Montenegro enters the 2027 parliamentary elections with an unfinished electoral reform and serious vulnerabilities to foreign interference, while there is a real risk that networks linked to the Kremlin, using similar models of operation as in Moldova and other European countries, will attempt to influence the electoral process through anti-EU narratives, social divisions, and support for pro-Russian and pro-Serbian actors - warns the Digital Forensics Center (DFC).
In the study "Elections Under the Spotlight: Threats to the Electoral Process in Montenegro", this organization describes the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC) as a factor with significant mobilization capacity, whose actions can transcend the religious framework and enter the zone of national and political mobilization.
The issue of the voter register and diaspora voting rights has been identified as a potential destabilizing factor ahead of the 2027 elections.
The study indicates that the share of registered voters in the total population is around 88 percent and that the ruling coalition is using this data as an argument for revising the Law on Residence, "whose real effect would be to delete the diaspora from voter registers."
"Such a move could lead to drastic changes in the electoral structure of the state, especially if one group is simultaneously granted citizenship and voting rights, while another is deprived of them," it warns.
It is emphasized that all previous amendments to electoral legislation have been adopted by consensus or a two-thirds majority, and all neighboring countries guarantee the right to vote to the diaspora.
The study points out that the unfinished electoral reform represents an entry point for foreign interference in Montenegro and a potential source of instability, and recalls that the parliamentary Electoral Reform Committee formed in 2023 has not completed its work. Only amendments to the Law on Financing Political Entities and Election Campaigns and the Law on the Election of Councilors and Representatives have been adopted, which introduced the concept of holding local elections in one day, with the planned date of June 13, 2027.
The committee is also tasked with drafting a bill on the voter register, residence and temporary residence registers, but has not defined disinformation and foreign interference as a subject of work, the DFC points out.
“Ambassadoristan” and the victimization of Serbs
The study recalls that the election cycles in Montenegro in the period 2016-2023 were marked by foreign interference, and that disinformation campaigns by Russian-Serbian proxies and influence campaigns shaped public opinion in the pre-election and post-election periods.
"The period before and after the 2023 parliamentary elections was marked by a narrative of victimization of the Serbian people in Montenegro," the DFC states.
They recall that the US Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) published the Annual Report on Global Security Risks, and that in the section on the Western Balkans, it states that Russia uses state and related structures for campaigns aimed at obstructing NATO and the EU, while promoting a narrative about the victimization of Serbs in Bosnia, Montenegro and Serbia.
“The narrative of 'ambassadoristan' - the construction that Western embassies do not allow Serbs to enter the 44th Government, was placed Milan Knezevic, President of the Democratic People's Party (DNP) in May 2023,” the study says.
It was assessed that with the narrative of discrimination against national and ethnic Serbs, pro-Serb state and non-state actors create conditions for the nomination of topics that polarize society.
"In this sense, the topics of introducing the Serbian language as an official language in the Constitution and the national tricolor flag may polarize the public. Also, insisting on these topics in the pre-election environment would allow the regime in Belgrade to more easily influence the democratic processes in the country," warns the DFC.
SPC active in periods of tension
According to the study, the practice so far indicates that the Serbian Orthodox Church has been active in periods of heightened socio-political tensions, including electoral processes. It is particularly significant that, as stated, the Serbian Orthodox Church has continuously used the narrative of protecting traditional values, religion, people and sacred sites, especially on the eve of important social and political events.
"Such a pattern was also noticeable before the local elections in Kotor and Podgorica in September 2024. Then, through a widely established priestly infrastructure, a message with strong identity-political content was broadcast from liturgies and public gatherings," the DFC points out.
In this way, he adds, an environment suitable for the political homogenization of the electorate was created, primarily in favor of pro-Serbian political options.
The DFC believes that an additional security risk arises from the fact that certain high-ranking representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church have shown a willingness to directly or indirectly make themselves available to political actors whose programs correspond to Serbian national and Russian geopolitical interests in the region.
"In the context of the 2027 parliamentary elections, the cultural, religious and symbolic activities promoted by the Serbian Orthodox Church are of particular importance, especially those related to the initiative to return the Votive Chapel on Lovćen," the study states.
It is indicated that such activities should not be viewed solely as a matter of religious or cultural identity, but also as a potential instrument of strategically preparing the ground for intensifying social tensions.
"Manifestations such as the 100th anniversary of the renovation of the Njegoš Chapel create narrative, symbolic and informational conditions for intensifying identity divisions and possibly causing political crises," it warns.
In the worst-case scenario, the DFC estimates, such activities could be used to destabilize the pre-election environment, delegitimize pro-European policies, slow down the European integration process, and further antagonize Montenegrin society.
Synergy with extremist structures
The DFC warns that there is a developed infrastructure for foreign interference in elections in Montenegro, consisting of political actors, pro-Serb right-wing organizations and networks on social media, which has already shown the capacity for destabilization during the incidents in Zabjelo (a clash with foreign nationals in October last year) and the erection of a monument to a Chetnik commander. Pavlo Đurišić in the Berane village of Gornje Zaostro.
A particular risk is the synergy between extremist structures and parts of the Serbian Orthodox Church, which could represent a significant source of instability ahead of the 2027 elections.
"The Kremlin's evident interference in EU electoral processes after the aggression against Ukraine, and the strong pro-Russian infrastructure in Serbia indicate the evolution of pro-Russian methods of foreign interference. The regime in Belgrade remains a complete support for Moscow in launching malignant operations in the Western Balkans region," the study says.
In the context of the Montenegrin elections, it is added, the interests of Moscow and Belgrade are identical, and Montenegro's move closer to EU membership has reactivated the Belgrade regime's narratives about Montenegro as a criminal state.
It is alleged that in the pre-election year, events are organized that polarize society and push the EU agenda into the background, so the DNP initiated the withdrawal of the decision to recognize Kosovo in the local parliaments where it holds power.
"Also, the DNP announced that it would submit a resolution to the Parliament to annul the recognition of Kosovo's independence. Such coordinated activity was already organized in 2023, after the unrest that occurred in northern Kosovo," it is recalled.
The DFC points out that historical revisionism and negationism represent a cohesive factor that binds the Serbian Orthodox Church and pro-Russian right-wing structures.
They believe that the crucial role in consolidating these elements is played by Metropolitan Metodije of Budimlje-Niksic, who, after being promoted to Metropolitan of the Serbian Orthodox Church in May 2025, became the main figure who brings together pro-Russian and pro-Serbian extremist elements.
Nuclear energy a new form of Russian hybrid action
The DFC states that the fact that Russian nuclear energy and the state company "Rosatom" are not under direct EU sanctions opens up space for official Moscow to preserve or expand its space for action in the near abroad.
"In the model of foreign influence deployment, nuclear energy represents a new form of Russian hybrid action. Nuclear projects create decades-long dependence of the recipient state on Russian fuel, technology, personnel training, maintenance, regulatory expertise, financing, and political coordination," the study says.
An example is the Hungarian project "Paks II", where "Rosatom" was given the opportunity to build two new nuclear units at the location of the same name, based on an intergovernmental agreement between Russia and Hungary from January 2014.
The opening of space for nuclear cooperation between Russia and Serbia should be viewed in this context, according to the DFC.
They add that potential cooperation between Serbia and Russia in nuclear energy is indicative in the context of the exit of Russian capital from the "Oil Industry of Serbia" (NIS). US sanctions on NIS, imposed due to Russian ownership - and in the context of the aggression against Ukraine - led to demands for the exit of "Gazprom Neft" and "Gazprom" from the ownership structure. In November 2025, the Serbian government announced that the US is seeking a complete change in ownership of Russian shareholders, i.e., the exit of Russian ownership from NIS.
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