Professor of the Faculty of Political Sciences (FPN) in Belgrade Milos Besic, assessed that it is a matter of time when the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) will become a desirable coalition partner of one of the parties of the current government.
He said in an interview with "Vijesta" that it will primarily depend on the DPS, i.e. from restoring their coalition capacity.
"... The question is when a coalition partner will be desirable for one of the other actors in their mutual splits, splits, quarrels, kidnapping over the electorate... We are talking about an actor who has a large amount of experience in the way the system works... I think that, sooner or later, this will put them in a situation where they are desirable partners, but their biggest problem was and still is - the lack of coalition capacity. The moment they acquire it, I would count on them as a serious actor", says Bešić.
Prime Minister Milojko Spajić said at the beginning of the week that the reconstruction of the Government will not take place until the receipt of the IBAR (Report on fulfillment of temporary criteria), which Montenegro could receive in June. This undermines part of the plan that he presented to the partners at the beginning of the year, that the first phase of the reconstruction should be carried out in the spring. What does that move represent for the constituents of the government, especially the ZBCG coalition that is not yet in the government, and what for aspirants to enter the executive power such as BS?
I don't see a particular problem with that. According to the coalition agreement, the deadline for reconstruction is the end of the year. Therefore, Spajić cannot in any way cause a negative reaction from ZBCG because he does not go beyond the framework of the initial plan and what was signed. The narrative that it could happen earlier - those are the options that probably figured as possible. If it happened earlier, before the end of the year, it would be completely in accordance with the agreement, but it would also be completely in accordance with the agreement if it happens in October or November. I don't see any political reason why the ZBCG coalition would question the reconstruction process in any way.
When it comes to BS, the whole thing is, so to speak, the good will of the prime minister and the other signatories of the agreement, because Bosniaks are not part of the initial agreement. Their inclusion in the Government is not an obligation of the prime minister, nor of any actor. Of course, if there is goodwill, that is another matter. When I say good will, I mean all actors who support the Government, but also the Bosniak Party, in which there are obviously opposition voices on these issues. I think BS would have to take a very clear position and not send conflicting messages. That is the first essential thing…
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You say that you do not see a problem in the Prime Minister's move, but what if ZBCG decides to blackmail him and does not support the adoption of the laws needed for IBAR? Would anyone from the opposition come to Spajić's aid in that case?
That's a hypothetical question. All party actors have their own calculations... The scenario you are talking about is possible, and you have seen what is happening between the Democrats and PES. All scenarios are open. This is my impression: I think that the ZBCG coalition, i.e. its two key actors NSD and DNP, have been and will continue to be cooperative in relation to the current government structure, I mean above all PES and Spajić, until the moment when they do not enter the government. They did not create serious obstacles in the work of the Government, they had certain demands, but they were in the acceptable zone... So, I think their strategy is to be "calm", not to make waves, until the moment they enter the Government. I think that their plan is not to cause any intolerance towards themselves, to show cooperation, and only when they enter the Government to use their experience and take as much leverage as possible and build credibility on that.
What I expect, however, is the obstruction of the Government's work, which, in my opinion, is quite obvious from some circles, including informal centers of power. Is it in the interest of the government to be very successful in terms of achieving economic and foreign policy goals, and I am primarily referring to IBAR, the answer is - no.
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All political actors who in any way share the electorate with PES, namely the Democrats and ZBCG, are threatened with the deprivation of voters if Spajić is effective with these moves. Therefore, it is not in their interest, but on the other hand, preventing such a scenario causes them even greater political damage. I will give you a very specific example: Spajić gained serious political points by successfully organizing the population census and especially by raising the minimum pensions. This puts primarily the Democrats and ZBCG in an uncomfortable position, but they cannot be against it because they will have resistance in their own electorate. So, if very explicitly and firmly Spajić and PES continue with this course, even if it does not please the ratings of ZBCG and the Democrats, they have no mechanisms to prevent it without causing harm to themselves. Possibly they can do it through some kind of bureaucratic processes...
What will be the position of the head of the government if Montenegro gets IBAR, if the construction of the second section of the highway starts or there is a certain start and if there is an increase in wages?
Simply - great. That is part of my previous argument.
In that case, would it be more realistic to expect extraordinary elections where the head of PES would "shoot" for greater support or reconstruction?
If I were in Spajić's situation, if I were to receive IBAR, if the highway works would start and if we had another salary increase - I would go to the elections. But I don't think he will do that because he feels loyalty to his coalition partners. But if viewed from the point of view of party interest, it (elections) would be very instructive and advisable for PES.
You know, the process of European integration in Montenegro had very interesting dynamics. Since Montenegro gained independence, in the first five or six years things went very fast... And then, primarily because of Chapters 23 and 24 and the corrupt practices of the DPS, that process slowed down a lot. Enthusiasm has now returned and it is clear that there is great progress. In other words, if IBAR were to be won, it would not only be good for the country, but it would be serious political capital that Spajić would have in his hands.
Given that you claim that ZBCG and the Democrats can potentially do more damage to themselves than to Spajić, what are the biggest challenges he faces?
There is no doubt that these actors will obstruct in some way peripherally. I think that there is even some kind of explicit or tacit agreement between the DF (ZBCG coalition), the Democrats, by God and part of the media and some media circles, possibly even in some dialogue with Ur and Jakov Milatović. It seems to me that there is an open or tacit agreement because they have the same interests - to make Spajić's work more difficult in different ways.
But, I repeat again - they have to do all that activity in a way that they do not do themselves more harm than good. They cannot in any way be openly against this process that leads to IBAR, they cannot be openly against raising salaries... You see what is happening in the Podgorica PES committee, these are all problems that burden the work of the Government and PES. If you look at the situation in Podgorica, PES effectively does not have a majority. And when you don't have a majority, you can expect elections in the capital at any moment, which are always important. So, these are the things that can cause political instability and all these actors, and I'm primarily referring to Milatović...
How much of a challenge is he to Spajić and how much damage did he cause to PES by leaving the party?
He is the president of the country who won the elections with great authority. He was the second man in PES. So you have the president of the state and another party man who has become an isolated political power center. He has public authority. He did not have party authority in PES, he did not have leverage that would provide him with any significant position, and that move initiated him to leave the party. My opinion is that this was not done because he does not want to participate in party life, but because he has political ambition and political plans, which is legitimate. This means that he will try to lower the rating of PES as much as possible and raise the rating of alternative political players and that he will look for some political arrangement in which he will have greater political influence.
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How do you interpret the data from the research presented the day before yesterday by CEDEM (Center for Democracy and Human Rights) that PES is supported by 26,3 percent of citizens? Was it possible to see in the investigation whether Milatović caused damage to the party?
It is. A few percent compared to the previous data - you have a three percent negative difference for PES (from 29,1 to 26,3). Given the fact that the president of the country has left the party, and the president is not just any party member, and bearing in mind all the party unrest, and I mean above all (Andrei) Milović - when you look at those negative factors, that three percent is not too much at all. I expected the loss to be more pronounced, but it's not that dramatic at all. The reason for this is the increase in minimum pensions, as this is a matter that is directly attributed to Spajić. You have noticed a very pronounced increase in his personal rating. Since I've been doing research, I've never noticed that in two surveys, someone's percentage of "fives" jumps by seven percent. That's dramatic.
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By increasing the minimum pensions, they seriously protected the electorate from having a bigger drop than the one recorded. If Milatović had not made the move he did, don't have any doubts that the rating of PES would have been significantly better than it was in the previous survey.
If the president forms a party, whose voters could he "hunt" for? Isn't the former prime minister Zdravko Krivokapić on the right track when he says that Spajić occupies a more liberal part of the electorate, and Milatović is more conservative, that is, that the prime minister takes the votes of DPS, and that the head of state will take Democrats and ZBCG?
In PES, there is both one and the other structure - conservative and civil. Some of those voters came from DPS, some from Democrats, some from DF. Thus, PES represents a conglomeration of different points of view, and what unites them is one civic, conservative-liberal-progressive, pro-European platform. It is true that in this terminology, some more conservative parts of the electorate will rather lean towards Milatović than Spajić.
When you ask me about the dangers of voter takeover, I have two things to say. First, I don't think Milatović has that kind of plan. I think that he will work on some kind of unification of a larger number of political actors, in order to have a broader coalition movement, an arrangement, which would gather these forces without the intention of taking over their voters. Second, if he were to create a party and in that situation without a coalition arrangement we wonder who would take over the voters, the PES is in less danger, and the SNP is in the greatest danger. My data shows that he would almost disappear because all the voters would go to that party. The Democrats would be in danger - politically and psychologically, it is a very similar profile, as well as part of Nova's voters, less DNP, and almost certainly all the small conservative and pro-Serbian parties that were on the threshold of the census in the previous elections.
When it comes to PES, it is possible that they would lose another percentage, but it would be proportionately much less than other parties would lose. Why - because that outflow has already happened by now.
You mentioned the constituents of ZBCG, Andrija Mandić's NSD and Milan Knežević's DNP. Do you see the future of their political alliance considering that Knežević made an arrangement with Marko Milačić's Prava Montenegro and that he says that he shares most of the program commitments with Mandić, but that they have different views on "strategic processes". What is that supposed to mean?
You have to ask Knežević that. I will tell you what I know based on data, past behavior of actors and facts. First, I don't know why there is any more talk about the ZBCG coalition considering that Nova and DNP have created separate clubs in the parliament. Knežević must explain what the strategic differences mean. If I understand correctly, considering what Knežević has been saying and doing for a long time, it is a more explicit pro-Serbian matrix when it comes to the DNP. Mandić softened that Serbian rhetoric, performance, behavior, and I think that Knežević plans to try to transfer the more radical part of the Serbian electorate to his mill. That is why he makes agreements and arrangements with smaller pro-Serbian parties.
Do not lose sight of the fact that somewhere around 12 percent of the total electorate in Montenegro is quite radically pro-Serbian. Most of them still vote for Nova, not DNP, but with this kind of activity of DNP, with the potentially softer approach of Mandić, it has the capacity to attract. That's the problem of animosity in similarities - you have an intense political battle for the same electorate, which they now have to distribute. The current balance of power, according to my research and estimates, is two to one. So, out of three such voters, Nova takes two, and DNP takes one.
Do you think that, to use the words of my colleague Željko Pantelić, between Montenegro in the EU and Aleksandar Vučić, Mandić would choose the first, and Knežević the second?
No, I don't agree. I think that both of them chose themselves, and that everything else is just a platform on which what is called "I", one's own political ambition, should come to the fore. I don't think that this is the case only with them, but with almost all politicians and political leaders in Montenegro... And everywhere in the world, not only in Montenegro, ideology is becoming marginal, there are only platforms where personal political ambitions are realized , even parties serve as nothing more than a springboard for personal ambitions. What I said about Mandić and Knežević is not much different with other party actors, but also with (donald) Trampa, (Victor) Orban, Vučića, (Milorad) Dodika, (Recep Tayyip) Erdogan...
The EU would be completely acceptable to both Mandić and Knežević if they were in important positions in the levers of power. The only difference here is that Mandić believes that he needs European identification, probably following the example of SNS in Serbia, that he needs it in order to be an effective government official, and Knežević believes that Serbian identification is important for him to strengthen his support for the electoral to the body. This is all.
When we talk about SNS, what do you think about the parallel that Mandić, with his rhetoric and conciliatory approach, reminds Vučić of 2012, when he came to power?
I don't like any kind of comparison of that type. Politics is a very sensitive matter. If you make the same moves in different circumstances, you will get different effects. Serbia as a political and social being is completely different now. You can't compare a DPS drop to a drop Slobodan Milosevic, and I also see that parallels are being drawn... The fact is one thing, I would say, the knowledge and political maturation of Mandić, who understands the simple fact - that in European-oriented Montenegro, you cannot be in power if you are not pro-European, at least nominally. He understood that very well, and he is working on it. I think it's politically wise, and we'll see how far it takes him.
You mentioned the DPS, which according to the CEDEM survey enjoys almost as much support as the PES - 26 percent of citizens. How do you explain that this party still has such a high rating?
DPS as it was when it was in power and DPS today - to a small extent, it is a different party that relies on the old mechanisms that brought them advantage. They managed to preserve everything that was their advantage, and I mean first of all a good organization. And what was actually the key problem of the DPS was the creation of divisions and corruption and crime, which weighed heavily. If you add to that the saturation of political leaders who have not changed for 20 years, those were the three key factors that led them to lose power.
When they lost power, they had 34 percent of support. When you look at it from that point of view, that loss is not small - from 34 to 26 percent. And what happened? What actually happened was that after losing power, they lost what they lost, and at this point they stabilized. I think that they are now at a stable percentage and that it is unlikely that this support will change significantly in the foreseeable future. By moving and pulling out of politics (Mila) Đukanović and key political personnel, and by that I mean n (Branimira) Gvozdenović and (Petra) Ivanovic, they somehow - in my opinion, not completely, not radical enough, I would go with even stronger innovative solutions in terms of personnel - still managed to move that type of pressure from their address, to repel attacks related to corruption and crime.
Another thing, they are no longer in positions of power, and even when they demonstrate the language of division, in my opinion, it is a very wrong strategy, but even when they do it, it no longer has that resonance. Those two factors stabilize them. One more thing is very important - most of the electorate they lost went to PES. These others who remained, according to the theory of approximation, no longer have much place to go... That process of departure is more or less finished.
We have one, I would say, new party called DPS. It is a question of the moment, and this is now my political assessment, when he as such, the new DPS, and that depends first of all on how much they will strengthen the capacity of the novum, the question is when a coalition partner will be desirable for one of the other actors in their mutual splits, splits, quarrels, kidnapping over the electorate... Don't forget, we're talking about an actor who has a lot of experience in the way the system works, we're talking about a party that actually created the entire social and political system, that knows how institutional resources are managed. I think that, sooner or later, this will put them in a situation where they are desirable partners, but their biggest problem was and still is - the lack of coalition capacity. The moment they acquire it, I would count them as a serious actor. I would by no means be a supporter of the thesis, and I heard it among some analysts, that they will disappear, etc. I don't believe that, I think they have consolidated and their rating is what it is.
The language of division does not lead to power
What do you think DPS should base its actions on?
I would nullify that whole narrative of division. We have a new environment, a post-depee society, in which the old DPS modes will not work. That is the first and foremost thing.
Another thing, I would be more constructive towards all political actors, in the sense that I would support and vote for everything that is a meaningful proposal, and everything that is for the benefit of the citizens of Montenegro. Why? The question for them is very simple - how can I increase my coalition capacity? All they can do in this sense is a strategy that should inspire their action. Everything that contradicts, and the further insistence on the language of division is, I would simply nullify and show a kind of political responsibility, I would be careful in the narratives, I would build bridges and communication with all other political actors, and I mean the former DF. ..
Without increasing the coalition potential, DPS cannot return to power in any arrangement. Period.
Some had reservations about the EU because they were against DPS
How do you interpret the fact that, according to CEDEM's research, support for Montenegro's entry into the EU and membership in NATO has increased since the dismissal of the DPS?
We measured a marked increase in support for the EU, above all for the Western orientation, immediately after the fall of the DPS. Since then, she has been tall. The fact that it is now higher in the last period is understandable because IBAR is going and something is happening on that front.
My interpretation is very simple - the reason is that DPS, while in power, monopolized the EU story. The thesis about EU integration was somehow exclusively their story. So you had to have a reservation regarding EU integrations with your opposition activities due to the fact that you are against the DPS... The moment when the DPS lost power and when the EU acted very benevolently towards all the actors who came after the DPS, what happened is the separation of the issue of EU integration from the discourse of DPS. In other words, the fall of the DPS relaxed the EU theme and the EU attracted parts of voters who were once against the EU only because they are against the DPS.
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