Although she had almost no chance of achieving significant success against the enemy and a certain probability that none of her ships would return from that task, 19 years ago the command of the strongest unit of the then Yugoslav Navy - the 18th Missile Ship Flotilla - did not hesitate to try to carry out missile attack on the warships of the NATO countries which on March 24, 1999 started an armed attack on the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
Due to circumstances, the planned attack was not realized, but there are written testimonies about what could have been the biggest naval battle fought off the coast of the Montenegrin coast.
This is shown by the "Defense Order No. 2" dated March 29, 1999, which was given to "Vijesta" by the then commander of the 18th flotilla of missile ships, retired vice admiral Jovan Grbavac.
In the rank of captain of a battleship, in the spring of 1999, Grbavac was at the head of a unit that united the most powerful ships at the disposal of the RMVJ - two missile frigates of the "Kotor" type, one missile frigate of the "Koni" type, four missile gunboats of the 401 type and two old missile boats of the "Wasp" class.
After the first attack by NATO forces on the FRY on the night of March 24, 1999, during which the adversary acted from the air on the radars and stationary communication systems of the RMVJ on Obosnik, Mavrijan and Crni rto, Grbavac issued an order to the forces under his command, which included and the possibility of launching a coordinated missile attack on NATO ships in the southern Adriatic.
The actors of that event, apart from Grbavac who later became the commander of the Navy of the Army of the State Union of Serbia and the defense advisor to the former President of Serbia Boris Tadić, were also supposed to be some of the officers who later played a major role in the introduction of Montenegro into NATO, such as the long-time former the Chief of the General Staff of the Croatian Republic of Croatia, Admiral Dragan Samardžić or the former or current Commander of the Croatian Navy, Captain Darko Vuković and Captain of the frigate Vesko Tomanović.
"I have decided: to defend against NATO aggression from the sea and from the airspace, the forces of the 18th FRBR will be grouped into Tactical Group 505, composed of Battle Group 1 (missile frigates-33,34) in the Bok basing area, Battle Group 2 (missile gunships 404,406), in the port of Bar, Battle Group 3 (missile gunboats 401,405) in the Bok basing area in the reserve of the Fleet Commander, and a group of missile boats (304,306) in the port of Tivat. With other forces in the phase of overhaul and discussion, perform anti-aircraft defense (PVO) and anti-sabotage defense (PDiVO) in the Tivat - Bijela area. With TG-505 of BG-1 and BG-2, be in constant readiness to attack the enemy's naval forces with the aim of inflicting the greatest possible human and material losses. Emphasis on the ships of further protection, and in favorable conditions also on the attack ships of the 6th Fleet of the US Navy. In the period until the completion of the task, perform PVO and PDiVO, eliminate malfunctions, make moral and psychological preparations for the attack. Intensively perform masking by concealment, deception and maneuver in the basing area. At the beginning of the attack with a simultaneous maneuver TG-505 and camouflage forces in cooperation with the 108th Coastal Missile Brigade, carry out a joint missile attack on the NATO naval forces," reads the order issued by Grbavac at 8 a.m. on March 29, 1999, on the RMVJ command ship. Lovćen" in Bar.
In front of his ships stood a formidable armada - 64 powerful warships of the USA, France, Great Britain, Italy and Germany (aircraft carriers, helicopter carriers, missile cruisers, destroyers, frigates and corvettes) and three submarines and about 280 aircraft and 60 combat helicopters on those vessels.
The entire fleet operated on targets in the FRY with cruise missiles or aviation from a distance of 70 to 200 kilometers from the coast of Montenegro. The NATO fleet was additionally provided with special ships for electronic reconnaissance that monitored every movement of RMVJ units or the effects of its surveillance radars, and patrol and anti-submarine aircraft that constantly flew over this part of the water area: Anti-submarine aircraft of the P-3C Orion type are the southern Adriatic, literally covered by throwing out hydroacoustic buoys for listening to the depths of the sea in which they tried to detect one Yugoslav diesel-electric submarine of the "Sava" type and four small sabotage submarines of the "Una" type.
Yugoslav submarines were considered by the NATO naval forces to be the most dangerous direct threat... They, however, like most of the rest of the RMV fleet after years of wars in the former SFRY and UN economic sanctions, were technically defective to the greatest extent...
"The submarine P-831 Sava, due to the lack of investment in diving issues for many years, had a series of malfunctions and unresolved technical details that did not even guarantee its safe operation in a submerged state, let alone an effective fight against the enemy's most modern ships. Namely, the enemy constantly had P-3C Orion planes in the air, which, in addition to electronic monitoring of our naval forces and warning their ships about our movements and intentions, laid hydroacoustic buoys for early warning of the possible passage of our submarines, and it is quite likely that our submarine would was discovered right after leaving the bay of Boka Kotorska. In addition to this anti-submarine security measure, the enemy sent out patrols of combat and anti-submarine helicopters designed to search for and destroy our submarines. The high probability of detection and destruction of our submarine before leaving the platoon's positions and the low technical reliability of the submarine itself are the basis of the decision not to send the P-831 to the task, but to save it for the eventual period of extended aggression and NATO naval-air landings on the FRY. For the same reasons, submarines were not used to insert underwater saboteurs into the enemy's waters", explained the decision of the then RMVJ command headed by Vice Admiral Milan Zec, one of his close associates, battleship captain Đorđe Pražić in the work "NATO Actions and War Countermeasures" of the Navy".
Nevertheless, the sense of duty that they have to defend their country regardless of the slim chances of success did not leave part of the younger command staff of the RMVJ. Grbavac thus ordered the 18th Flotilla: "With BG-1 (RF-33,34) in the waiting area of Bok, in cooperation with the other forces of the Fleet, perform air defense and air defense of the base area." With a missile strike in cooperation with the 108th Coastal Missile Brigade from the Mamula Island-Cape Veslo region, inflict losses on NATO naval forces on the approaches to the territorial sea and in the territorial sea of Croatia. With BG-2 (RTOP-404,406) in the expected area of the port of Bar, in cooperation with other forces of the Fleet, perform air defense and air defense of the basing area. With a missile strike in cooperation with the 108th Coastal Missile Brigade from the Cape Mendra - Ulcinj region, inflict losses on NATO naval forces on the approaches to the territorial sea and in the territorial sea of Albania in the Durres region. The support officer is the commander of BG-2. With a group of missile boats 304,306 in the port of MTRZ Tivat, in cooperation with other forces of the Fleet, perform air defense and air defense of the basing area. At the beginning of the missile attack by deception, mask the development of the forces for the attack, so that the group of unmanned missile boats from the Mamula island - Cape Mirišta area heads for a course of 200 with the maximum possible speed".
The commander of BG-2, which was supposed to fire four missiles at NATO ships in the territorial sea of Albania, was the then captain of the frigate Dragan Samardžić on missile gunboat 406. The commander of a group of old missile boats that were supposed to serve as bait and distract the attention of NATO ships from the main body of the Yugoslav forces attacking them, was then the captain of the corvette Milisav Vuković. His task was particularly interesting because the crews of RČ-304 and RČ-306 under Vuković's command were supposed to perform a kind of diversion, that is, to attract the attention of NATO ships and aircraft in their protection: "The ships were supposed to set sail with their crews from Boka and the water area between Mamula and Mirište, by turning on the autopilot, set a course of 200 degrees, and give full power to the engines. Before the ships accelerate to maximum speed, the minimum crew that would be on them, should have left them and transferred from them to the speedboats that would follow the missile boats, and after accepting the crews, they returned to Boka. The rocket boats would have fuel in their tanks for about an hour's drive, and at full speed they would resemble the enemy as if they were undertaking a missile attack maneuver. Therefore, the enemy's attention would be focused on those old and for us less important ships, and during that time, our real forces, with which we wanted to launch a missile attack on NATO vessels, would complete their development and position themselves for an attack. The plan was not implemented, because it was not approved by the superior command," Grbavac told "Vijesta".
He added that, even if the diversion succeeded, the rest of his ships would hardly be in a position to launch a successful missile attack on the NATO ships because they were quite far from the coast, and the effective range of the missiles armed with the Yugoslav ships was only 80 kilometers. .
"All the NATO ships were very far from the coast, so we would have to sail at full speed for at least an hour before the attack, which was very difficult in those circumstances," explained Grbavac. In Pražić's work, it was explained in detail how much time it took our warships, that is, mobile coastal missile launchers, to get into position for attack, while at the same time NATO ships needed significantly less time to move away from the coast at maximum speed and get out of the range of our missiles: It can be concluded with high probability that our missile ships or coastal missile batteries would be immediately detected at the moment of leaving the camouflage moorings - waiting areas, that enemy ships would be warned to leave critical areas, and that enemy fighter-bomber aviation, combat helicopters or warships countered our launch vehicles before they could take effect - they launched cruise missiles... To this we can add that according to the rules of use of our missile carriers, fighter aviation achieves partial and short-term supremacy in the airspace above the launch zone, which was also impossible to demand and unrealistic to expect, given the situation in the airspace. All this justifies the decision not to conduct an anti-ship battle with the aggressor's naval forces in such conditions, because the probability of experiencing heavy losses without inflicting the desired losses on the enemy was too great and did not justify the risk," summed up Pražić.
Vuković expelled the German reconnaissance ship
A week before the start of the NATO bombing of the FRY, on the radars of the 9th Coastal Surveillance and Reporting Detachment of the RMVJ, at night they monitored the suspicious movement of an unidentified ship on the edge of the territorial sea of the FRY, about 12 miles south of Petrovac. The ship was sailing at a low speed and according to the position determined by the radar, it entered our territorial sea at a depth of about 2 cables (about 400 meters). The operational center of the RMVJ immediately sent the missile gunboat 404, under the command of the frigate lieutenant Darko Vuković, towards the unknown vessel. "We approached an unknown ship that had all lights turned off except for the navigation light on the stern. It moved at a slow speed, did not respond to our radio calls and kept turning our stern, from which I concluded that perhaps it was a fisherman trying to put her net between us and us, with the hope that our propellers would become entangled in network and they thus escape. Only when I called them from a distance of about 60-70 meters to, if they were fishermen, raise their net from the sea, stop and follow me because I intend to bring them to the port of Bar due to violation of our territorial waters, the unknown ship turned on all its lights and then I saw that it was not a trawler, but a military ship. In question was the special ship of the Republic of Germany for electronic reconnaissance and data collection A-53 "Oker", it is stated in the testimony of the former commander of the Navy of the Army of Montenegro, the captain of the battleship Darko Vuković.
According to his words, someone who spoke our language spoke to him on the radio from a German warship.
"I informed him that they violated the territorial sea of the FRY and that there were 2 cables (less than 400 meters) from the border within our waters, which they persistently denied. After consulting with Operations Center and Command, we ordered them to take a 180 degree course and leave our waters, which they immediately did, but immediately afterwards they stopped again in international waters half a mile from our border and continued their reconnaissance - intelligence mission", Vuković recalled the event that was the prelude to war operations a week later, in the spring of 1999.
A ship of the Navy of Montenegro shot down a NATO aircraft
In 1999, NATO aviation never directly attacked RMVJ ships, but on several occasions, when NATO aircraft came within range of their weapons, they opened fire on targets in the air. According to Pražić's data, RMVJ units opened fire on NATO aviation, unmanned aerial vehicles and guided missiles 20 times...
A total of five unmanned reconnaissance aircraft were shot down, and it is assumed that three planes were damaged. It is interesting that the only RMVJ ship that was confirmed to have shot down a NATO aircraft was the missile gunboat 405, which is currently being reconstructed and modernized and will be put back into operational use by the Croatian Navy this summer. On June 1, 1999, at 22.40:405 p.m., that ship, on which the deputy commander was the lieutenant of the battleship Darko Knežić (also today an MVCG officer), shot down an unmanned aerial vehicle over Boka, in the area of the Risan Bay. "RTOP 57 operated from a camouflage connection between Verigo and Stoliv. It was a kind of ambush because the drone had passed this way the day before. Only three shells were fired from the 34 mm "Bofors" cannon, everyone heard the change in the sound of the aircraft's engine and then it crashed into the sea between Rino and Lipac", Vice Admiral Grbavac, who was observing this action from a nearby rocket station, told "Vijesta" frigate XNUMX.
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