Professor of international relations at the Faculty of Political Sciences in Zagreb Dejan Jovic he assessed that the post-Yugoslav space still exists three decades after the bloody disintegration of the SFRY, despite the fact that the political elites view that country negatively, and some consider it a "dungeon of the people".
In an interview with Vijesti, he said that the new states consider it their duty to consolidate the new national identity, to reshape it so that it is stronger and no longer mixed with others, despite the fact that socialist Yugoslavia was "formative for today's states" and " gave the borders and status of the people.
"They promote homogeneity, talk about unity, are skeptical of pluralism and especially try to control narratives about the past. Yugoslavia is their ideal 'enemy other'".
Jović assessed that the problem is that the Western Balkans is a political category that was conceived as temporary, and it seems that it will remain permanent.
He announced that Montenegro has a chance for a new beginning after the change of government, warning that the long-term rule of the DPS "left its mark" and that "the tails of the past will be long and the transition will also last a long time." He also stated that the way in which the DPS left power was "quite appropriate".
Jović assessed that Milo Đukanović is undoubtedly the most important figure in Montenegrin politics in the 21st century, and that historians will have something to say about him.
"It should be seen as a whole, so the picture will be more precise and complex than it seems today, both to those who like it and to those who don't like it".
Are the idea of Yugoslavia and its two state phases understood in different ways in the former Yugoslav republics? For Montenegro, the Yugoslav state of 1918 was a dominantly negative experience, because Montenegro then lost its statehood and all elements of that statehood were abolished, from the currency, state symbols to the dynasty. Socialist Yugoslavia restored state subjectivity to Montenegro. How is it viewed in Croatia?
In today's circumstances, after achieving independence - some as early as 1992, and Montenegro and Serbia in 2006 - all post-Yugoslav states view Yugoslavia negatively. This applies far more to politicians and to those who create new national and state identities - which I call identity designers, because identity is a construction - than to the people, in which there is still not only nostalgia but also a great interest in Yugoslavia and its heritage. , which is not only evaluated negatively. In this sense, there is a split between the official narrative and private memories.
States tend to suppress private memories, especially if they are positive, and impose an official one that is negative. The new states consider it their duty to consolidate the new national identity, to reshape it so that it is stronger and no longer so mixed with others. They encourage homogeneity, talk about unity, are skeptical of pluralism and especially try to control narratives about the past. Yugoslavia is their ideal "enemy other". They try to build a bridge between the present and the distant past, bypassing the recent past, because it is easier to manipulate the distant past that no one remembers than the recent one that many remember.
This is typical for new nation-states - they behave in a nation-building manner, not in the sense of creating a nation anew, but of transforming it into something new, in contrast to what it was in Yugoslavia. This is also how Yugoslavia behaved in relation to the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires. The new states particularly focus on three main aspects of national identity: language, religion and history. In all three aspects, they create distinctiveness while reducing similarities and negating identities. They create new languages, while actually treating the citizens as children who have yet to learn to speak correctly, as if the citizens do not know it.
Linguistic nationalism is happening, based on puritanism, on the expulsion and proscribing of words that are supposedly not in the spirit of our language but of another. In some cases, new churches are founded or existing ones are divided into several. The church is treated not so much as a religious organization but as a social one, as the supposed guardian of tradition, as a bridge between previous generations and future ones. And finally, history is reinterpreted.
This is done in a selective and manipulative way. In Croatia, for example, it is now considered that Yugoslavia was a kind of dungeon for Croats, similar to what was once said about Austria-Hungary for those Yugoslavs who lived there. But he "forgets" that socialist Yugoslavia also made Croatia a republic, that it gave it borders as they are today and that even in its constitution it did what any small country does - it declared it a state within a state. But also the Kingdom of Yugoslavia - through Banovina Hrvatska - recognized the subjectivity of the Croatian people, and due to the resolution of the so-called of the "Croatian question" gave up the idea of creating a Yugoslav nation.
As Dejan Đokić says, Yugoslavia lasted a little more than 70 years, and in those 70 years only five, from 1929 to 1934, actually created the Yugoslav nation, trying to cancel the existing nations. In all other periods, it recognized the existence of special nations, although not always the same and not all. It is also forgotten that the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was the first modern state with a Croatian name in the name of the state. And so on.
Selective forgetting of what does not suit us and selective remembering of only what suits us - as well as enormous "addition", often in the form of falsification of history, are typical characteristics of the process of state nation-building. As for Montenegro, the same or similar processes are taking place in it as in other new states, with the fact that this process began with a delay of 15 years compared to Croatia, since it declared independence not in 1991, like Croatia, but in 2006. ., thereby making Serbia independent.
On the issue of independence, both countries were undecided and extremely divided. Let's remember that in 1992 Montenegro rejected independence and voted for the survival of the union with Serbia, and in 2006 the opposite, although not unanimously for independence. Serbia, on the other hand, has never had a referendum on independence. It became independent by remaining independent, thanks above all to the victory of the sovereigntists in Montenegro. Serbian sovereignists – or nationalists, if you prefer – should therefore erect a monument to Mili Đukanović in the middle of Belgrade. Both of these countries, Montenegro and Serbia, are currently in a phase of intense nationalism - I would even say that this nationalism is greater today, although not more violent, than it was in the nineties.
The XNUMXs were the years of aggressiveness, but also of "weak nationalism", confused, unclear in terms of goals, borders and the general desire for independence. The only thing that should be singled out from that is Slovenia, and Croatia only since the beginning of the war. Now, nationalism in Serbia and Montenegro is consolidated, the idea of Yugoslavia has been rejected, and both are implementing a policy that nominally accepts minorities but in reality excludes them - although, again, not all equally.
Serbian nationalism today primarily excludes Albanians, and Montenegrin nationalism primarily excludes Serbs. And both consider Yugoslavia a mistake and a "dungeon", which is far from the truth and has already been disputed in academic research and will be even more so in the future. History will not look at Yugoslavia the way today's ideologues of nationalism would like.
In September 1991, Montenegro accepted Carrington's plan, but gave it up under pressure from Milošević. If that plan had succeeded, if a kind of Yugoslav commonwealth had been created with a peaceful dissolution and the preservation of the common market, do you think that all the countries formed from the former Yugoslavia would be part of the EU today?
It's a somewhat hypothetical question, but I think it's certain that the decision of the Montenegrin leadership at the time was very important and wrong from this perspective, because it somehow complicated the situation for everyone. Montenegro could have been independent like the other Yugoslav republics, if it had wanted to. The majority mood of the public was for the survival of some Yugoslavia, even if that meant only with Serbia, although we cannot consider the 1992 referendum any more free than those in other republics, because they all took place in a situation of war or the threat of war. If Montenegro had left Yugoslavia then, Serbia would also have become an independent state. Kosovo would very likely remain in it, because at that time no one - neither the Badinter commission nor the other Yugoslav republics, including Slovenia and Croatia, supported the independence of the provinces.
However, I think that even in that case, Serbia would continue to focus on trying to change the borders with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, because its policy was based on the idea that "the people" are ethnic peoples and not the demos, so it also interpreted the "right of the people to self-determination", a category that was always vague and undefined. She considered the disunification of the Serbian people a huge problem, among other things, because it would nullify the results of both world wars on this soil, and not only the fundamental demands of Serbian nationalism throughout history. Nationalist and Yugoslav forces in Serbia agreed on that issue.
Since there were only nine percent of Serbs in Montenegro in 1991, it would be difficult to justify some such ideas regarding Montenegro. However, the question is what consequences such a decision would have for internal relations in Montenegro, which was and remains divided in terms of relations with Serbia, and in a rather specific way. The pressure would increase from those who dispute the status of the Montenegrins as a nation and who treat them as just slightly different Serbs. This would create resistance, so that Montenegro would be more unstable than it was.
From this perspective, it is easy to talk about 1918 as a fraud of the majority mood of Montenegrins, because we do not have public opinion polls that would give us some indicators of that mood. But the fact that the majority of Montenegrins voted to remain in the same state with Serbia in 1991, as well as the fact that the political leadership that came to power during the anti-bureaucratic revolution with the strong support of Serbia successfully won the elections in 1990 and then remained in power and after the decision not to ask for independence but to form the FRY, show that the majority of Montenegrins did not want independence after all. I consider that a logical and also an honorable, though perhaps wrong, choice from this perspective.
Let's face it, neither wanting independence nor being against it is a problem - many small nations decide against their own independence because they feel better in union with larger nations. An example of this is the Scots, who have already repeatedly rejected independence. The problem is exclusively violence, and it is always a problem, regardless of whether it is carried out for separatism or unitarism. Whoever uses weapons to achieve his political goals should be stopped in time, regardless of the motives and goals he proclaims.
The Montenegrins did not behave as the wind blew, although they took a lot of risk by doing so. From today's perspective, it could be said that they misjudged the spirit of that time, although that spirit also changed as events on the field changed. Let me remind you - no one recognized Slovenia or Croatia when they declared independence, because the West stood in the position of preserving Yugoslavia. But, when the violence started, when it was seen that Yugoslavia could not prevent it, but even encouraged it because it tolerated it and even armed the violent, when Vukovar was destroyed and Dubrovnik was shelled, then that policy changed.
The recognition of Croatia, and thus of Slovenia and others who wanted it, is a direct consequence of the attack on Dubrovnik and especially Vukovar. The question is whether these countries would be recognized without war, and therefore the separatists are indeed right when they see war as the birthplace of independence for their countries. In addition, Montenegrins trusted Milošević too much, who decisively helped them - that generation of leaders of the anti-bureaucratic revolution - to come to power in 1989.
But we should not forget that Milosevic, just like Aleksandar Karađorđević, was one of them for many Montenegrins. Both were to some extent Montenegrins as well as to some extent Serbs, and they were also Yugoslavs, opponents of the independence of their "immediate homeland" - Serbia. However, it was not Yugoslavianism for everyone - and it was even anti-Yugoslavism because, in my vision of Yugoslavianism, one cannot be Yugoslav and at the same time anti-Croat or anti-Bosniak. But it should be accepted that Yugoslavism means different things to different people, and that it has many forms and contents.
The problem I sometimes have in communicating with other colleagues is that they reduce Yugoslavism to only the form that suits them personally, and they deny that it was possible to be Yugoslav in a completely different way. Neither Karađorđević's nor Milošević's Yugoslavianism is close to me personally, but it was also Yugoslavianism. Not every Yugoslavianism is to everyone's liking, and it seems that the experience of Yugoslavia teaches us that no Yugoslavianism is to everyone's liking. This is how it is in complex communities, which must be based on compromise and not imposition.
The history of Yugoslavia is the history of seeking compromises, and the episodes of the disappearance of Yugoslavia (in the Second World War and in the nineties) caused violence, extremism and tragedy for many people. At the same time, we should not forget that Alexander - in addition to abolishing Montenegro - also abolished Serbia as a political unit, for the first time after 1817. Until the end of his mandate, Milošević refused to declare Serbia independent, refused to change the national anthem and the last elections - which lost - he ran under the slogan "For Yugoslavia". Today, Serbian nationalists will not hear that Tito restored Serbia, declared it a national state, a republic and gave it borders that today seem difficult to achieve. And at the same time he achieved the goal of all Serbs living in the same country - Yugoslavia.
In relation to Montenegro, he achieved a balance between "whites" and "greens", so that during his time Montenegro was restored as a state within Yugoslavia, separate and independent from Serbia, while at the same time it was united with Serbia - so that both parties could be equally satisfied and equally dissatisfied.
In addition, Montenegro profited - as well as Macedonia, Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as Kosovo - from the socialist ideology, according to which the position of small nations and less developed republics and provinces should be protected and improved. The point of socialism was to be on the side of the weaker and smaller, not the big ones - both in international relations through non-alignment and in domestic politics through the affirmation of minorities (except German and to some extent Italian after the war) and small nations. And yet, neither Montenegrin nor Serbian nationalists show Tito any respect for those achievements today.
It is particularly paradoxical that Montenegrin nationalists do not respect Milovan Đilas, who was one of the main architects of the restoration of Montenegrin statehood, apart from the fact that he is also the most famous Montenegrin in the world in the 20th century.
Do you think that, despite everything, the Yugoslav cultural space still survived? Can EU membership further revitalize it?
The Yugoslav or post-Yugoslav space still exists, regardless of what, say, Mirjana Kasapović, who recently wrote a polemical article "Goodbye, post-Yugoslavia", thinks about it. Socialist Yugoslavia was, above all, formative for today's states in that post-Yugoslav area. She gave them borders and the status of a nation. She gave them a republican form of government. Political culture, including a preference for monism instead of pluralism, strong leaders and hegemonic parties, was largely determined by that Yugoslav experience. Also, the way in which Yugoslavia fell apart, as well as the war in its central part, continues to strongly influence the new countries. As I have already said, they are all formed in opposition to Yugoslavia, using Yugoslavianness as an "enemy Other", and others are all marked by Yugoslav heritage.
I recently published an article in which I show that all five sectors of transition - political, economic, state, identity and peace - are incomplete in these countries. I would also say that even previous forms of statehood, such as the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires, are still somewhat relevant to the political culture, especially nationalism, in those countries. They are indeed not only post-Yugoslav but also post-Ottoman, i.e. post-Austro-Hungarian. For example, when Croatia joined the EU, and that was exactly ten years ago, the main newspaper in Croatia, Večernji list, presented it as a "return to Europe". At the same time, they were referring to the fact that Croatia, as part of Austria-Hungary, belonged to Europe and was then "kidnapped" by Yugoslavia and taken to the Balkans. That Austro-Hungarian, Central European experience, as opposed to the Ottoman one, is therefore still relevant. After all, history is not electricity, so that by pressing a switch you can produce darkness or light.
In politics and society, the past has long tails and never disappears, but is revived again and again. She may be sleeping, but she is not dying, and it is easy to wake her up - which is what all new countries do, usually so that it is the distant past and they put the near one to sleep. A nation is a living organism that is sometimes in hibernation and sometimes in reincarnation. In addition to all that, I would say that the post-Yugoslav area is connected by a common language, which today all four countries and four peoples who speak it are trying to dismember and deny: both Serbs and Croats and Bosniaks and Montenegrins.
Why do they do that? Because they believe that the common language, which we all called as we thought was right, but we did not deny that it is one, relying on Krleža's definition of language, is an obstacle to achieving distinction between them, and without distinction they believe that their identity is threatened. But the theses that these four nations speak different languages are simply not accepted because they are meaningless and obviously false. People are not uninformed, and today they can follow TV programs, Twitter posts, etc. which are created in an alleged second language, and they themselves see that they understand everything.
Common sense rejects political manipulation. This common language, let's call it "our" language to avoid controversies surrounding its naming, keeps the post-Yugoslav culture alive, facilitates economic cooperation and still creates a feeling that relations between our countries and peoples are special. This closeness based on language and culture, based on the sympathies we have for each other, even despite what we did to each other in the Second World War and in this one from the XNUMXs, will probably not lead to any new unification in the future into one state. But, proto-Yugoslavism and post-Yugoslavism are completely legitimate categories, at least for now - as already pointed out by many who debated this thesis, e.g. Jurica Pavičić, Dragan Markovina and others.
Is there still a realistic perspective for the Western Balkans in the context of EU membership?
The Western Balkans is a political category that was conceived as temporary and it seems that it will remain permanent, and therein lies the problem. Namely, the idea was for it to be a "waiting room" for those waiting for membership in the European Union. By joining the Union, the countries leave the Western Balkans. The Western Balkans thus becomes the Western Balkans and eventually disappears. The designers of Europeanization are simultaneously the designers of debalkanization. Croatia no longer belongs to it since it is in the EU.
But since the European Union is hesitant to admit new members from the region, something that was intended as temporary is now becoming a waiting room for Godot, something that does not come. Something that was a tent for temporary care is now becoming destiny. When a disaster occurs, e.g. earthquake, so your house collapses, a tent is a good solution. But nobody wants to stay in a tent for 20 years or more, how many years have passed since the Thessaloniki summit, where the "European future of the region" was declared. I think the EU is wrong to hesitate so much. It should be extended to all the countries of the region and now immediately, and to all of them at the same time. The principle of individual admission should be abandoned, because whichever country is admitted before others, the others will be dissatisfied, and the one that enters will use this newly acquired power and influence against these others. This would only increase the problems.
How do you see today's Montenegro, above all the party-political scene? The formal departure of Đukanović triggered tectonic changes...
Montenegro now has a chance for a new beginning, although even in that case the tails of the past will be long and the transition will also last a long time. I hope they put it to good use. It is a small country, which is not necessarily a disadvantage. I like the European orientation of the new authorities, as well as the fact that they want to stop the trend of reducing everything to a national issue, which divides Montenegro and weakens its development capabilities.
I also like the fact that they do not view others in the region negatively, but rather express their readiness for friendly relations and cooperation. It is also about the new generation of politicians, who are certainly inexperienced in matters of governance, but that will change. It can be seen that Montenegro is a pluralistic country, so compromises and agreements are necessary, which is normal in democracies. The long-term rule of one party has left its mark because the opposition was clearly not ready to take over. You need to know how to rule. And on the other hand, the way in which the DPS left power was quite appropriate and leaves hope that it will be a constructive actor in the opposition as well.
How do you assess the overall political legacy of Đukanović?
He is undoubtedly the most significant figure in Montenegrin politics in the 21st century, at least so far, as the creator of Montenegrin statehood - albeit with a 15-year delay compared to others - so historians of the future will have something to say about him. It should be seen as a whole, so the picture will be more precise and complex than it seems today, both to those who like it and to those who don't.
It is positive about him that he accepted the results of the elections when he lost them, that in 1997 he distanced himself from Milosevic and gave shelter to oppositionists and progressive people from Serbia, that he brought the country closer to the West and still modernized it quite a bit, that he carried out the process of separation from Serbia on a democratic and a "velvet" way, without confrontation, although not without certain manipulations, which took care of Montenegro's reputation and avoided it being affected by stigmatization in the same way as Serbia.
It is negative, in my opinion, that he led the anti-bureaucratic revolution and was thus responsible for its consequences, that he was too close to nationalisms and that he encouraged them himself - both Serbian in those early years and Montenegrin in the late years of his rule, which he monopolized political space and slowed down the emergence of political pluralism, because he did not give the same chance to everyone in the country, because instead of a legally based system, he ruled with the help of informal and party structures, which led to the feeling of exclusion of many citizens, and because he claimed that he was in power without him Montenegro is threatened and could collapse.
This was also accepted by some of his fans in the region - so they claimed that the DPS's departure from power, especially Milo Đukanović, was a disaster, a victory for the Russians and Serbs, a deviation from the European path, etc. Such manipulation has the effect of creating fear and uncertainty, which is dangerous. His responsibility for the war is not the same as that of Milošević, Kučan and Tuđman, but it is still great, especially in connection with the shelling of Dubrovnik.
It is a good thing that he later took a negative view of those events, that he supported RECOM and managed to repair relations with Croatia, although often in an anti-Serb way. Croatia saw through his fingers because of that anti-Serbian attitude, which was later "paid for" by the influence that the Croats had in the process of forming a new Montenegrin identity, especially in matters of language. Corruption was also high in his time, with the fact that it is also high in other countries of the region, and I would say in many other countries.
There is probably more that could be said, but we need more time for that and it will be possible only when the archives are opened and a thorough research of that period is carried out.
Do you recognize nationalist practices in Montenegro and are they a danger to the civil concept written in the Constitution?
The civic concept is close to my heart, although in our circumstances it can be applied in balance with the situation on the ground, which is still nationally determined. Reality cannot be ignored, and it should not be ignored - especially when it comes to the protection of minorities, their complete affirmation and autonomy in the main issues of maintaining identity. A civil position without the protection of the weak, especially minorities, can be a problem and cannot be a solution.
In the Montenegrin version, however, it was also about using the civil concept to avoid reaching a compromise between the two largest ethnic communities, the Montenegrins and the Serbs. Let's say, today in Montenegro, parties of smaller nations are talked about only in the context of Bosniaks, Croats and Albanians, and not in the context of Serbs. Thus, on the one hand, the civil concept is selectively applied - only in relation to Serbs - and on the other hand, the peculiarities and autonomy of others are recognized.
On the other hand, as I have already explained, the new Montenegrin state is trying to blacken Montenegro, through its attitude towards language, church and interpretation of history, so it has an ethnicizing effect. This is somewhat understandable because the Montenegrins really do not have another country, and the Serbs and these other peoples still have one. This situation is similar to the one in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the fact that relations between nations in that country are still regulated by international agreements, such as the Washington and Dayton agreements.
I recently spoke with one of the main architects of the Dayton Agreement, who told me that the Americans also wanted to establish Bosnia and Herzegovina on civil principles, but they saw that the reality on the ground was not such that it would succeed. Therefore, they accepted the principle of "constituent peoples", which still causes problems and dilemmas in that country today - but nevertheless enabled a very long period without any attempts to renew violence. Such is the reality.
Fortunately, Montenegro did not have such internal conflicts, nor was it attacked from the outside, as was the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina. But the increased nationalism of both peoples after 2006 made things even worse, and the new ethnic structure of Montenegro contributed to this, which today - unlike all other post-Yugoslav countries, including Bosnia and Herzegovina - is the only one that does not have a majority of one people. Constitutions are, to a large extent, proclamations of wishes and not only or even primarily descriptions of reality. They often write things that are not true. Therefore, referring to the Constitution as a description of reality is inadequate and can be harmful.
The thesis that any criticism of Montenegrin nationalism is its equalization with Serbian nationalism has been put into the public domain. How do you look at it and is there any nationalism that could be compared to Montenegrin?
I will answer first with a question: what would it mean if the two nationalisms were equated? For me, each nationalism is similar to another, if not the same, because they use the same models - they try to homogenize the population, ignore everyone else except their own nation, claim that they are the victims and never the perpetrators of crimes, they believe that it is necessary to separate "us" from "others" as much as possible. ", so they divide the cultural space, introduce borders and controls, exclude minorities, suspect them of disloyalty, and interpret the past through myths. Montenegrin nationalism is the nationalism of a small nation, which, however, in the context of Montenegro, is greater than the others.
So, on the one hand, he is constantly afraid for the fate of his people, and on the other hand, he does not have enough awareness that, along with Montenegrins, many others live in Montenegro, who are just as autochthonous as they are and must not be excluded from political and social life. Serbian nationalism is the nationalism of a somewhat larger nation, but also small in global terms. It has an additional problem - because unlike Montenegro - it itself questions its borders, which is completely counterproductive and paradoxical, even from the point of view of Serbian nationalism.
In this regard, the idea of a "Serbian world" and flirting with the idea of uniting the Republika Srpska and Serbia is particularly harmful. Both are schizophrenic and ultimately destabilize their countries. There are no greater pests for the interests of the Serbian people than Serbian nationalists. And the same can be said for all nationalists, including Montenegrins. In that sense, I equate them.
Do you see any model for solving the Montenegrin identity puzzle that will at least reduce divisions?
Identity issues should be left to the sphere of freedom of expression and action. Everyone has the right to be what they want and not to be what they don't want to be. Everyone has the right to autonomous action or inaction. If he wants to act as a member of a nation, he can. If he doesn't want to, he doesn't have to. The state should, as much as possible, get out of that discussion, and not constantly try to regulate how one should speak, which church one should go to, what can be written about the past and what can't, who are patriots and who are potential traitors.
Any imposition of identity creates rebellion among those who do not consider the imposed symbols or practices as their own, nor accept them as general, universal. Michael Billig describes this "nationalism of everyday life", or - as it is wrongly translated in our country, "banal nationalism" - as a nationalism that the majority does not notice and does not see it as nationalism, and the minority does notice it and considers it discriminatory and hegemonic. The state should follow practices that would encourage us to put ourselves in the shoes of others, to ask ourselves: how would we feel if we were a minority, if we were different. That would be a good path, which would lead to a more solidary, tolerant and pluralistic society.
In the polemic you led with Professor Olivera Komar, you were criticized for proposing the reorganization of Montenegro from a civil state into a so-called ethno-federation. Can you explain what exactly your idea was?
It's one of her fabrications. I have not suggested that anywhere, nor would I. On the contrary, I criticized Milo Đukanović and the others for declaring a civil state while working to create an ethnic state, ethnicizing Montenegro and being behind the growth of Montenegrin nationalism, thus maintaining and strengthening Serbian nationalism. So I was criticizing it, not suggesting it.
It is paradoxical that Olivera Komar defends socialist Yugoslavia against me, and at the same time attacks me for wanting ethno-federalism in Montenegro. Well, socialist Yugoslavia was an ethno-federation, except that it was conceived as a dying state, in which sovereignty is distributed among the working class, working people and citizens, nations and nationalities. I think that SKJ eventually became the birthplace of nationalism, and this was possible precisely because of that ethno-federalist element in the structure of Yugoslav socialism, while neglecting all these other elements of divided sovereignty that were supposed to be safeguards against ethno-nationalism. But it is completely paradoxical that today you are attacking me because of the ethno-federalization of Montenegro, and at the same time you are defending socialist Yugoslavia, an ethno-federation, from me.
If socialist Yugoslavia was so good to you, then I would expect you to praise me if I want ethno-federalism for its successors as well, and not to criticize me for it. However, I do not see ethno-federalism as a solution - I also see ethno-federalist elements in Bosnia and Herzegovina as problematic, although probably necessary at the present moment. But, if long-term stability is desired in BiH, it must be accepted that there is a people of Bosnia and Herzegovina and not only the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In North Macedonia, it was done in a better way - a certain autonomy was accepted for a smaller community (Albanians) without territorial division, without federalization and with a reasonable compromise in the Ohrid Agreement, which has been going on for 22 years now.
So, in short, I did not criticize the DPS because of the civil state, but because it used the state to ethnicize Montenegro, thereby encouraging nationalism - both Serbian and Montenegrin - in order to rule as long as possible, claiming that without them in power, everything would fail and end badly. .
Tito restored Montenegrin statehood, that's why many sovereignists are Titoists
A monument to Josip Broz Tito was erected in Podgorica, and this was used as an argument in the alleged controversy that Montenegro still inherits Yugoslavia. Part of the Montenegrin public has the interpretation that this monument was erected to be instrumentalized for contemporary political needs, where is a narrative created in which political opponents are labeled neo-Chetniks, so Tito's legacy is reduced to reviving that historical dichotomy? It seems to affirm the legacy of Jov Kapičić more than Milovan Đilas. How do you interpret that?
Tito is a great historical figure and as such is open to various "uploads" of content. His system was also a compromise. He was not a nationalist, but the system he created in his later phase - at a time when Tito did not agree with everything that was offered as a solution, but as a realistic politician he had to accept compromises, e.g. with republics and provinces – strengthened nationalisms, all but Yugoslavian, and ultimately enabled the disintegration of the country. When nationalists celebrate Tito today, it is for this reason.
We should not forget that Tuđman also spoke positively about Tito, and that he did not allow the most beautiful square in Zagreb to be renamed, but until 2017 it was called Marshal Tito Square. What Stjepan Radić promised the Croats but did not fulfill, Tito achieved for them - a republic, a federation, recognition of statehood, political status as an equal element of the federation, the right to self-determination. He also achieved a lot for workers' emancipation, for the modernization of the country, for its reputation in the world. But nationalists don't celebrate him for that - they consider those parts of his policy totalitarian and reject them. They robbed the people, abandoned socialism and equality, and at the same time they talk about national self-determination and the 1974 constitution and that they had the right to statehood and secession.
For Montenegro, Tito did a key thing: he practically annulled the act of unification of Montenegro and Serbia and restored Montenegrin statehood, which I explained earlier. That is why many Montenegrin sovereignists have become Titoists - at least partially, even when they are opponents of everything else that socialist Yugoslavia stood for. But the relationship between Tito and Montenegro was very complex and somewhat specific. It was in Montenegro that he experienced the greatest resistance in his attempt to take over a leadership position in the KPJ in the XNUMXs, and later there was also resistance here regarding the Informburo - stronger than elsewhere.
That's why, in my opinion, Podgorica was called Titograd - to "prove" loyalty to Tito, which he doubted a little. A serious study has yet to be written about the relationship between Tito and Montenegro. Here are suggestions for Montenegrin historians and political scientists.
Montenegro is well protected from all external threats
Aleksandar Vučić's influence on the political situation in Montenegro is obvious, or at least there is an undisguised ambition to achieve that influence. Do you think that Montenegro could be the object of Aleksandar Vučić's trade, or that he could get certain political concessions in Montenegro for the moves expected of him regarding Kosovo?
I don't believe that. Montenegro is in NATO and is well protected from all external threats. I think that even in internal politics, after the departure of Đukanović from power, the possibility for some radicalism on the part of Serbian nationalism weakened. We can see this from the results of the last elections - both presidential and parliamentary. That option is in a downward trajectory.
That's why I considered that the election of Jakov Milatović - with such a convincing majority - is good news for Montenegro. This seems to me to be a defeat of both Montenegrin and Serbian nationalism, as a chance to turn to new issues on the agenda, the new generation, the European future. The future will tell if I was mistaken or not. I expect that the new authorities will actively work to reduce nationalism in Montenegro. Both.
The Serbian Orthodox Church in Montenegro had considerable autonomy during the time of Metropolitan Amfilohi, and after his death, a good part of that heritage was almost erased. How do you see the role of the SPC in Montenegro today, from the point of view of the Metropolis and other dioceses that are now under incomparably stronger influence of the Patriarchate, and from the point of view of the patriarch and his loyal bishops?
I am not an expert on the SPC, nor am I a member of that Church. It is necessary to separate intra-church, that is, doctrinal positions that are not close to me, from social moves, and then especially from political ones. In Montenegro, the politicization of the church issue is too great, and both parties worked on it, both the DPS, which at the party congress entered the domain of intra-church relations and declared them political, and the SPC itself, which influenced political trends, organized the opposition and helped form the government after the elections in 2020. All this seems to me unnecessary and harmful for a secular, democratic state. In such a state, church and government should be strictly separated, have their own autonomy and internal rules - and neither churches should interfere in politics nor politics in churches.
The agreement between Abazović's government and the Serbian Orthodox Church seems to me to be a good step to improve those relations. Within the SPC there is also a narrative that the Church is the main organization for connecting all Serbs, especially after they were divided after the breakup of Yugoslavia, and that it is important for shaping a new, anti-Yugoslav and anti-secular Serbian identity. I do not share that attitude, I consider it backwards and wrong. But at the same time, it should be recognized that the SPC played a positive role in the solution of the Macedonian church issue, and thus in the solution of the dispute between Serbia and North Macedonia, which lasted over that issue for 50 years and more.
During the time when he was the Metropolitan of Zagreb-Ljubljana, the current Patriarch Porfirije made a great contribution to the rapprochement of Serbs and Croats. After all, he wrote a book entitled "Zagreb and I love each other publicly". So I think that we should carefully monitor what is happening within the SPC, but above all, how the SPC relates to specific issues in the region, and how much it works to solve problems and how much is possibly the opposite.
The SPC spoke about the need for centralization and thereby justified the abolition of the Episcopal Council in Montenegro. At the same time, autocephaly was given to the Macedonian Church, and in Croatia the Episcopal Council still exists. At the same time, there are public confrontations with some prominent bishops, such as the German Bishop Grigori... To what extent is the SPC politically instrumentalized today?
More than she should. But churches are also pluralistic organizations, so we need to see what the purpose of centralization is - whether it helps to solve the problem through some eventual disciplining, or not.
Bonus video:
