with real life. Furthermore, they self-sufficiently listened to the media echoes of their own fantasies that melodiously bounced off the walls of that bubble. In addition to this, absolute faith in the incorruptibility of America and its institutions contributed to their confusion and post-election shock.
In the Balkans, however, Trump's victory was celebrated by many. Balkan opposition politicians and populists were intoxicated by his rhetoric, so the defeat of the democratic candidate was interpreted as an indication that the local political situation, domains of influence and post-Yugoslav and post-Dayton borders might change. Trump's self-projection as an anti-establishment candidate was music to the ears of local and regional leaders, and they were not interested in any deeper analysis of the substance of his rhetoric and policies.
The Balkan vision of Trump was, in part, formed as a product of decades of frustration with American policy in the region, which, as we well know, supported dictators and autocrats. On the other hand, the election and post-election political romance between Trump and VV Putin fuels hopes that a new redistribution of spheres of interest is being prepared in which it might be possible to make up for what was not won by the wars of the 1990s.
Although it is a legitimate local visa (it is as legitimate as it is local), it is important to say that, in addition to the mentioned frustration, it is also an indicator of boundless opportunism. Time will, however, show whether this opportunism had some foundation. However, since I believe that Trump's election victory does not represent a step forward in democratic development, I want to recall some of the characteristics of the ideological model and political rhetoric of the new US president, as well as the American and international corporate structures of which he is a candidate.
Trump's victory serves as a sobering reminder that history is not linear and necessarily progressive, and that the experiences of the past do not always lead to better solutions in the future. Four years before he was elected president, Barack Obama gave a speech at the Democratic National Convention. That speech ignited a spark of popular hope for a post-racial era in America. The shift from Obama to Trump's presidency shows that social justice can be marginalized when those who call themselves white prioritize their own needs at the expense of the needs of others.
Trump's victory is a lesson that the proverbial long line of the moral universe that eventually touches justice can be very long indeed. (I had hoped in vain that, after twenty years of efforts to achieve justice for the victims of the wars of the 1990s, Balkan politicians would recognize the value of at least this lesson.) Trump's entry into the White House and activities during the first weeks of his presidency have shaken the foundations of the US and made it clear that are long-lasting and deep inequalities in that society of a structural nature, and that democratic institutions are not inherently moral.
Those who think that nothing similar has ever appeared on the political and public scene are wrong. Trump's coming to power is only the freshest example of a global phenomenon: populism as the final product of problematic relations between democracy and capitalism.
Populism functions as an unconscious symbolic structure of the political. In that spectrum, which varies from discursive elements to active mobilizations, it has many forms. Populism draws its basic energy from binary opposition and the quasi-structured way in which groups are formed: us/them; friend/enemy, and most significantly, people/power. It is important to remember that populism is a discourse that separates people from the structures in power and mobilizes them through the "unification" of their democratic demands. Unfortunately for us, this discourse was clearly manifested in the Balkans more than once.
Historians and political scientists have recorded the first examples of populism in Russia and America: the Narodnichesto movement from the mid-1890th century and the American People's Party from XNUMX. The Narodnichestos were intellectuals who enthusiastically projected values associated with the rural population. The People's Party was made up of farmers from the American South who reacted to the difficult working and living conditions, and were connected to big business and the elite. It should be noted that similar political organizations (former and current) can be recognized in Montenegro as well. In addition to the Russian and American examples from the end of the XNUMXth century, there were and still are numerous Latin American populists. Trump's victory has actualized comparisons between his attitudes and worldview, and populist politicians from Europe and Latin America.
What line of comparison is that? It is, among other things, an ideological transversal that connects the Italian fascist dictator Benito Mussolini and the Argentine populist and fascist Juan Peron. It should be remembered that populism arose in the process of modernization by combining elements of authoritarianism and democracy, instead of creating formal institutional structures. With Trump's victory, the classic image of a populist leader from the middle of the XNUMXth century (caudillo) who gives simple but fiery speeches, rewards the loyalty of his followers, creates multi-class coalitions, mobilizes large groups that are not corporatized, turns his back on an economy that relies on imports, and projects many elements of fascism, becomes relevant again. It is right, therefore, that the new American president and what he represents have also earned their own 'ism': Trumpism.
Before the emergence of Trumpism, analysts and scholars did not necessarily connect American populism with the dilemmas of modernization in Latin America. Instead, they associated him with a rich tradition of anti-elitism and occasional conspiratorial rhetoric. Richard Hofstadter called it "the paranoid style of American politics." If we compare Trump with other American politicians who are considered populists, we can say that he simultaneously projects the fascism of the Catholic priest Carls Kohlin, the impulsiveness and appetite for conspiracy of Joseph McCarthy and the model of government as a profitable business advocated by Ross Perot.
Although aspects of nationalism, isolationism and xenophobia have always been present in the tradition of American populist rhetoric, Trumpism translates these discursive elements into political decisions and practice in a manner reminiscent of right-wing parties in Europe. In the Netherlands, Geert Wilders has a similar haircut and a similar stance on Muslims, while in Italy we have Silvio Berlusconi as a point of comparison with Trump. The marriage between populism and neoliberalism was formalized and consolidated during the late 1980s and early 1990s across Europe and South America. Peru's Alberto Fujimori - populist and criminal in a designer suit, and his anti-corporate politics - is also a suitable figure for comparison.
A logical question arises, what is new in Trumpism? To begin with, we have the American president as an empirical type who manifests all three regional definitions of populism on a daily basis. Trump's rhetoric and official actions are aimed primarily at his white voters, and the effect of his actions is enhanced by his anti-immigration views. That is why he succeeded in mobilizing a large non-corporatized sector in the traditional industrial part of America. Trump also managed to form a (white) multi-class coalition.
Populists in power are known for their centralized and personalized model of charismatic leadership. Like the Balkan autocrats (such as, for example, Milo Đukanović) who have been supporting American administrations for decades, Trump is doing all he can to undermine the institutions of the system he presides over. How is it possible that such actions of his are welcomed by politicians who have been rightfully punishing the local autocrat for the same activity for years at home?!
In any case, the man who represents a combination of the most severe scum of right-wing and left-wing populism now has control over all three branches of government of the world's greatest power (Congress, Senate and the White House). There is no reason to expect anything from Trump, except further centralization and personalization of government mechanisms. There is also no reason to believe that he and his administration would change any of their fellow Balkan autocrats, especially if they are significantly financially savvy. It is more likely that they are already on the waiting list for the exclusive Davos club of billionaires.
Many, like Vladimir V. Putin, Rafael Cora, and Slavoj Žižek, wanted Americans to vote for Trump in order to realize their perverse Trotskyist fantasy of destabilizing the American empire and global capitalism.
However, now Exxon Mobil heads the State Department, and Goldman Sachs and Silicon Valley billionaires hold important positions in Trump's cabinet. Those government institutions and agencies whose activities have come into conflict with big capital - from the environment to the public health service - are now facing budget cuts and program cuts. It is becoming clear that since the beginning of Trump's presidency, business and politics have begun to operate in a much more coordinated way than was the case during the Eisenhower and Reagan administrations combined.
Although they are loud in praising Trump as a "man of the people" who will drain the proverbial swamp in Washington (!) and end the dominance of speculative capital over politics (!), one gets the impression that the fact that, according to Naomi, is quite acceptable for Balkan politicians Klein, a "corporate coup d'état" took place in America. American plutocrats who have more in common with Putin's oligarchs and other members of the aforementioned club from Davos than with their own fellow citizens came to power. It is no coincidence that one of the richest people in the world, Kalros Slim Helu, offered to negotiate with Trump on behalf of Mexico. Although it is disappointing, it is somewhat understandable because the combination of business and politics has long been one of the basic characteristics of the Balkans.
University of Alberta, Canada
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