It may happen that in the case of the election of a government under the amended Law on the President, the West will not take any formal steps towards Montenegro, such as breaking off relations and sanctions, but there may be a significant cooling of relations and deterioration of cooperation in many areas, primarily in European integration.
This is what the professor of the Faculty of Political Sciences (FPN) in Podgorica and the former head of Montenegrin diplomacy assessed in an interview with "Vijesta". Srdjan Darmanovic.
He says that the EU envoy's warning about the possibility of interrupting the accession negotiations with Montenegro is currently only a possibility, but that it can become a reality relatively quickly.
"I assume that in the eyes of EU officials, the image of current Montenegro is devastating... I believe that among EU officials, perhaps still cautiously and without any decision, the question has begun to arise - what should we do with such a country? Can a country whose political class is not even able to establish a court dealing with the protection of the Constitution, aspire to become a member of a club such as the EU?", says Darmanović.
Asked what in practice it means to ignore the opinion of the Venice Commission (VK), which challenged the amended Law on the President and recommended that it not be adopted, the interlocutor replied that the VK enjoys a high reputation in the Council of Europe (CoE) and the EU, but that "no country does anything must be based on the opinion" of that institution.
"There are countries that really behave like that and do not follow her recommendations. In America, there is a saying for such behavior 'my way or highway'. It turned out, however, that these are mostly countries that have serious problems with democracy," Darmanović points out.
EU envoys, Slovenian Minister of Foreign Affairs Tanja Fajon and her Austrian colleague Aleksander Schallenberg, threatened Montenegro at the end of December with the possibility of interrupting the accession negotiations if the parliament does not elect the judges of the Constitutional Court by the end of January and thus enable the exit of that institution from the three-and-a-half-month blockade. Are they threatening the EU with an "empty gun" or is the danger of suspension of negotiations real?
I assume that in the eyes of EU officials, the image of current Montenegro is devastating. The country, which is a member of NATO and a candidate for EU membership, is in a political and constitutional crisis from which there is no way out. The political class of the country, which is a member of NATO and a candidate for EU membership, has almost stopped representing citizens and acting in the public interest, but lives and acts only in its own world of endless party combinations and its own interests. I believe that among EU officials, perhaps still cautiously and without any decision, the question began to arise - what should we do with such a country? Can a country whose political class is unable even to establish a court dealing with the protection of the Constitution, any longer aspire to become a member of a club like the EU?
I believe that what you called "threats" is currently moving at approximately this level, that there is no procedure that has been initiated or a decision that has been made. The Slovenian minister and the Austrian minister very likely expressed themselves precisely. It is a "possibility", which, for now, remains only a possibility. But, a possibility that can be turned into reality relatively quickly.
The representatives of the EU warned that the Union will consider cooperation with the government if it is elected under the amended Law on the President, which was challenged by the VC. On a similar background are the messages of the US official Gabriel Escobar, who said that he does not see how his country could work with the government that would be formed in this way, and the envoys of Great Britain and Germany, who pointed out that the "harmful message" should be considered ” which would be sent by that. What consequences would the formation of a government according to the controversial law produce for Montenegro and its international position, and would the West recognize the cabinet thus established?
The facts regarding the Law on Amendments to the Law on the President of Montenegro are inexorable. No amount of political demagoguery or legal equilibria can change them.
Firstly, it is understood that the Constitution of Montenegro can be changed, but only in the procedure prescribed by the Constitution itself and only by a qualified majority in the Assembly, and in some issues even with a mandatory referendum of the citizens.
Secondly, the Constitution, in the case we are talking about here, was changed outside of the procedure that it itself mandates and that by an act of lower legal force - a law. The change was made by a simple, not qualified majority, which is mandatory in the constitutional revision process.
Thirdly, the unblocking mechanism for the allocation of mandates for the composition of the new government, which foresees a new unconstitutional law, is possible as an idea and even as a practice, but only if it is part of the Constitution or if the Constitution foresees that this procedure will be elaborated by law. Neither one nor the other was the case here, which makes the violation of the Constitution obvious.
Fourth, the prime minister who will be elected on the basis of the new law will receive, or has already received, a mandate from a constitutionally unauthorized entity, whether it is the president of the Assembly or the parliamentary majority. By the way, I am not aware that in any country the mandate for the composition of the government is assigned by a group called the "parliamentary majority". Almost always, it is the head of state, and in some very rare cases this authority is given to the speaker of the parliament. However, any of these two cases is regulated by the constitution, not by law.
Fifth, all the ministers elected in the new government, including the prime minister himself, will take an oath to the Constitution of Montenegro, even though they take up this duty in violation of the Constitution, contrary to the Constitution and in violation of the Constitution.
Sixth, the new government will take office despite the strong recommendations of the expert body of the Council of Europe (CoE) - VC not to do so, and Montenegro is a member of CoE and should act in good faith in relation to the organization to which it belongs and in accordance with the rules of the pact sunt servanda.
These are too hard facts for our partners and allies to ignore. What attitude they will take towards all this is a matter of assessing how far they want to go in relation to the new government. It can also happen that there are no formal acts (termination of relations, sanctions, etc.), but that de facto there is a significant cooling in relations and deterioration of cooperation in many areas, primarily in European integration, which is extremely important to us.
Since you are a member of the VK, what does ignoring her opinion mean in practice and what kind of message does it send?
The SC is a very prestigious SE expert body that enjoys a high reputation both in the Council itself and in the EU. Even 12 non-European countries are active members of the Council of Europe and strongly adhere to its findings and opinions. The commission does not force anyone to do anything, nor can it. Her opinions on various issues of building or strengthening democratic institutions are based on the rich European democratic, legal and constitutional heritage, as well as on the valid principles of European and international law and their most important documents.
No country has to do anything based on the opinion of the Supreme Court. There are countries that actually behave like that and do not follow its recommendations. In America, there is a saying "my way or highway" for such behavior. It turned out, however, that these are mostly countries that have serious problems with democracy.
Do you see, as a part of the political actors, in the statements of representatives of the West, such as Escobar's in which he calls on the parliament "not to try to form a new government" according to the disputed law or those that the Democratic Front is not a partner of the USA, which means that it is not wanted in power? meddling in the internal affairs of Montenegro? Where, in your opinion, is the line between permissible partner-allied messages and interference in the affairs of a sovereign state?
In today's world, there are very few fully "sovereign" states. Partnerships and alliances carry with them certain obligations or at least responsibilities. At least so much so that your partners and allies have the right to express their opinion and coordinate their policies, if they think that you, as a member of a joint organization, question some common fundamental principles or the most important strategic directions.
It should be remembered that during the 1990s the EU could not influence or change the results of the Austrian elections in which the Freedom Party Jergo Haider took the victory. Austria could enjoy its "sovereignty" as much as it wanted with the ultra-right party in power, but it came at a price - the EU imposed economic sanctions on its member. Likewise today, no one in the EU tries to dispute the convincing election victories Viktor Orban and the establishment of an illiberal regime in Hungary, but this also has its price - the so-called "nuclear option", i.e. deprivation of voting rights within the EU, and the denial of 13 billion euros from European funds for this country is also being prepared.
At one time, in the now relatively long Cold War era, Italy's European and Atlantic allies asked the leading political forces in that country to provide such a coalition government after each election, in which the Communist Party (CP) of Italy would not be able to enter, as long as it received financial aid from Moscow. This long-standing policy is known as the "Exclusion Pact" and was in effect as long as the USSR and the Warsaw Pact existed. After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disappearance of the USSR, the renamed former KP of Italy even became the leading part of the government without any problems, and its former secretary general became the Italian prime minister.
Therefore, everyone can invoke sovereignty as much as they want and pursue whatever policy they want, but this produces certain consequences. In these areas, we have already seen it in the tragic 1990s. Slobodan Milosevic led such a policy of "sovereignty" and conflict with the international community. Let's remember the famous slogans "Serbia will not bend", "Freedom - freedom!" and many other symbols of that self-destructive policy. Its result, as well as the fate of its leader, are known. It is almost unbelievable that many of today's framers of unconstitutional government forget the recent history they themselves lived.
Last year, in an author's text, you stated that "there will be no political stability in the Western Balkans, and perhaps no lasting peace, as long as the regime of Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić is in power in Belgrade." Bearing in mind that Vučić, together with the Prime Minister of Albania Edi Rama and the former Prime Minister of North Macedonia Zoran Zaev, is the initiator of the Open Balkans, are you indirectly suggesting with your assessment that this project can be a tool for some kind of destabilization?
That was the text in which I dealt with the nature of Vučić's regime in Serbia. As it was published immediately after the violent enthronement of the Metropolitan of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Montenegro in Cetinje, I partly considered the effects that regime causes in its environment. When assessing that there will be no stability in the region as long as that regime is in power, I did not specifically have in mind the "Open Balkans" initiative, but rather its overall neo-Milosevic character, as well as the redesigned pan-Serbian program adapted for peacetime conditions ( "Serbian world") and the corresponding policy towards Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia and Kosovo. And, of course, the circumstance that that regime represents a kind of "Balkan Cuba", the only Russian ally in the region in the environment of EU and NATO members and candidates. "Open Balkans", in certain circumstances, can be one of the instruments of such a policy.
It can be assumed that Vučić's case and his regime are some kind of inspiration for the representatives of our parliamentary majority in ignoring all the views that come from our international partners and allies regarding the formation of an unconstitutional government. The EU treats as a legitimate candidate for club membership a country that refuses to join the Union's common foreign and security policy towards Russia and that is a major friend Vladimir Putin in the Western Balkans, so that example is probably an encouragement for all those who think that European values can be violated without consequences.
Do you see Montenegro or one of the neighboring countries in the EU in the foreseeable future?
In the foreseeable future - no. Neither the countries in the region are ready for that, nor is there any will in the EU for any rapid expansion. President of France Emanuel Macron for example has for a long time been of the view that there can be no enlargement until the decision-making process within the Union is reformed. In other words, until the veto right of all member states is abolished and decisions are made by a qualified majority. Also, countries like the Netherlands, as well as the Scandinavian members of the EU, want to see clear progress in the area of the rule of law in the countries of the Western Balkans so that one or more of them could deserve membership in the Union.
On the other hand, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Union began to think about expansion, at least to some extent, in a geopolitical way. The completion of the process of integration of the Western Balkans into the EU is one of the strongest obstacles to Russian influence in our region. For example, the candidate status finally granted to BiH in December can be at least partially understood as an understanding by the EU that the enlargement policy cannot ignore geopolitical dangers. It is possible that such an understanding dynamizes the enlargement policy to some extent, but I do not believe that anything will happen quickly.
No ambassadors in two-thirds of the missions
Due to dysfunctional cohabitation, Montenegro has been without an ambassador in key Western countries for almost two years. What are the consequences of this for the country and its international reputation, citizens and the Government, which implements foreign policy?
Cohabitation is never an easy arrangement. Problems with appointing ambassadors where the head of state and government come from different or opposing political parties/coalitions are not uncommon and can be found in different countries. What makes our situation unusual is the almost unbelievable fact that Montenegro does not have heads of diplomatic missions at the level of ambassadors in almost two thirds of its missions abroad.
True, diplomatic work can be carried out to a significant extent through the so-called chargé d'affaires, but the existence and activity of ambassadors as heads of diplomatic missions is a normal and customary situation among partners who have good diplomatic relations. This is because of the reputation of one's own country, as well as due to the respect of the receiving countries and the status of the highest representatives in those countries and international organizations.
Bonus video:
