Prioritizing changes to the Law on Montenegrin Citizenship and the eventual liberalization of the right to dual citizenship is a clear form of hybrid activity, and manipulations and the use of emotional narratives are trying to mask the serious implications that these changes could have for Montenegro, the Digital Forensic Center (DFC) announced.
This organization states that with the adoption of the Law on Dual Citizenship, Montenegro would fully become part of the "Serbian world".
They said that after the change of government in Montenegro in 2020, pro-Serbian and pro-Russian structures within the new ruling majority actualized the issue of changes to the Law on Montenegrin Citizenship, along with active promotion of the idea of introducing the so-called dual or multiple citizenship.
They state that it is indicative that the campaign for the introduction of dual citizenship and the amendment of the Law on Citizenship was especially intensified after the parliamentary elections in 2023, "that is, the formation of the government in which the proxies of Serbian influence are involved, who coordinate their policies with the official Belgrade".
They point out that their analysis deals with the "deconstruction of manipulative narratives propagated by proponents of the idea of changes to the Law on Citizenship, as well as the implications that these changes may have on the European integration and NATO membership of Montenegro".
Harmonization of policies with the interests of Belgrade
"The topic of changes to the Law on Dual Citizenship was brought up to date by political actors who make up the majority in the 44th Government of Montenegro. In parallel with the narrative of accelerated accession to the EU, representatives of the coalition For the Future of Montenegro increasingly place the construct of changes to that law as a basis for alleged reconciliation in Montenegro. The President of the Parliament of Montenegro, Andrija Mandić, and the President of the Democratic People's Party, Milan Knežević, are the loudest supporters of the idea of changes to the Law on Montenegrin Citizenship. In December 2023, the President of the Parliament of Montenegro, Andrija Mandić, announced steps towards changes to the Law on Citizenship and the Constitution in the part concerning the official language. The government of Zdravko Krivokapić initiated changes to that law in 2021, which caused protests from the citizens of Montenegro due to attempts at demographic engineering. made a decision in which five years of temporary and five years of permanent residence are included in 4 years of residence in Montenegro. The previous legal requirement for admission to Montenegrin citizenship was 2022 years of permanent residence in Montenegro. That Regulation is being applied, and the Constitutional Court has not yet decided on the constitutionality of such a decision," the announcement states.
"The narrative promoted by the representatives of the New Serbian Democracy and the Democratic People's Party is made up of two vectors of influence on public opinion. The first vector relies on the construct of reconciliation through the change of the alleged discriminatory attitude towards Serbs from the past. The second vector relies on the narrative that by changing that of the law to enable the reunification of families, i.e. to obtain Montenegrin citizenship for all those living abroad, whose heart and roots are connected to Montenegro visit to Turkey on December 10, 2023, he stated that he would work together on a legal solution that would enable everyone who has their roots in our native land to exercise their right to citizenship in the simplest and most efficient way possible. It is indicative that Andrija In his congratulatory message on the occasion of Gusinje Municipality Day, Mandić pointed out that Montenegro will never forget its emigrants, but will work to ensure that these people become its citizens. In August 2024, the leader of the DNP launched an identical narrative that dual citizenship with Serbia will eliminate the injustice towards our brothers and sisters who feel rejected and forgotten. Through the symbiosis of the hegemonic aspirations of the regime in Serbia with fundamentally ethno-nationalistically motivated emotional manipulations about the union of citizens of Montenegro related by blood and family around the world, the pro-Serbian proxy network is instrumentalizing the issue of dual citizenship to undermine Montenegrin state sovereignty. It is indicative that before the parliamentary elections in 2020, the Coalition for the Future of Montenegro launched an application called Stay home, through which citizens could register all persons who have a residence in Montenegro and residence and citizenship in another country. MP of the ZBCG coalition Slaven Radunović called this activity a fight against phantom voters," it added.
The DFC said that in parallel with the activities of actors of Serbian influence, Prime Minister Milojko Spajić in September 2024 used the phrase that Montenegro must not give up its children, and that there are about 300.000 cases that the law on dual citizenship should to recognize.
"Also, building on the narrative about the restrictiveness of the existing law, he stated that the amendments to the Law on Citizenship will not allow new citizens to vote in the next ten years. It is indicative that the Prime Minister positions voting rights in the same context as the amendments to the Law on Citizenship. Voting rights it is regulated by the Constitution of Montenegro, namely Article 45, which states that the right to vote and be elected is for a citizen of Montenegro who has reached the age of 18 and has resided in Montenegro for at least two years. This means that the limit of 10 years or which other limitation of the right to vote or be elected for Montenegrin citizens was unconstitutional. The concept of Serbian proxies on dual citizenship with the Republic of Serbia does not represent a new model of hybrid action. The strategy to penetrate the electoral system in Montenegro through the idea of dual citizenship was initiated by the Prime Minister of Serbia Kostunica in 2006. On the eve of the independence referendum, he handed over to Oli Reno, the European Union Commissioner for Enlargement, a list of 264.000 Montenegrins who were allegedly living in Serbia at the time, for whom he requested the right to vote in the referendum. And the Serbian People's Party, one of whose founders was Andrija Mandić, initiated a petition in 2006 for the realization of the rights of Serbs from Montenegro and obtaining Serbian citizenship," the DFC statement reads.
Security aspects and the Russian-Serbian agenda
The DFC says that the projections of independent experts indicate that the lifting of the ban on dual citizenship could result in the expansion of the Montenegrin voter list by over 150.000 new voters.
"The change in the electoral structure, the undermining of the state's sovereignty and the de facto erasure of the borders with Serbia are justified by pro-Serbian actors with a manipulative emotional narrative that Montenegro is the only country in the world that renounced its citizens. With a manipulative narrative about a state that renounces its citizens, Serbian proxies devalue any form of discussion about granting Montenegrin citizenship by origin would affect ethnic and national tensions in the country and completely stop Montenegro's approach to the EU. On September 4, the European Commission announced that Montenegro, as a candidate country, should refrain from any which measures could threaten the country's strategic path to the EU or the security of the EU, including the use of the prerogative to grant citizenship," said the DFC.
"A polarized Montenegrin society, with possibly several hundred thousand new citizens, would represent a risk for the Union's foreign and security policy. Also, the model of dual citizenship would serve the authoritarian regime in Belgrade to turn around without changing the borders and state-legal status, and through the control of the electoral process the pro-Western course of the state of Montenegro. The dominant anti-Western attitude of the citizens of Serbia, through the provision of voting rights in accordance with dual citizenship, would be reflected in the strategic pro-Western orientation of Montenegro. According to public opinion surveys, 88% of Serbian citizens are against membership in NATO, a 33% support joining the EU. The long-term strategy of Russia and Serbia to undermine Western security institutions would be realized through Montenegro as an unreliable NATO member, which undermines the Alliance's strategy in the region and promotes anti-Western and authoritarian narratives," the statement reads.
They point out that pro-Serbian proxies use the mechanism of dual citizenship based on the model that Russia tried to impose on the former members of the Eastern camp, after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
"The strategic documents of the State of Serbia, which deal with the issue of Serbs in the region, starting with the Law on the Diaspora and Serbs in the Region from 2009 and the Strategy for the Preservation and Strengthening of Relations between the Home State and the Diaspora and the Home State and Serbs in the Region from 2011 are conceptually identical with the Kremlin's strategies on the position of Russians in the near abroad. The strategy of the Russian nation established by Boris Yeltsin's government includes 25 million Russians living in the near abroad was left to live in the former eastern camp. Basically, the Russian nation's strategy involved giving dual citizenship to the Russians living in the Baltics. The three Baltic states: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania rejected such a solution when Vladimir Putin came to power in Russia near abroad was actualized through the Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation from 2013. This concept includes the protection of Russian minorities through the promotion of culture and language. In 2013, under the guise of protecting identity, language and culture, Russia started hybrid activities that resulted in the annexation of Crimea," the DFC assesses.
They state that in 2011, Serbia adopted the Strategy for preserving and strengthening relations between the home country and the diaspora and between the home country and the Serbs in the region.
"The operating principle of that strategy contains the prerequisites for hybrid activities in the Western Balkans region through the strengthening of institutions and organizations that undermine the constitutional order of the states of the region by applying the principles of so-called soft power. The Declaration on the Protection of National and Political Rights and the Common Future of the Serbian People, which was adopted at the All-Serbian Parliament 8 June 2024, dominantly targets Montenegro through Article 32 in the domain of the alleged protection of Serbian culture, language and Cyrillic script. On June 9, 2024, the day after the All-Serbian Parliament, we want to sign the dual citizenship, we want special and spiritual ties with Serbia and to create a basis for the Resolution on Srebrenica to never happen again. According to the model of special ties, in 1999, Russia and Belarus signed the Agreement on the Federal State, which defines a deeper integration of those countries in all social - political aspects. Also, the Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation in Article 3 paragraph 14 states the protection of the interests of Russians in the near abroad through the preservation of the all-Russian identity," the announcement reads.
Baltic - Montenegro - dual citizenship
The DFC says that the three Baltic states Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania base the restrictiveness of the citizenship law on the size of the state and the number of inhabitants, that is, the preservation of sovereignty and the prevention of foreign political and security influence.
"Estonia with 1,3 and Latvia with 1,8 million inhabitants do not allow dual citizenship. They also problematize the issue of dual citizenship through loyalty to the state in relation to the possible danger of war, i.e. military service. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the three Baltic states adopted are restrictive citizenship laws because of the immediate threat they saw from neighboring Russia. The rigid attitude towards the issue of dual citizenship is part of the efforts to preserve territorial integrity and sovereignty after the acquisition of independence in 1991. The justification of such legal solutions was demonstrated after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. When the Baltic states became the target of Russia's hybrid activities, Sputnik and RT raised inter-ethnic tensions in the three Baltic states and instrumentalized the Russian-speaking minority. After gaining independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Estonia and Latvia adopted laws on to citizenship that provided citizenship only to those citizens who acquired citizenship before the Soviet occupation or to the descendants of those persons. Those Russian citizens who migrated during the Soviet era or their descendants, who did not take Estonian or Latvian citizenship, have the status of non-citizen in these countries. The term non-citizen refers to the specific status of residents of Estonia and Latvia who are not citizens of those countries, nor of other countries. These citizens are mostly of Russian ethnic origin, and their unresolved civil status is used by official Moscow as an instrument for hybrid action towards Estonia and Latvia. With disinformation about the threatened civil rights of non-citizens, that is, Russian minorities, Russia raised inter-ethnic tensions and antagonized the Russian ethnic population in the Baltics through the information space. In 2018, Vladimir Putin asked the EU to stop the massive violation of human rights that is being carried out against the Russian-speaking minority in Latvia and Estonia," the DFC points out.
According to them, the regime in Serbia has been antagonizing the Serbian national and ethnic population in Montenegro for decades.
"Analogous to Russia's hybrid activities towards ethnic Russians in the Baltics, the regime in Belgrade uses identical methods towards Montenegro. The regime of Aleksandar Vučić, through proxy actors, is trying to introduce Montenegrin society into a state of permanent instability. Pro-Russian and pro-Serbian structures in power are using the institutional advantage, i.e. the fact that are part of the majority in the parliament, in order to present their agenda as the desire and aspiration of the majority of the population. Following the same model, the pro-Russian proxy government in Georgia took advantage of the institutional advantage and adopted a law according to which organizations that receive more than 20 percent of funds from abroad must register as foreign agents. The EU has stopped the accession negotiations with Georgia, so the pro-European agenda in that country has been stopped," the statement reads.
International conventions and court rulings
The DFC states that Montenegro has the right to apply the restrictive provisions of the law on dual citizenship based on several international conventions that emphasize the sovereignty of states in determining who their citizens are.
"According to the European Convention on Nationality of 1997, every state has the right to freely decide on matters of nationality, including the possibility to limit or prohibit dual citizenship in accordance with domestic law. That convention recognizes that there are different approaches to the issue of multiple citizenship and allows states contracting parties to apply their own policies regarding the retention or loss of citizenship when their citizen acquires another citizenship. By adopting the Law on Confirmation of the European Convention on Citizenship in 2010, Montenegro reserves the right to limit dual citizenship, as well as to adapt its policy according to the country's specific interests. "Also, the 1963 Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Citizenship recognizes the right of states to prevent cases of multiple citizenship, especially when it is in line with their national interests," the DFC said.
"On the other hand, the rights guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) imply the obligation of states to hold elections that ensure the free expression of citizens' will, including individual rights, which constitute the right to vote ("active" aspect) and the right to be a candidate in elections ("passive" aspect). The rights guaranteed by Article 3 of the ECHR are not absolute and can be limited. In a series of cases, since 1, the European Commission has considered that complaints limitation of the right to vote based on residence was clearly unfounded and rejected them, taking, among other things, the position that state legislatures have the right to limit the influence of foreign citizens on elections that primarily concern those citizens who live in the state," the statement added.
"Regarding the aforementioned and the current debates regarding the eventual enabling of multiple citizenships, the case of Shindler v. the United Kingdom from 2013, which dealt with the right to vote of non-resident UK citizens who have lived abroad for more than 15 years, is indicative. European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) upheld the UK's 15-year limit on expatriate voting rights, concluding that it was within the margin of state appreciation. This margin allows states some latitude in setting policies, particularly in relation to electoral laws, provided the restrictions serve a legitimate aim. and that they are proportionate. In this case, the UK argued that long-term non-residents have weakened ties to the state and are less affected by its policies, the ECtHR ruled that the restriction was reasonable and did not violate the right to free elections under Article 3. Protocol No. 1 of the Convention, the ECtHR has taken the position that states are not obliged to grant non-residents unrestricted access to this right. The fact that some of the member states were in favor of giving non-residents the opportunity to vote, is not enough to establish the existence of any common approach or position in the way of solving that issue. States, in accordance with their policies and the existing legislative framework, have the freedom to assess this issue and choose the way to solve it," the announcement reads.
Electoral manipulations
"In the study Unbreakable ties and geopolitical strategy - Serbia's influence in Montenegro, DFC pointed out the ways in which the regime in Serbia abuses voting rights and implements electoral engineering in the countries of the Western Balkans. In the local elections in Nikšić in 2021, the elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the Belgrade elections in 2023, voters were brought in from other countries for the sake of the political projections of the Aleksandar Vučić regime. With the use of sophisticated means of special war, that regime undermines the integrity of the elections of the Western Balkans. A glaring example of such abuses was visible in the local elections in Belgrade in 2023 The observation mission of CRTA documented the migration of voters, which, according to their estimates, had a decisive effect on the results of the elections in Belgrade which strongly indicate that this practice, on a somewhat smaller but still significant scale, was already used in the previous election cycle, in April 24.000. The observed voter migration relied on the abuse of the right to dual citizenship by citizens of the Republic of Serbia living in neighboring countries, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The practice of voter migration from Serbia to Bosnia and Herzegovina was seen during the local elections held in October 2022 in Srebrenica," the announcement states.
They say that it is rational to expect that identical abuses will be applied in Montenegro, bearing in mind that the backbone of the government is made up of political structures that are loyal to the regime of Aleksandar Vučić.
"Even without dual citizenship, Montenegro has a serious problem with voters who have two citizenships or residences and thereby violate Montenegrin laws. The Center for Monitoring and Research (CEMI) estimates that there are around 80.000 voters in Montenegro who illegally have two residences - in Montenegro Gori and other countries, above all in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). A month before the elections in May 2021, 10,5 percent of voters in Herceg Novi also have the citizenship of Serbia or Bosnia and Herzegovina part had the citizenship of all three countries. In July 2024, the MP of the Movement Europe announced the liberalization of dual citizenship as well as the conclusion of a bilateral agreement on the regulation of voting rights in Montenegro would have a citizen who meets the ten-year residency requirement. That agreement would be problematic from a constitutional point of view, because the Constitution of Montenegro requires that a Montenegrin citizen with two years of residence in Montenegro exercise the right to vote. "An identical proposal on concluding a bilateral agreement between Montenegro and Serbia was announced by DNP leader Milan Knežević on October 10, 2024, with the statement that according to that agreement, Serbia would provide Montenegro with the residence data of its citizens," the DFC points out.
"In the previous period, Serbia refused to cooperate and exchange data with Montenegrin institutions in order to correct irregularities in the context of residential conditions. The only case when the Ministry of Interior of Serbia gave data was recorded during the election campaign for the presidential elections when, at the request of the Montenegrin State Election Commission, it was published that the current Prime Minister of Montenegro, Milojko Spajić, is violating the law because he has both Montenegrin and Serbian citizenship. According to the identical request for Andrija Mandić, the state authorities of the Republic of Serbia did not answer whether he has citizenship and residence in Serbia the parliamentary majorities in Montenegro are continuously trying to move the boundaries and implement initiatives that can directly threaten the national interests and strategic goals of Montenegro, according to the already established methodology of gradual adaptation of Montenegrin society to previously unacceptable attitudes and solutions. The initiative to introduce dual citizenship with Serbia is blatant an example of that," it added.
The DFC states that Montenegro has adapted the issue of dual citizenship to regional security and demographic challenges.
Amendments to the law on dual citizenship to the extent of Serbian-Russian proxies would introduce Montenegro into a state of permanent instability, and the agenda of early EU accession would be completely marginalized. Their goal is to maximally narrow the space for accelerated membership in the EU that has opened up for Montenegro. The destabilization that the changes to the citizenship law would cause would definitely contribute to the loss of support for Montenegro to be the first next member of the EU that currently comes from Brussels. In the end, changes to voting rights would make sense and derogate from the integrity of the electoral process, which would be held in an environment of complete control by the regime in Belgrade, regardless of who would be in power in Serbia at that moment. The elections in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Republic of Srpska) have already clearly shown this. The sensitivity of a system with a small number of voters, such as the Montenegrin one, clearly indicates that any change can play a key role in winning power," the announcement reads.
The DFC says that by introducing dual citizenship without a comprehensive expert analysis and public discussion, in which eminent lawyers and institutions from Montenegro and the EU would be involved, Montenegrin national interests, sovereignty and national security would certainly be endangered, and Montenegro would completely become part of the Serbian world.
"The question of how data on dual citizenships, i.e. residence, would be exchanged between Montenegro and Serbia is particularly important, considering Serbia's previous practice of not providing data on citizenships, with the exception of Spajić's case. That case is particularly indicative. from the aspect of the control of state institutions by the Vučić regime, but also the Vučić regime's clear support to Andrija Mandić during the presidential elections. According to international conventions, Montenegro reserves the right to limit dual citizenship, as well as to adjust its policy according to the specific interests of the country the case concerning the voting of persons with dual citizenship does not yet exist, Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights protects the right to free elections citizenship or residence. States may introduce reasonable restrictions, provided they pursue a legitimate aim and do not violate the essence of this right," it added.
"The socio-political and security situation in the Baltic countries and their relationship with Russia have some similarities with the situation in Montenegro and its relationship with Serbia. Therefore, Montenegro should follow the example of the Baltic countries when it comes to the policy of dual citizenship. citizenship is absolutely not necessary for Montenegro at this moment. The focus of Montenegrin political elites should be exclusively on reforms that will contribute to the acceleration of the European integration process and the realization of the key strategic goal of Montenegro's membership in the EU. Opening up issues that can stop that path, and the issue of dual citizenship is precisely one of those, it is not in the interest of Montenegrin citizens and it is far from the national interests of the state of Montenegro," the announcement concludes.
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