Montenegro enters 2026 as the most likely candidate in the Western Balkans for the next EU enlargement, after a year in which it further strengthened its pro-European course and strengthened its international position.
This is stated, among other things, in the Atlantic Alliance's report for the Western Balkans.
"The past year has been dynamic for transatlantic relations, and the Western Balkans was no exception. Throughout 2025, countries in the region continued to rely on the United States (US), the European Union (EU), and each other to secure greater economic investment, expand infrastructure connectivity, and strengthen regional stability. At the same time, Washington sent a number of mixed signals about the scope and durability of future engagement with Europe, while Brussels remained unclear about the timelines for EU accession for several Western Balkan countries," the report says.
If the trends that were visible in 2025 continue next year, the Western Balkan countries, it added, may increasingly have to take a greater role in shaping their own trajectories.
Montenegro
In 2025, Montenegro moved further closer to Europe, expanded its economic development, and strengthened its security and defense position. It closed several negotiation chapters in its EU accession process, opened an office of the European Investment Bank, and contributed to NATO efforts and European initiatives to counter Russian aggression in Ukraine.
Among the Western Balkan countries, Montenegro is widely considered a leading candidate for the next EU accession. Although the European Commission’s 2025 reports on the Western Balkans highlighted more challenges than praise, Montenegro continues to implement structural reforms, increase investment opportunities and modernize its military capabilities. The next EU enlargement package, expected in late 2026, will be another opportunity for Brussels to assess Podgorica’s progress.
Looking ahead, Montenegro is likely to continue to position itself as a European and regional leader. In June, it will host the EU-Western Balkans summit, dedicated to EU enlargement and accession. During 2026, Montenegro will chair meetings and events within the framework of the Berlin Process, a German initiative for the economic integration of the Western Balkans. Starting in November, it will also chair the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, an influential position that allows Montenegro to set the Council of Europe’s agenda, promote initiatives and provide leadership on sensitive political issues.
Bosnia and Herzegovina
For Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2025 was partly a year of looking back, as leaders marked the thirtieth anniversary of the U.S.-brokered Dayton Peace Agreement, which ended the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. There were several notable commemorations of the anniversary, including in Dayton during the spring session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, as well as in Sarajevo and Washington. These events were marked by gratitude, but also uncertainty about the country’s future. The agreement was never intended to be a permanent constitutional framework for Bosnia and Herzegovina, but it has served that function for the past three decades.
The past year has also raised questions about the future, as the White House and Congress have brought uncertainty to the region by sending mixed and sometimes conflicting signals. One example is the Western Balkans Democracy and Prosperity Act, which was annexed to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 and signed into law in December. The law calls for sanctions on those who “undertake actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, stability, or territorial integrity of any region or state in the Western Balkans.” But just weeks earlier, the U.S. Treasury Department lifted sanctions on Milorad Dodik, the former leader of Republika Srpska, a Kremlin ally, and his associates, even though he has long threatened secession from Bosnia and Herzegovina.
More broadly, the US National Security Strategy 2025 has cast doubt on the US commitment to Europe going forward. If the United States reduces its engagement and presence in Europe, Bosnia and Herzegovina - which has relied on international support for institutional stability and the ability to govern effectively since the 1990s - could be affected. Furthermore, the NSS has caused more than a little concern in Europe, with the veiled threat of US intervention in internal European politics.
As it adjusts to possible changes in American approach in the year ahead, Bosnia and Herzegovina should also advance its own agenda. Sarajevo, for example, should strive to advance major constitutional reforms and demonstrate its ability to complete major infrastructure projects. One such project that will test Bosnia and Herzegovina’s governance capacity is the proposed US-Bosnia Southern Interconnector gas pipeline, which would reduce the country’s dependence on Russian energy by importing gas via Serbia, with its termination in Croatia. The pipeline is perhaps the best short-term example of a project that, if properly positioned, could strengthen Bosnia and Herzegovina’s institutions and address ethnic minority concerns without becoming hostage to their demands.
Serbia
Serbia has been rocked by student protests since November 2024, when a train station canopy collapsed in Novi Sad, killing sixteen people, in what protesters see as a preventable tragedy and, they say, the result of state corruption. Whether the protests will succeed in calling for early elections is uncertain, although President Aleksandar Vučić has publicly hinted at the possibility.
While the EU has long shown more patience with Vučić than many in Serbia had hoped, the messages from Brussels in 2025 have been increasingly harsh regarding Belgrade’s alleged anti-democratic handling of the protests. This European concern is expected to continue in 2026 unless Vučić delivers a substantive response to the protests and their causes. However, Washington’s view of Belgrade may differ from Brussels’s, as the Trump administration announced a new US-Serbia strategic dialogue in September 2025, signaling a willingness to find common ground and cooperate.
Another key issue in 2026 is Serbia’s move to force Russian state oil company Gazprom to withdraw from the Serbian Oil Industry (NIS) – the refinery in Pancevo – after it became the target of US energy sanctions on Russia in October 2025. Removing Gazprom’s control from NIS is crucial to Serbia’s energy and security agenda. Failure to effect a change of ownership would allow Russia to retain effective control over Serbia’s energy sector and would keep Serbia in the focus of US and European energy sanctions. Washington has given Serbia until March 24 to find an alternative owner; on January 19, Hungary’s MOL Group reached a provisional agreement to buy a majority stake in Gazprom Neft.
Albanija
Albania is likely to continue to be in the spotlight in 2026 as one of the frontrunners in the EU accession process, alongside Montenegro, and there are high expectations in Tirana that negotiations could be completed by 2027. Albania is also preparing to host the 2027 NATO summit.
However, corruption scandals at the top of government threaten to slow down progress on accession. Last year, Tirana Mayor Erion Veliaj was convicted of corruption and money laundering, and corruption charges against former Deputy Prime Minister Belinda Baluku led to her temporary removal from office. Also, the National Agency for the Information Society (AKSHI) - the main state body for digital and IT affairs - is under investigation for alleged rigging of public tenders.
These developments highlight the challenge of corruption in Albania and the deepening struggle between anti-corruption institutions and entrenched political and economic interests. While Prime Minister Edi Rama's negotiations with the EU have been effective, these scandals will put his government under greater pressure from Brussels and potentially slow down the accession timeline.
Kosovo
Prime Minister Albin Kurti leads an increasingly rigid caretaker government and has increasingly strained relations with Washington. In September 2025, the US suspended the US-Kosovo Strategic Dialogue, a key platform for American engagement with Pristina. According to the Trump administration, the dialogue was suspended for two reasons: first, Kurti’s government has not made measurable progress in establishing a Union of Serb-majority municipalities in northern Kosovo, one of the obligations of the 2023 EU-brokered Ohrid Agreement between Pristina and Belgrade. Second, Kurti has proven unable to form a governing coalition following his party’s election victory last February.
Following the snap parliamentary elections held last December, Kurti's Self-Determination Movement will still need the support of coalition partners to form a government, but the increased number of seats in the new parliament will make it easier to do so compared to the situation after the February 2025 elections. The upcoming presidential elections in March this year will be another opportunity to end the political paralysis in Pristina. Incumbent President Vjosa Osmani, known for her positive efforts to bring the country into line and cooperate with the international community, is running for re-election.
Northern Macedonia
North Macedonia has made gradual but limited progress towards EU membership in 2025. According to the report from the 2025 Enlargement Package, Skopje has made some progress in the rule of law, public administration reform and the functioning of democratic institutions. However, North Macedonia still has an understandably pessimistic view of the EU accession process, seeing it more as an instrument of political pressure than a technical assessment of the fulfillment of conditions.
The country implemented the Prespa Agreement in 2019, changing its official name to the "Republic of North Macedonia" in exchange for Greece dropping its threat to veto accession. However, North Macedonia remains bound by a 2022 agreement, imposed with French mediation, which imposes additional conditions to overcome Bulgarian objections - including constitutional changes to recognize the country's Bulgarian minority.
The results of the second round of local elections in late 2025, including in Skopje, have solidified the political momentum of Prime Minister Hristijan Mickoski. Given this, Skopje is unlikely to agree to unpopular constitutional changes in the year ahead. Political instability in Bulgaria is not helping either: early parliamentary elections will be held in early 2026, the eighth in five years. However, there is little prospect of significant change or willingness to move this issue beyond the deadlock in relations with North Macedonia.
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