Russia is pursuing an active policy of fighting against the accession of the Western Balkan countries to the European Union (EU). We have seen this in the example of Montenegro, Igor Bandović, director of the Belgrade Center for Security Policy, told Radio Free Europe (RFE)'s Most.
The RFE/RL's Most program discussed the state of relations between Serbia and Russia. The interlocutors on the show, written by Omer Karabeg, were Jelica Minić from the European Movement in Serbia and Bandović.
There was talk about how Russia is behaving in the oil crisis in Serbia caused by US sanctions, and how much the delivery of Serbian ammunition to Ukraine has affected relations between Belgrade and Moscow.
Why did Russia continue to help Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić despite this, and why did the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) announce at his request that a sound cannon was not used at the protest in Belgrade on March 15? How present are Russian intelligence services in Serbia and are they working together with Serbian ones to break up student protests?
There was also discussion about how Serbia, in order to please Russia, was one of the few countries in the United Nations (UN) that did not vote for the return of Ukrainian children forcibly deported to Russia. Is it important for Vučić to have good relations with Russia because of his pro-Russian electorate? Does Russia need Serbia primarily as a stronghold from which it can expand its influence in the Western Balkans?
Omer Karabeg: The Serbian government constantly says that Russia, next to China, is Serbia's greatest friend. Has Russia proven to be its greatest friend in the current crisis surrounding the oil industry?
Jelica Minic: I think we can hardly talk about any Russian friendship because Russia is not showing any willingness to cooperate with Serbia and help it overcome the difficulties related to the problem of the Oil Industry of Serbia, which is under American sanctions.
On the other hand, Serbia did not take all the necessary steps, even though it had almost a year to solve the problem.
Igor Bandovic: I often like to say that Russian influence in Serbia is either underestimated or overestimated. Very rarely is there talk about the multi-layered relationship that Russia has with Serbia. This oil crisis is just one level which, in my opinion, is not crucial and the most important.
More significant is security cooperation, which has advanced so much in the last few years that Russia's security structures are now directly interfering in Serbia's internal affairs, and our officials are practically thanking them for their help in suppressing what they call a color revolution.
Suspicion and help
Omer Karabeg: Has Moscow always viewed Aleksandar Vučić with a bit of suspicion? It seems to me that it does not trust him as much as Milorad Dodik, whom President Putin received much more often than the President of Serbia?
Jelica Minic: I think that Moscow never had full trust in Aleksandar Vučić and that there was always some reserve and distance. This could be seen both in his meetings with Putin and with other people from the Russian administration.
But there were other politicians and officials from Serbia in whom Moscow showed a great degree of trust. I am thinking first of all of Aleksandar Vulin, but also of Ivica Dačić and Nenad Popović. They are much closer to their Russian partners than is the case with Aleksandar Vučić.
Igor Bandovic: Suspicion towards Vučić has existed to some extent and still exists, but only because Moscow has no idea what direction Serbia will ultimately take. On the other hand, in recent years, Russian security services have helped the regime tremendously to practically quell the protests.
My impression is that this was done in a kind of symbiosis between our and Russian security services.
Let's just remember the report by the Russian Federal Security Service that no sound cannon was used at the March 15 protest, then how this summer the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service accused 20 Serbian media outlets of preparing the so-called Serbian Maidan, and recently we have had attacks on independent media outlets such as Južne vesti, KRIK and Nova by hacker groups close to the Russian military security service. It seems to me that Vučić has made some kind of arrangement with Moscow to practically keep him in power. Vučić is only pretending to try to distance himself from Moscow because on the ground this is absolutely not the case.
That's why I think Vučić's long-awaited turnaround will not happen. Vučić has done too many favors for Moscow in the hope of staying in power.
After all, Putin (Russian President Vladimir), like any dictator, is trying to preserve all autocratic or authoritarian regimes everywhere on the planet. A good part of the establishment in Moscow recognizes Vučić as an ally and turns a blind eye when he makes some moves they don't like. It's a kind of alliance of autocratic and dictatorial regimes in the world.
That, in my opinion, is a glue that is stronger than any foreign policy aspirations.
Jelica Minic: However, we should not forget the recent statement by Maria Zakharova, spokesperson for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who practically accused Vučić of being two-faced.
She said that we hear one statement from Vučić in Moscow, and a completely different one when she is in the West and asks the question of whether there are two Aleksandar Vučićs. That was a very brutal way of communicating and sent a very direct message to President Vučić.
Ammunition for Ukraine
Omer Karabeg: Has the delivery of Serbian ammunition to Ukraine disrupted relations between Belgrade and Moscow?
Jelica Minic: I think the Russians knew this from the beginning. It was just a question of when they would initiate it, and when they did, harsh words were said about Serbia - that Serbia was stabbing Russia in the back, that Serbian weapons were killing Russian soldiers in Ukraine, and the like.
As for the sonic cannon, the Russians were very pleased that Vučić openly invited their Federal Security Service to come to Serbia and verify the authenticity of the accusations. However, the same invitation was also extended to the American side, which did not respond.
The Russian Federal Service's report that there was no use of a sonic cannon shows the depth of cooperation between Serbian and Russian intelligence services.
After all, didn't Aleksandar Vulin, then Minister of Internal Affairs, sign a document on a joint fight against color revolutions four years ago, together with Nikolai Patrushev, then Secretary of the Russian Security Council?
Igor Bandovic: Vučić managed to convince both the West and the East that he is the only leader that exists in Serbia and that there is no alternative.
It has managed to position itself as the sole interlocutor of the East and the West. While this is generally acceptable to Russia, it is no longer the case for the European Union. The European Union has changed its position since the visit to Belgrade by Marta Kos, Commissioner for Enlargement, at the end of April this year.
Her message was that the European Union needs a European Serbia and that it is not the job of just one man, but of the entire society. It was an attempt to demonopolize Vučić's position in Serbia. Unlike the European Union, Vučić answers to Russia and it is not looking for an alternative.
Omer Karabeg: Vučić has recently, at least in words, increasingly turned to the European Union and vowed to follow the European path, and after Russia's aggression against Ukraine, the European Union has become its biggest enemy, and it does not hide this, even threatening it with war. Does Russia mind that Vučić is turning to the European Union?
Jelica Minic: Vučić has always emphasized, at least declaratively, that integration into the European Union is Serbia's priority.
That's the mantra that's been going on since he came to power. There's no change in that.
It is quite another matter how sincerely he worked on it and how much he fulfilled what was necessary for Serbia to enter the European Union. There is a huge gap there. The Russians know this and are trying to make as deep a penetration into Serbian society as possible on many levels.
We should mention culture, education, media and a whole range of sectors where Western partners have not managed to make such a substantial breakthrough because the doors were not open to them to that extent.
Russian Historical Society
Igor Bandovic: Russia is pursuing an active policy of fighting against the accession of the Western Balkan countries to the European Union. We saw this in the example of Montenegro. It was a serious attempt to change the country's foreign policy course.
Russia is trying to anchor itself in the Balkans, and its location should be Serbia. This is being attempted primarily through so-called cultural cooperation. The founding assembly of the Russian Historical Society, whose president is Sergei Naryshkin, director of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, was recently held in Belgrade. Aleksandar Vulin was elected president of the Council of the Belgrade branch of that organization.
These are unprecedented precedents. While the government accuses students and the opposition of collaborating with foreign services with the aim of overthrowing the current regime, it is simultaneously forming a network of its own organizations with the direct support of Russian intelligence services. And it is practically not hidden.
You also have an attempt to create a Faculty for Serbian Studies that would study the history, language, and literature of the Serbian and Russian people. All of these, in my opinion, are serious attempts to turn the European Union away from Serbia.
The European Union now does not know what to do because it fears that, if it stops Serbia's European integration, Serbia will end up like Georgia, which slipped into Moscow's hands after the Georgian government severed relations with the European Union.
Jelica Minic: When it comes to Serbia's European path, Russia has not been so direct. Sometimes, one could even hear statements that it has nothing against Serbia joining the European Union.
After all, it would be difficult to expect Russia to directly impose its position on Serbia on all foreign policy issues. What Russia really thinks is evident through its actions in Serbia. The anti-European campaign, which has been going on in Serbia for a long time, certainly has a Russian stamp.
The Russians are very skilled at using their soft power, and Sputnik is the best example of how to do it. The Russians are much more skilled at it than any other media outlet that came from Europe and America.
Ukrainian children
Omer Karabeg: Serbia was recently one of the few countries at the United Nations that did not vote for the return of Ukrainian children who were forcibly deported to Russia. How do you interpret this move?
Igor Bandovic: When the vote was taken, the Serbian representative left the room. This action is interesting in the context of what Ursula von der Leyen (President of the European Commission) said when she visited Belgrade two months ago. She explicitly asked Serbia to impose sanctions on Russia.
Given that this has not been done, I assume that Vučić thinks that he still has room not to align his foreign and security policy with that of the European Union because he has the support of some countries within the Union, such as Hungary.
Orban's (Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor) regime is constantly advocating Serbia's accession to the European Union. It is a coalition of autocrats in action. Serbia's vote in the United Nations is to some extent Vučić's repayment of his debt to Russia for what he receives from it. And to repeat, Vučić receives protection from Russia's security services to remain in power. Because the Serbian security services do not have enough capacity to deal with mass protests.
That's why Vučić reached out for Russian help. Given the current state of these protests and the suppression of the student movement, we at the Belgrade Center for Security Policy believe that there is a major influence by Russian services.
Omer Karabeg: Was the vote at the United Nations Vučić's attempt to appease Russia to help him with the oil crisis?
Jelica Minic: It is unlikely that this will appease Russia, especially since Russia is now in a specific position where it has an astonishing level of support from the US and where we have an aversion to Europe from both sides.
President Vučić probably counts on Russia to reactivate on the international scene if there is a successful solution to the Ukrainian war. However, by refusing to vote for the return of Ukrainian children, Serbia is further widening its gap with the European Union's foreign and security policy, while at the same time expecting support and progress in the EU accession process from Brussels.
Vučić's voters
Omer Karabeg: Is it important for Vučić to have good relations with Russia primarily because of his electorate, which is very pro-Russian?
Igor Bandović: That's a very common argument that is made when talking about it. But I fundamentally don't believe in that argument because I think that the natural habitat of this regime is not the European Union, but rather the Eastern autocracies. Vučić can turn his electorate to whichever side he wants.
We have countless examples of this. I will mention two. When aid arrived from China during the pandemic in March 2000, Vučić declared that our only true friends were the Chinese. In June of that year, the Belgrade Center for Security Policy conducted a public opinion poll on who our friends were.
At that time, China was by far the friendliest country, 70 percent of citizens thought so. Then, when Trump came to power, you had a change in mood towards America. The government put up a huge number of billboards in Belgrade and other cities in Serbia celebrating Trump's victory.
This had a dominant influence on the fact that a few months later the Trumpian moment became very present in Serbian public opinion. Vučić can, to put it colloquially, make any pie he wants out of his voters because these citizens are informed through Informer, Pink and tabloids that are practically edited by Vučić's cabinet. These media can change the attitudes of citizens within three months.
Jelica Minic: I would like to remind you that these days Aleksandar Vulin proposed holding a binding referendum in which the citizens of Serbia would declare whether they are in favor of the European Union or the "Serbian world", which is in fact a copy of the "Russian world".
By the way, considering that some big deal is being made between the Russian Federation and the USA, which we can only speculate about, but if there is some division, some new Yalta in the shadows, it is difficult to expect that this part of the Balkans, in which we are located, will remain a Russian sphere of interest.
As for the domestic electorate, I would say that in this whole mess around the Oil Industry, where the government bombards us with different news every day, there is a certain nervousness towards the Russians in the public. Our president says that we will offer the Russians more than others for the Oil Industry, that we are ready to overpay, and even risk our banking system entering secondary sanctions just so as not to hurt the Russians. Then people wonder if the Russians are more important than our citizens.
Omer Karabeg: In conclusion, how important is Serbia to Russia?
Igor Bandovic: Serbia is important to Russia to the extent that it can be a proxy regime through which it can project its power beyond Russian borders. That is the only parameter of Serbia's importance to Russia.
Jelica Minic: I think that Serbia is economically unimportant for Russia. The only thing that is important for it is that it has the ability to influence the development of events from Serbia, not only in Serbia, but also in the region, and thereby spoil the business of other actors - the European Union and the USA.
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