The story of the main "sinner" obscures the real culprits

The researcher's great effort should be praised. But also bring it under serious scientific doubt. All the more so since valid archival material on "left errors" is very scarce or non-existent

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Đilas, Photo: Printscreen/YouTube/TV Vijesti
Đilas, Photo: Printscreen/YouTube/TV Vijesti
Disclaimer: The translations are mostly done through AI translator and might not be 100% accurate.

Regardless of whether it is written about "leftist" or "rightist mistakes" that happened in the Second World War in Montenegro - but also much more widely in the territory of Yugoslavia - a researcher cannot, nor should, run away from his ideology. On the contrary. History is a struggle to measure the power of one's idea (ideology) and its politics against the power of another idea and its politics, i.e. practices.

All in all, the political struggle for the consciousness of ideas (ideology) is actually a struggle for political power and the appearance of the type of society in the future. (That is why with the idea and its "truth" that is imposed and often subverted in society, one must be very careful and extremely socially responsible.)

At the same time, every way (method) of individual interpretation of the truth or, more precisely, the conceptual "protractor" of each researcher to the root of any war event - and thus to the war crime - is always obscured. Often cramped, narrowed and partial. Often fake.

That everything is more complicated when it comes to "left mistakes" and more dangerous for people in the Montenegrin "revolutionary war" (M. Djilas), it is also the fact that any emerging, new consciousness and possible power that grows out of that consciousness, on the one hand, as well as the defense of the power of the "old" consciousness, acquire terrifying and unfortunately inhuman proportions in Montenegro. This is clearly seen in the "left" and "right" errors in Montenegro. It is not surprising that a great poet rightly observed that everything that comes to Montenegro as new and different from the traditional one - brings evil ("Perke?! Perke mi je Boga mi, here I am a wise man").

And yet, Montenegro is not an exception. On the contrary. Many traditional societies are full of friction and conflict between old and new social relations in the struggle for power. More or less all revolutions are like that or very similar.

The pathos of the Montenegrin past should be added to revenges, the Montenegrin agony, neighborly and fraternal inherited quarrels and revenges, etc. which collectively and singularly in the environment of war easily emerge on the surface and gain a wide momentum of evil in evil.

Therefore, it is always healing to study literature Mihailo Lalic. He is by far the greatest and most subtle researcher and connoisseur of the depth and breadth of Montenegrin metaphysics of group and individual evils and revenge. Lalić clearly states that evil knows how to wrap and hide in some ideological framework and even after death it knows how to live and create new evil. Similar to some Shakespeare's dead heroes.

Ideological and other divisions

Recently, the book "Lejeve žureta" (Podgorica, 2023, p. 497, hardcover) by a publicist and journalist was published in our country. Buda Simonović. The theme of the book is the "left mistakes" that happened in Montenegro at the beginning of the Thirteenth of July Uprising in 1941.

A few very brief observations about the book.

First of all, the title of the book itself is quite pretentious. Because the "left's mistakes" extended throughout the war not only in Montenegro but also throughout Yugoslavia. They culminated immediately after the end of the war and the capitulation of Germany. At the same time, it is important to emphasize that every murder in the war, as it was in and outside of Montenegro, was not a "left-wing mistake" made by the partisans. (Just as, after all, the "right-wing mistakes" made by the Chetniks do not have that warlike nature either.) This is important to note, because few in our country have studied these "mistakes" in a strictly legal and professional manner.

Because the nature of the war in Montenegro and throughout Yugoslavia was guerrilla, which means several wars in one war. (It was not known who was beating and killing whom: Ustasha Chetniks, occupying partisans and collaborators, Ustasha Serbs, Jews and Roma, occupying Chetniks from the beginning of the war, Chetnik ballisticians and partisans, etc.) Only at the end of the war (the Srem Front or the liberation of certain cities such as Belgrade , for example) it is mainly a frontal war. And in that kind of war or type of war, there are no "mistakes" or they are negligible.

At the beginning of the war, the uprising in Montenegro had a national character, which the author rightly states. The strength and breadth of the uprising was such that almost all of Montenegro was quickly liberated, with the exception of five major cities.

A little later, ideological and other divisions among the insurgents came to the fore. It is obvious that, from the beginning, both insurgent "consciousness" were afraid of the outbreak of the so-called civil war. (Although, for the sake of precision, the Montenegrin "civil war" was more like a war of feuding peasant-tribal and fraternal groups and individuals against each other - and some of the insurgents against the occupiers - than a civil war in the European sense of the word, as the war is "defined" by the history of France revolution of 1848.)

Contrary to the excessive breadth of the book's title, the author's interpretation of the beginning of the "civil war" in Montenegro is overly narrow and exclusive. Namely, the author lightly claims that the revolutionaries are primarily to blame for the "left's mistakes". communists (p. 40). It is a fairly widespread narrative among many authors of "right-wing" pubic studies and historiography who deal with the roots of "left-wing mistakes".

In this sense, the author quotes a part of the letter Moša Pijade addressed to his pre-war intimate Josip Broz about the reasons for the expansion and success of the Chetniks in Montenegro. Here we note that Moša Pijada was an "outsider" who escaped to Montenegro the "day" before the war. Well, in a way, he was also a communist, a war deserter. Even if very sharp and warlike, Moše Pijada did not know the character of Montenegrin society, so his war reports (letters) to Tito can be considered less or even not at all reliable. (His "left" radicalism is very well known in the Durmitor, Zabljak area, where he spent part of the beginning of the war.)

However, when it comes to the main culprit for the "left's mistakes", it would rather be said that these war crimes went hand in hand, both on the left and on the right side of the insurgents. Mistakes trace their "class", national and other roots back to pre-war times. Whether it is about the awareness of the new revolutionary-ideological time that brought the 20th century, on the one hand, or the defense of the traditional values ​​of Montenegrin society, i.e. defense of the pre-war government, on the other hand.

On the third hand, the Italian occupier fueled the "civil war" in Montenegro to a large extent. The occupier found in the Chetniks his extended hand and his interest, which the author also notes. Also, the occupier found his collaborators in the "left side" of the insurgents who left the uprising, became collaborators of the occupier, spied for the occupier, appeared as fifth columnists, etc. In any war, such "mistakes" are not forgiven. Even intra-ideological and party factionalism is not forgiven. Ideological monolithicity (Bolshevism, even Stalinism) was necessary to win the war.

In other words, it was difficult to avoid a "civil war" in Montenegro from both opposing sides. He was "logical".

"Right" - the traditional approach

Another feature of the book is important. It is a way of research that is "right" traditional. This methodology is more or less known in our country. It is present on almost all pages of the book in question. In this sense, the researcher's great effort should be praised. But also bring it under serious scientific doubt. All the more so since valid archival material on "left errors" is very scarce or non-existent. It is often based on less reliable, stereotypical, and even unreliable testimonies of witnesses, ideological assumptions and the like. Normally, there are very reliable and high-quality witnesses from both warring sides.

The angle of selection of these witnesses depends on the ideological approach of each researcher and his goal.

Considering the complexity of the topic of "left error" - as well as "right error" of course - the most necessary are the opinions and views of a lawyer, a specialist in the law of war. Because every war killing, to repeat, is not a "left" or "right" mistake in guerrilla warfare. Many factors influence the legal interpretation of a "mistake" and the truth in that "mistake".

Let's remember that the Nuremberg process itself, i.e. the international military court (November 20, 1945 to October 1, 1946) struggled with the legal proof of obvious war criminals and their crimes both vertically and horizontally in the ruling structure of fascist Germany.

We would like to say that in Montenegro, few people, or rather no one, has dealt with the legal scientific methodology of "left" or "right" mistakes. Therefore, when writing about "left errors", a sophisticated, expert institutional and multifunctional approach is needed in the study of this topic. Primarily lawyers. But also other experts in order to get closer to the truth and bring punishment. We don't have all this.

When the book is read from an individual point of view, the point of view of the individual, most if not almost all reflections in the book deserve a deeper and more sophisticated attention when Milovan Djilas concerned. Because M.Đ. he was not in Montenegro during the months-long culmination of "left mistakes" during November, December 1941 and January, February, until mid-March 1942. This is what the author emphasizes.

Đilas was just returned to Montenegro for the second time by the Supreme Staff (March 15, 1942) to deal with the disastrous consequences of "leftism" by the NOB during Ivan Milutinović suppress and "save what can be saved". It is logical to ask why M.Đ was sent back to Montenegro for the second time if he had already initiated and spread "left errors".

Obviously, during the absence of Milovan Đilas from Montenegro, the Montenegrin athlete received his five minutes of "fame". (The author clearly observes the acceleration and spread of "left errors" after the Battle of Pljeval from the beginning of December 1941.)

In this regard, the crucial book of the almost diary-based war activities of Milovan Đilas at the beginning of the Thirteenth of July Uprising, authored by Miloš Mido Milikić ("The War Paths of Milovan Đilas") - and not only this book - brings into serious doubt and inaccuracy numerous narratives, "facts", memoirs, statements of certain "right-wing" historians and the like, opponents of the NOB and the anti-fascist revolution, when Milovan Đilas in question. According to that very wide "literature", the biggest and even the leading leftist "sinner" of the NOB is M. Đilas.

However, the real "explosion" of these narratives came only when M.Đ. fell from power in 1954 and a little later. And it is known that Milovan Đilas admitted only those "left mistakes" attributed to him - while he was in power. The others don't.

Let's conclude.

From all that has been said, many more conclusions could be drawn from the evil wartime "left-wing" or "right-wing" in Montenegro, which the author presents.

Unlike the book - and not running away from the legal court of history - today, exclusively self-critical analysis of its "leftist sinners" is the only medicine that could guide Montenegrin society towards mental and psychological healing from the traumas of the past. But also the excess of history that we have more than is necessary and necessary.

The same self-critical methodology can be used by right-wingers in their "right-wing" mistakes.

This is not a novelty. On the contrary. The experience of the democratic and liberal world clearly shows that only self-criticism can guide Montenegrin society towards a better and more normal future. The experience of fascist Germany after the Second World War. war is an example of how quickly - in about 30 years - we too can create our own "Willy Brant" with a new, higher culture and recognition of our "left" or "right" ugly face. And to create at least one "Willy Brant". It's a long process. But it is necessary and must not be skipped, if we want to be part of a successful and even normal human civilization.

Any other methodology that uses looking at the opponent "through the fly" easily ignites a new wart and leads to bleeding of unhealed wounds.

Therefore, we emphasize the statement of the author of the book, Mr. Simonović, who quotes Mihail Lalić regarding the mistakes of the left and the right in our country, that - "in such a life-and-death conflict, where the needs of both sides raised people against each other, awakened hatred, prejudice, malice, arrogance and stupidity - hardly anyone was left without guilt, but also without some kind of justification" (p. 483)

Gens una Summus.

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