Analyst at the Berlin-based European Stability Initiative (ESI) Adnan Ćerimagić He assessed that the experiences of other countries show that it is not impossible for Montenegro to close the remaining chapters by the end of 2026, but that this requires exceptional political will on both sides.
"Croatia, for example, has closed 18 chapters in the last 15 months of negotiations. This happened thanks to the strong support of the member states and Zagreb's determination to implement the necessary reforms. Montenegro can do the same, if reforms are significantly accelerated and clear political support from the member states is ensured, including those with which Podgorica has open bilateral issues," Ćerimagić said in an interview for "Vijesti".
Podgorica has opened all 33 chapters in negotiations with the EU, and temporarily closed seven.
He pointed out that Montenegro has the best chance to become the first EU member state, but that this chance will not come about on its own:
"At this point, there is no guarantee when or if Montenegro will convert this advantage into membership."
ESI is an independent analytical organization that deals with issues of Southeast Europe and the European Union's enlargement policy.
The Montenegrin Government's goal is to temporarily close all negotiation chapters by the end of 2026, so that Montenegro can become a full member of the European Union in 2028. Given the pace of negotiations so far, is this a realistic goal?
There are 15 months left until the end of 2026. During that period, Montenegro should close the remaining chapters. The experience of previous candidates shows that this is not impossible, but it requires exceptional political will on both sides. Croatia, for example, has closed 18 chapters in the last 15 months of negotiations. This happened thanks to the strong support of the member states and Zagreb's determination to implement the necessary reforms. Montenegro can do the same, if it significantly accelerates reforms and secures clear political support from the member states, including those with which Podgorica has open bilateral issues.
Croatia and Montenegro are reportedly very close to reaching a compromise to resolve bilateral disputes that should allow Podgorica to close Chapter 31 (on foreign, security and defence policy) by the end of the year, the closure of which was blocked by the neighbouring country in December last year. If Croatia gets everything it wants, does this open the way for other EU members to use a similar blocking model towards candidates?
A more important question than what Croatia will gain, and whether other member states will resort to similar blockades, is whether Montenegro can count on getting what it wants - full EU membership. If the answer is yes, then none of the concessions now being discussed, publicly or behind closed doors, would be too great a deal in the long run to achieve that goal.
What are the biggest obstacles in Montenegro itself when it comes to joining the EU? Are they political stability, the rule of law, the fight against corruption, or something else?
In the Montenegrin case, political stability, consistent commitment to reforms and convincing progress in the rule of law and the fight against corruption remain the prerequisites of all prerequisites. Without this, progress in the negotiations will be impossible. A clearer picture of the situation will be provided by the next report of the European Commission. The last one, from October 2024, was not encouraging: Montenegro was then ready for membership in only eight chapters, while it was only at the beginning in five, including the very demanding chapters on the environment, fisheries and freedom of movement of workers.
The European Commission has repeatedly emphasized that enlargement remains a strategic priority of the Union. How do you see Montenegro's position in this context? Do you think that Montenegro is among the countries that could be the first to take advantage of this political will from Brussels?
The new European Commission brought with it a much stronger and more concrete narrative, as well as resources and energy, to the EU’s enlargement policy in December last year. The final decision on enlargement, however, is made unanimously by the 27 EU capitals. From the perspective of Berlin, where I spend most of my time, there is a sincere desire among those in the new federal government dealing with EU enlargement, and even some concrete initiatives, to bring the process with Montenegro to a successful conclusion. What I miss, however, is a unified and loud message from all 27 members that Montenegro’s membership by the end of this decade is a realistic and achievable goal. That kind of political consensus was crucial in 1999, when the EU unanimously committed to admitting ten plus two countries soon after 2002, provided that the candidates implemented reforms.
How do you assess Montenegro's current position in the negotiation process with the EU, compared to other Western Balkan countries?
Montenegro is formally the furthest advanced: it has opened all chapters and closed the largest number of them, and in terms of its level of preparedness for membership, it is ahead of other countries in the region. This also gives it the best chance of becoming the first EU member state. However, this chance will not materialize on its own - at this point there is no guarantee when or whether Montenegro will convert this advantage into membership.
Membership will depend on Montenegro, not Belgrade
It is often speculated that Belgrade does not want its neighbors to join the EU before Serbia. Do you think Serbia is actively trying to slow down Montenegro's path to membership, and if so, in what way?
There is now a much greater awareness in the EU of the negative influence of the Belgrade authorities in the region - not only in Montenegro, but also in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, increasingly in North Macedonia, and even in Slovenia. This influence is increasingly clearly recognized and openly criticized.
When it comes to Montenegro, Belgrade's potential to stop its path to EU membership is most often discussed by those who consciously or unconsciously want to strengthen Serbia's negotiating position towards Brussels or create an excuse to shift responsibility to Belgrade in the event of a lack of consensus among the member states.
My view is that Belgrade's potential is no greater than that of Prime Minister Ivo Sanader in relation to Croatia's EU accession. If the EU and its members are decisive and demonstrate political maturity in Podgorica, then Montenegro's membership will depend primarily on itself, not on Belgrade.
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