The situation in Montenegro, after the change of government in 2020, is worse in all elements except in the domain of the European path - only the government is truly engaged in politics. Andrija MandicThe Europe Now Movement (PES) has no strategy, and the opposition is irrelevant and unimaginative, said a political consultant and political scientist. Aleksandar Music.
In an interview with "Vijesti", he said that this government will survive until the 2027 elections because the arrangement of relations is such that all components of the government depend on each other, and the Montenegrin opposition has not seriously strengthened.
He believes that the zenith of PES has passed and there are two possible scenarios for the party. The first, he says, is that if it continues in this composition/tone until the 2027 elections - it can expect between 10 and 15 percent of the vote at most.
"The second is that a global economic crisis occurs, in which case Montenegro will receive an extreme external shock to its budget, much stronger than other countries - then the PES will be electorally erased. If that happens - they will be charged for their own mistakes and the mistakes of others (DCG, NSD), they will be blamed for the collapse of the economy, and the others will look for lifelines and panicky shift responsibility away from themselves," said Music.
According to him, the growth of power of the Speaker of the Parliament and the leader of the New Serbian Democracy (NSD) is a consequence of the decline in power and disinterest of others. In addition, as he says, he has protected flanks from the strongest veto player in Montenegro - increasingly represented in To Ljubiša Ostojić (metropolitan Methods), which raises the game to a higher level than that Jovan Micovic (metropolitan Joannikius).
How do you see the political situation in Montenegro five years after the first change of government in the elections?
The situation is worse in all elements except in the domain of the European path - and that is understood only officially (chapters, conferences, statements). In the field of economy, the welcome wage increase is not accompanied by any (necessary to be sustainable) reform, but by record-breaking infiltration in the state and public sector into an economy already wounded by party parasitism. In the field of culture and social hygiene, the abnormal has been normalized - Chetnikism is growing noticeably.
In the area of the state's authority and reputation - the state has never seemed weaker - it fears and retreats before the violent and loud, and suffers insults from those worse than itself.
In the area of personnel selection, the selection has never been more negative - before, for every 10 officials, there would be on average three professionals who know something about something, maintain the system so that it doesn't fall apart, and seven party members who get in the way (which is a bad ratio), and now it seems to me that the ratio is even worse, closer to 1:9.
Given that the situation in the country at the time of the change of government in 2020 was not great, and there was no need to improve much - these (anti)"achievements" are all the greater/sadder.
Do you have the impression that the constituents of the ruling majority are more at odds with each other than the government with the opposition? Do you think this majority can survive until 2027, when its mandate expires and regular elections are due?
This government will last until 2027. Namely, the arrangement of relations is such that all components of the government depend on each other, they do not have sufficiently plausible alternatives in which they would retain equal or greater benefits, and equal or fewer costs. Both PES (Europe Now Movement) and DCG (Democratic Montenegro and NSD/DNP (New Serbian Democracy and Democratic People's Party) do not have better options than each other at this moment. If the Montenegrin opposition had seriously strengthened - imposed itself on the ground, in the media, in the digital world, if it had made itself inevitable - Spajić might have had a wider space to throw the non-PES element out of power. But, that process did not happen. Also - we are not dealing with three different policies in the executive branch, which would then be scratching each other in full blood, perhaps even clashing, We only have one politician, one policy and one strategy. - Andrija Mandić - and other incidental, episodic characters who deal with tenders, party recruitment and - bare survival. Although they are all politicians on paper, only Mandić is truly involved in politics.
What role do Prime Minister Milojko Spajić and his Europe Now Movement play on the Montenegrin political scene? In what direction is that party developing? Has it permanently missed the opportunity to establish itself as a key political factor in Montenegro in the next few years? If so, when? If not, how can it achieve that position?
The zenith of the Europe Movement is long gone now. From what I can see, that party has no strategy, no mechanisms for profiling people, no mechanisms for expanding its social reach, every now and then the news is about quarrels in the party's organs - it is completely clear that these are people thrown together with power as the only link. As long as the power is there and as long as the European route is there - things somehow go on, they float.
There are two possible scenarios for this party.
The first is that in this composition/tone, he can expect between 10 and 15 percent of the vote maximum until the 2027 elections.
The second is that a global economic crisis will occur, in which case Montenegro will receive an extreme external shock to its budget, much stronger than other countries - then the PES will be electorally erased. If that happens - they will be charged with their own and others' mistakes (DCG, NSD), they will be blamed for the collapse of the economy, and the rest will look for saving straws and panicky shift responsibility away from themselves.
In order to establish themselves as someone and something, Spajić and PES would have to know who their electorate is, which of their officials someone wants to circle by name and surname, what value system they inherit (robotic rants about the EU are not that), what situations they react sharply to, where they draw red lines when it comes to the state and society, and what results they deliver for the broadest masses (praising the chapters is not that). Then they would have a chance to truly establish themselves, and not be a passing career-driven story.
Who is Andrija Mandić, the head of the Assembly and New Serbian Democracy, on the Montenegrin political scene today? Do you still stand by the assessment you made in July last year - that Mandić is always two or three steps ahead of the others, and that he strengthens himself in the long run, while the others weaken?
Mandić is a textbook example of political strategy and the accumulation of power step by step in the reference period. His strength rests on three pillars, I list them from least to most important - 1) experience (cunning, patience, tact, softening the position with European actors, framing others) 2) operational-ideological-propaganda pusher of the SNS regime, 3) someone else's weakness. Mandić grows and becomes stronger because others give him that space. The growth of his power is a direct decline in the power and disinterest of others - it is a zero sum game system that he has established. He is the only one who always takes into account the 3D effect - propaganda (changing the picture of reality), depth (the best public companies) and time (he knows what he is doing today, what in half a year, and what the goal is in 4-8 years). In addition, he has protected flanks from the strongest veto player in Montenegro - increasingly represented in Ljubiša Ostojić (Metropolitan Metodije), who raises the game to a higher level than that of Jovan Mićović (Metropolitan Joanikija). To whom this seems excessive - let him remember Mandić from 2008, let him remember him from 2012, let him remember him from 2015/2016, let him remember him from 2020 and let him look at him today. Exponential growth/strengthening. At the same time - those who were at their peak in those years, had all the resources of the world - today are in a state of trouble. Someone knows what they are doing, and someone doesn't know what they are doing.
Would Mandić's position be shaken if Aleksandar Vučić's government in Serbia were toppled? On the other hand, who will Mandić be if Montenegro enters the EU with him in power?
This is a key question. I fear that, for example, in Nikšić and Pljevlja, there are some processes underway whose roots could prove to be deeper than Mandić, these processes could politically outlive both Mandić and Vučić. If they fall, the intensity of the above will decrease, but I am not sure that the processes will disappear. The growth of parallel societies, the perception of (every!) Montenegro as hostile to individual citizens, the militarization of local communities - these are the gates of Hell. Personally, I would most like to be wrong about this.
How do you see the position of Montenegrin President Jakov Milatović? What, in your opinion, is his political modus operandi? Do you maintain that Milatović is "on his way to the dustbin of political history"?
Jakov Milatović is the greatest political anti-talent to have emerged in recent Montenegrin political history. His modus operandi is balancing (until collapse), in which in the end only he loses. If one concentrates and tries to understand what Milatović is trying to do, one can see traces of framing some issues - electoral reform, bans on cultural events, Lora, etc. - but his performance is so weak, timid, unclear and calculating - that in the end there is nothing from it but ridicule, in the gap between knowledge and ambition that has ultimately deceived itself. Milatović is a man without an electorate and without a political future, which everyone around him is aware of except himself.
How do you assess the situation on the opposition side of the Montenegrin political scene? Do the moves of the opposition, led by DPS, hint at the possibility that it could somehow threaten the government and possibly take it over, or do you think it will continue to languish, without the strength to change anything? Many initiatives by the DPS and the opposition have failed, the latest in a series being the interpellation on the work of Deputy Prime Minister Aleksa Bečić...
For now, there is no such possibility. Namely, the opposition can be reduced to two words - irrelevant and idealess. Irrelevant because it fails to impose itself in any element of society and life. Namely, devastatingly - it has a solid percentage of the electorate, and at the same time no influence on events in the country, on topics, trends, the atmosphere, everything happens outside of them. Idealess because it is clear that, beneath the self-confident words, these people actually do not know what they should do. Then they turn to individual improvisation, and at the end of the day it all looks like an out-of-tune orchestra.
Did DPS gain or lose with the departure of long-time leader Milo Đukanović from the party leadership and the arrival of Danijel Živković to that position?
Neither won nor lost. On the one hand, those who demand a ritual renunciation of Đukanović from DPS - themselves will never vote for any DPS (with Đukanović or without him), and on the other hand, the Đukanović era towards the end showed that the old approaches and recipes are not even close to being enough to win in the new structure of the Montenegrin political fabric, that they are even harmful. If a radical approach to regeneration had been taken then, if work had been done at all intelligently, that party would not have been on autopilot of defeat after defeat to this day. Here I am primarily talking about ideological weakness and operational incompetence.
Danijel Živković seems like a decent and calm man, he is not a barker and bluffer like the Montenegrin political scene abounds with, but honestly - I don't see any changes in the vertical, no new life for that party. It's all the same slowness, the same boredom, the same lagging behind in terms of phase. If the cosmetic corrections are removed, that party works the same, looks the same and sounds the same. It will have its solid and non-negligible percentage for some time to come, but betting on someone else's failure instead of your own success as a means of coming to power - is not a strategy, but a consolation. Being the "individually strongest" in a political game is irrelevant, what matters is - power.
Where are former Prime Minister Dritan Abazović and his Civic Movement URA going?
Abazović is destined for a fate identical to Milatović, which is the garbage dump of political history, but for diametrically opposite reasons. Milatović failed because he fooled himself, and Abazović failed because he fooled whoever he could - and now he is seen as a toxic actor. His only chance to survive politically in 2027 is to place himself on someone else's list and smuggle himself back into the Parliament, and it seems to me that there are no such naive people (housewives) left. The final nail in the coffin of his image as a supposedly green-left politician of the new generation was his slimy squirming when it comes to Vučić and his tyrannical regime, last (and nth) time in an interview on the show Načisto on your television. To pompously talk about yourself, and then in practice fail the most concrete and loudest test of that, ignoring students, young people who are fighting for a better tomorrow - and kneeling before a dictator on a downward path - is disgusting. Also - it is unclear who the voters of Abazović and URA would be in 2025. Namely, Abazović grew up on the pro-Montenegrin anti-DPS story. There were not many of those voters, but there were some. Today, these are the people who despise him the most, consider him a traitor and will never vote for him again. The URA rally on Lovćen was the best indicator of the travesty of Abazović's position - a gathering that should mark a new beginning, civic momentum, and the speakers were unhappy Vladislav Dajkovic and even more unfortunate Vladimir Pavicevic who praise Abazović there for serving Joaniki, for the ultimate anti-civic story. Psihodelia. Abazović could not get anyone else to say even a nice word about him. When all this is summed up, it is obvious that such disintegrated political phenomena will not be repeated - literally everyone is sick of it.
How do you assess Montenegro's place in the negotiation process with the EU, compared to other neighboring countries? Do you think it is a realistic goal for the Montenegrin authorities to close all negotiation chapters by the end of 2026, so that the country can become an EU member in 2028?
The goal is quite realistic and it would be good if it happened. At the same time, as I have repeatedly warned - if the toxic processes in Montenegro continue, European membership may become nothing more than an empty shell without content. It is important that Montenegro joins the EU, but it is not unimportant what kind of entry it will have. What kind of civilizational content, what kind of relations in society, what kind of economic structure, etc.
Following this - the stupider part of Mandić's critics constantly label him as an 'anti-EU' politician. They haven't updated their software, so they parrot the worn-out neo-Cold War story that no one in the country or in Europe hears. They don't understand that, if the toxic processes continue, Mandić will end up in a win-win situation with the EU. If Montenegro enters the EU broken from within - that suits him, he will be the first to run to claim credit for EU membership (and they will all be shocked again how he tore their hand off and then beat them with it), and if Montenegro is slowed down by the aforementioned processes and ends up joining the EU in a package with Serbia - that suits him again. 2D categories are dead, (geo)politics is a living thing.
What are the biggest obstacles to Montenegro's entry into the EU - the fight against crime, the "Serbian world", opposition from some member states...?
The biggest obstacle is the proliferation of parallel societies. It is also the most dangerous process I see in Montenegro. People living next to each other, but neither seeing nor hearing each other, nor connecting. They have started to differentiate/accept/reject each other according to the criteria of nuances of language (e.g., iotvovanje as a sign of “ours” or “theirs”). This worries me and it hurts me as someone who has insight into the complexities, differences and nuances of Montenegro.
How dangerous are the increasingly frequent revisionist narratives coming from parts of the government and the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC) for Montenegro?
The Serbian Orthodox Church is on a political mission, playing a political game with political means and with political results. It no longer hides that it is a political actor, that it is a veto player. It is interesting to observe the (d)evolution of its most powerful prelates in Montenegro. From Amfilohije Radović who was part of an archaic world that no longer exists, through Joanikije Mićović who purposefully destroyed all resistance and all traces of independence in the Metropolitanate and aligned it with the SNS, to the rising star Metodije Ostojić who steps on the gas, moves borders and carries out cultural shock therapy day and night, who plays to everyone. The goal is clear - the target is not Montenegrins, Bosniaks, Albanians, Croats - the target is Montenegrin Serbs. The goal is to completely and permanently change the minds of Montenegrin Serbs, present (every) Montenegro to them as an enemy state, and turn them into cannon fodder for the SNS regime. I call this process the SNS-ization of Montenegrin Serbs, drawing them into a collective psychosis and a permanent state of emergency imposed in Serbia and the entity of Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The hearts and souls of Montenegrin Serbs are the main battlefield for the future, survival and health of Montenegro. In this fight, we have a duty to help and protect our fellow citizens, our friends and our members of our immediate and extended families. Maybe we will still differ in some things, but let's differ in an independent, democratic and prosperous Montenegro where everyone, regardless of our differences, will know that they are - in their own home.
In the fight against crime, there are "equals and more equals"
Some political actors claim that the key difference compared to the period before August 30, 2020, is that the fight against crime has begun, which, they say, was not the case during the DPS government. Is this noticeable from the outside, regardless of the lack of convictions?
Every fight against crime in Montenegro should be welcomed, without "buts". What seems to me, observing these processes, is that in this fight there are equals and more equals. Namely, for Montenegro, every clan is problematic, whether it was called Kavački or Škaljarski, and it seems to me that the Kavački clan is under attack, while the Škaljarski clan has semi-preferential treatment. That is not good. I repeat - both are problematic, the problem is every clan, every state in the state. Particularly worrying are the indications of Sky correspondences that show contacts between the Škaljarski clan and the holders of power of the 30th of August changes. Sky cannot be used only in one case, and ignored in another. Whoever breaks the law must be held accountable. Whoever plants pumpkins with any criminal - must be removed from public life. Because - otherwise - one might think that the reason for the demolition of some was not moral and civilizational as is pompously claimed, but only so that others could have their turn, as the Italian mafia says - "to eat". "Now it's our turn to eat."
Bonus video:
