A ticking time bomb in the foundations of the state

For years, Montenegro has been living its state life between two ethno-political extremes. One nationalist extreme - Serbian, clearly recognizes itself as such, due to undoubtedly larger dimensions and a longer tradition, but also due to much broader (cross-border) ambitions.

Montenegrin nationalism and Montenegrin nationalists do not recognize themselves in that way, believing that the only criteria for the existence of nationalism are: expansionist policy towards neighbors, war crimes, mass graves...

If you even notice the outlines of Montenegrin nationalism, they perceive it as defensive and justify it by saying that it does not pose a danger to any country in the surrounding area. What does not seem to reach the brain, and most often because it is stuck in the pocket, is the fact that such and such nationalism represents a time bomb in the foundations of the state of Montenegro, above all in the context of building its civic essence. Comparing Montenegrin with other recognizable nationalisms in the region, the sociologist Bojan Baca he also characterized it as "asymptomatic nationalism": a nationalism that produces all the political consequences of other nationalisms, although it lacks all their visible features.

By analyzing the ideas and statements of the public bearers of the Montenegrin nationalist narrative, it is easy to see that, unfortunately, Montenegrin nationalism has left its defensive positions, which it was in during the nineties of the last century, with the aim of resisting the onslaught of Great Serbian nationalism and militarism, and in the meantime has gone so far to the right that he sometimes flirts with fascist and cultural-chauvinist ideas. The author of this analysis wrote back in 2012 that this turnaround did not happen only in the last few years, but that there were serious indications of movement in that direction even before.

Service arranges between

The foundation stone of that, let's call it for this purpose a belvedere narrative, was laid at the so-called Patriotic Rally, organized at the beginning of September 2020 in Podgorica.

Associate at the Faculty of Political Sciences dr Nemanja Batrićević then called the officials of the Civil Movement URA by name and standardized the terminology "betrayal" and "traitors" as the essence of the aforementioned narrative. The key message of his statement was that "Montenegros and civil-oriented Serbs" stand with the minority peoples. The coin "Civil-oriented Serbs" reminded irresistibly of the nationalist construction of the time Slobodan Milosevic about "honest Albanians". Just as for Milošević's Greater Serbian nationalist hysteria, Albanians are mostly dishonest people, so for the new Montenegrin nationalist narrative, Serbs are mostly nationalists. For the same narrative, it is unthinkable that there are Montenegrins who are nationalists, which again goes back to the initial premise that Montenegrin nationalism does not recognize itself as nationalism.

The writer figures as the paterfamilias of the circle of people who nurture this narrative in public appearances and statements Milorad Popovic. Except that he is no stranger to being a guest in the neo-Ustasha show "Bujica" by the controversial Velimir Bujanec, or to label people because of their possible non-Montenegrin origin, alluding (with a strong whiff of orientalism) that they come "from some southern Serbian village around Kraljevo", recently attracted public attention and accusations against representatives of the Albanian minority Nika Đeljošaj that he is "Serbian Kadyrov". This thesis coincides with the thesis of the associate at the Faculty of Montenegrin Language and Literature, dr Alexander Radoman who at the end of 2020 presented his own "typology of Chetniks" in his author's text, where he included GP URA, certain non-governmental organizations, and even some members of minority nations as special types of Chetniks.

The striking fist of the Belvedere narrative remains the already mentioned Nemanja Batrićević, who, on the eve of his enthronement, wrote in his column:

"For us who will be in Cetinje on September 5, the matter is simple. On that day, the enemy is coming to Cetinje."

Additionally, he emphasizes the cultural superiority of Montenegrins in relation to eternal otherness:

"The organizers of the Svetosava spectacle refuse to enthrone the citizen Mićović in the architectural kitsch of the temple in Podgorica. The place for that ceremony is in the building whose exterior so clearly signals the difference between Montenegrin and Serbian culture."

Furthermore, in his May speech at the Belvedere, local-exclusivism was evident:

"The one to whom Cetinje closes its doors cannot rule Montenegro."

The question arises, why in Batrićević's vision should Cetinje be more important for modern Montenegro than any other Montenegrin city, say Ulcinj, Bar, Herceg Novi, Rožaj, Beran or Nikšić?

Nemanja Batrićević is also recognized by the public as someone who criticizes the insufficient national homogeneity within the personnel structure of the DPS:

"It seems to me that the local elections held in December showed that the 'nervous system' of the DPS is excessively decentralized. What do I mean by that? In Cetinje, the candidates for councilors proudly point out that they were at Belvedere, while in Mojkovac the list holder is participant of the liturgy. In Podgorica, the mayor launched an initiative to allocate land to the Montenegrin Orthodox Church, and in Žabljak their councilors supported the initiative to build a church of the Church of Serbia. I don't think I need to go any further than this."

In this way, it calls for the nationalist ghettoization of the Montenegrin identity, sending indirect messages that Montenegrins cannot be considered those who participated in litias or are believers of the SPC, which is perfectly connected to Đukanovićevo a question from the time of protest litias, which will turn out to be out of touch with political reality:

"What will we do with the 43% of Montenegrins who do not participate in the litias?", he wanted to say that he who protests against the Law on Freedom of Religion cannot be considered a Montenegrin.

Batrićević also presents a thesis that is identical to the thesis of Serbian nationalists that Orthodox religious communities are national institutions.

"However, regardless of its current status, the CPC is an inseparable part of the national being of all of us, and we must treat it as such", announced Batrićević, irresistibly reminding us of Andrija Mandić and his thesis that the SPC is the most important national institution of the Serbian people.

The question arises whether, at least privately, Batrićević criticized the head of the DPS, after baptizing his grandson with the patriarch of Constantinople, instead of "an inseparable part of the national being of all of us". Because we know that it is not public.

One author from the same group even admits that there is an ideological shift of Montenegrins to the right and explains this by saying that "Montenegroes are being excluded from government structures because they are Montenegrins. Because the Montenegrin language, the sovereignist intellectuals, the CPC, simply are being attacked more and more people are being led to the right, because they believe that it is necessary to respond to it with more radical solutions. However, this is defensive nationalism."

This idea and message essentially gives legitimacy to anyone who in the past or in the future (will) feel "threatened" to reach for nationalism. And thus his alleged defensiveness is exposed as a cynical wink: aggression is unjustified on the outside, but necessary on the inside.

The mentioned circle of people showed their concerted action even before August 30, especially since Milorad Popović did not pass the election for academician of CANU, after which synchronized columnist attacks on the president of the state academy began. Dragan Vukčević.

Some individuals from this circle are also members of DANU, but there were no condemnations or even fences in relation to the national-chauvinist texts of their colleague from DANU. Miodrag Drago Bajković, published by the obscure portal Aktuelno.me.

Conspirators from international circles

The creators of this narrative often resort to explaining events that do not go their way with an alleged conspiracy by foreign embassies and Western diplomats against Montenegro. In several texts, representatives of the European Union, the USA, and Great Britain are designated as anti-state elements, which makes this narrative complementary to the one promoted by Serbian nationalists, who equally blame the American "deep state" and Western embassies for all their misfortunes and the "anti-Serbian conspiracy". Both nationalisms have in common that they are unable to admit that they were defeated by the despised "other side", so failures are always justified by some international conspiracies of the "power center".

Many elements that are present today in the Montenegrin nationalist narrative, before August 30, could mostly be found only in the epistles and announcements of the Montenegrin Orthodox Church, the Montenegrin Cultural Network or DANU, but due to their limited political usefulness, almost no one looked back on them. Today, in the promotion of this narrative, the former "grey zone" of Montenegrin intellectuals, activists and experts who until the fall of the DPS were mostly mild critics of the regime, and after that they began to poison the public discourse with extremely radical observations and theses, making right-wing and nationalist manner of public speech and address acceptable. Thus, the public discourse routinely entered the mention of the "bloody feast", the conflict in Montenegro, and worryingly threatening warnings about civil war also came from the DPS presidency.

"I expect so Abazovic every time he goes to Cetinje, he will be welcomed and sent off like on May 9," wrote another associate of FCJK Stefan Todorovic, inviting (un)conscious verbal and physical violence.

Previously, such messages were most often sent by the leaders of the Democratic Front, threatening civil war and unearthing weapons.

Narrative characteristics

This narrative is characterized by recognizable and specific terminology, such as the name "Church of Serbia" for the Serbian Orthodox Church. The mentioned expression is used purposefully and is obviously agreed and coordinated on several levels, so it is most often treated as a sign of recognition of public officials who work on the same and agreed political agenda. Brothers in nationalism "on the other side" followed up on this discrediting term. After recognizing the canonical status of the Macedonian Orthodox Church, the Ecumenical Patriarchate itself was given the name - the Church of Turkey - in the "pro-Serbian" political tabloids.

Both sides are decorated with similar creativity in searching for national heroes, most often printed on T-shirts. While the former most often use the figure of a quisling Krsta Zrnov Popović, others in the same way glorify numerous Chetnik collaborators of the occupiers.

Through some texts, the earlier abuse of state resources by the DPS, for the national cause, is indirectly legitimized and lamented: "By losing control over state resources, the sovereignist bloc is mostly forced to finance from within - or from what the parties of this orientation they receive from the state budget or from Montenegrin businessmen and entrepreneurs and the Montenegrin diaspora."

Some texts also use homophobic constructions and comments about the physical appearance of dissenters. This is how we witness the expressions: "whispering from the closet" and "instead of driving out", then calling people "curly dzhilkosh" and stating that someone is "squeezed between the will for power and the lack of constitution to carry it".

In a similar way, he is a Belgrade professor Nikola Samardzic, in an interview on Gradska TV, expressed a distilled nationalist and racist astonishment at the height of the Montenegrin prime minister: "I can't believe... Such people, Montenegrins, suffer THAT."

This shows that the essence of all nationalism is hatred for others, which ends in the general persecution of all otherness.

Distribution of narratives

This narrative, without any reaction from media associations or institutions, is distributed through media from the same media group or with close editorial policies. In the past, it was necessary to import tabloids from Serbia in order to conduct brutal campaigns against dissidents, and now a large number of media outlets routinely and without any professional and civil responsibility publish unsigned statements of alleged groups of citizens. Therefore, the public is presented with the addresses of entire alleged groups, without any closer definition - personal or collective, without basic information about who made the said announcement and in what way, while almost all announcements of this type furiously call for violence and invoke civil conflicts . In those announcements, the expressions used by the public bearers of this narrative are often used. These announcements usually serve as the first harbingers of protest announcements, which are then distributed by political parties, all according to the model of the Patriotic Rally, from the beginning of September 2020 ("we are not calling you, we are informing you, but if you are patriots, you will come!").

What is surprising is the silence of a huge part of the civil public towards violent and fascist elements, as well as the traditionally selective care and condemnation of verbal or physical acts of violence motivated by national or ethnic intolerance.

Romanticizing and idealizing one's own nation

In addition to the radicalization of political circumstances, there are seemingly less serious consequences, but equally nationalistic, such as romanticizing and idealizing one's own nation and history, which most often ends up on the edge of cultural chauvinism.

In this regard, the Montenegrin director is especially leading in his texts Danilo Marunović who says in one of his columns:

"Being a Montenegrin today means saving both Montenegrin and civil values. All other peoples - if you are healthy, except for exceptional individuals, you care as much about 'civilian' as about last year's snow. Sounds radical? That's right."

Marunović is also no stranger to indirectly emphasizing the superiority of Montenegrin culture, again with a strong whiff of orientalism:

"Montenegro, I really feel that way, has never belonged, apart from geographically, to the Balkans. All these (good) Kusturičine we looked at the films, colored with Balkan colors, as if they were some exotic faraway places, not 'domestic' films. Our views have always been somewhere across the sea, and our culture was shaped by the sea."

While in one column he calls Montenegrin nationalism a fabrication, in another he enthusiastically, nationally conscious and elitistly concludes:

"There is no Montenegrin who will ever again give a chance to parties that do not have a clearly profiled national sign! (...) Okay, I will also divide into subtypes of Serbs in one of the future columns, but for now let me just say that my favorites are those with the amount of Serbian in the chest proportional to the amount of personal defeats and failures in life, so Serbia is their justification that their €300 in the state institution, where DPS employed them, lasts until the ninth of the month."

The mentioned text, directed by Marunović, ends by grafting Montenegrin anti-fascists and a quisling in the same sentence:

"For Ljuba Čupića, for Krsto Popović, for Sava Kovačević. For our children and our parents... For ourselves!"

How we got here

How did Montenegro come from emancipatory promises in 2006 to nationalist fears and lies in 2022? Nationalism arises as a result of the weakness of the civic concept, that is, the combination of insincerity and incompetence of the state elites who allegedly stood behind it after 2006. Those elites politically opportunely appropriated emancipatory ideas, and then created an anti-civilizational model of the private state, which reduced the civic concept to platitudes. This is how we got what is called citizenism - fertile ground for nationalism and cultural chauvinism.

The state elites decided on the concept of national exclusivity, reducing the basis for unity within a possible common identity, all with the aim of maintaining the referendum division, and therefore maintaining power, opening up space for additional ethnicization of less numerous peoples and their homogenization due to fear of Serbian nationalism. So everyone else lost - Montenegrins, Serbs, Bosniaks, Albanians, Muslims, Croats, Roma, and the national elite who based their activities on political deals within a loose state framework gained.

Montenegrin nationalism began to develop into its current form at the moment when the Montenegrin identity ceased to be fully inclusive. Awareness of this was not fully crystallized until public opinion polls appeared, which brought surprising findings. Thus, the basic thesis about Serbs as the only "nationalist" collectivity in Montenegro fell into the water when the survey from 2020 showed the following: 64,1% of respondents believe that Montenegro should be defined as a civil state, 21,1% of them would defined as the state of the Montenegrin people and other citizens living in it, 11,3% as the state of the Montenegrin and Serbian people and other peoples living in it, 2,4% as the state of the Serbian people and other citizens living in it, and 1,1, XNUMX% have no opinion on this issue. Therefore, the largest percentage of citizens who do not want Montenegro as a civil state are those with a vision of Montenegro as a state, primarily of the Montenegrin people. This significantly deviates from what was the dominant and long-standing impression among the public, which President Đukanović tried to normalize with statements that almost half of the citizens of Montenegro "worked so passionately against the existence of their own state", and that those citizens "who were against independence they have no moral right to ask for Montenegro's consent to be its representatives".

In this way, the DPS with its satellites and especially the current president of the country contributed to the already mentioned ghettoization of the Montenegrin identity, denying the right of entire political and ethnic groups to feel (and) like Montenegrins. As a reminder, in the same way Serbian identity was ghettoized to a good extent in Montenegro, where there were also a number of criteria for belonging to the Serbian people: being anti-NATO oriented, being a Russophile, being Orthodox and a believer in the SPC, while the status of "integral Serb" " by decree, only "leaders of authentic Serbs" from the Democratic Front could be awarded.

What Montenegrin nationalists don't understand or don't want to understand is that by extremizing identity determinants, most often through the anti-civilizational idea of ​​rounding up identity, they only harm that same identity, which is much more complex than a simple binary division and which has undergone numerous twists and turns, especially in the last 100 years. .

Let's be clear, these public propagators of Montenegrin nationalism are the consequence, not the cause, of the disintegration of the Montenegrin civic substance and are nothing more than politically instrumentalized individuals, who, due to the weakness or lack of interest of the political elites in these issues, managed to impose themselves as the supposed intellectual wings of the new narrative.

Is there anyone left to rebel for me?

Although Montenegrin and Serbian nationalism, in terms of their historical and contemporary activities, cannot be compared, it should be noted that Montenegrin nationalism follows the well-trodden paths of its older brother - Serbian nationalism, often imitating it. And this is happening because DPS did not want to deal with democratization - because nationalist Montenegro "defended" itself from Serbs, and democratic Montenegro would have to defend itself from criminals.

However, this detour hides two key truths. The first is that there is no national collectivity in Montenegro that does not feel threatened, and this has been the case for years. However, this does not give the right to any of those collectivities to behave nationalistically and chauvinistically. Another truth is that neither national Montenegrins nor national Serbs in Montenegro are threatened (only) because of their own identity, but primarily because of their political ineligibility. And so we come again and again to what has been warned about for years - where there is no principle and no rule of law, only temporarily privileged groups are safe, because there are no institutions, free from political influence, that would protect each individual, regardless of his affiliation.

What that principle looked like, but in a more brutal form, was best described by a German pastor Martin Niemeler in his song:

"First they came for the communists, and I didn't rebel, because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews, and I didn't rebel, because I wasn't Jewish. Then they came for the Catholics, and I didn't rebel, because I wasn't Catholic. Then they came for me, and then there was no one left to rebel."