How we came to know God: Dramatic changes in religion in Montenegro in the last 30 years

The issue of religion is unimportant today for about eight percent of the population, which is five times less than in the second half of the 1990s.

The move towards traditional values ​​reflects deep structural problems, including socio-economic inequalities, weaknesses in the education system and political polarization, warns psychologist and communicologist Radoje Cerović.

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The Church also interferes in state affairs: From one of the litanies in 2020, Photo: Litije
The Church also interferes in state affairs: From one of the litanies in 2020, Photo: Litije
Disclaimer: The translations are mostly done through AI translator and might not be 100% accurate.

Religion was unimportant to almost half of Montenegrin citizens in the 1990s, at the end of the bloody wars in the former Yugoslavia.

Some thirty years later, the issue of religion is unimportant for only one in eight residents of the smallest republic in the former socialist Yugoslavia, while almost 86 percent of the population considers it important.

The dramatic changes in citizens' attitudes towards religion are evidenced by data from the World Value Survey (WVS), a global map that measures cultural values ​​that influence the social and political development of countries around the world in waves. Seven waves of measurements have been conducted so far, and Montenegro has participated in three.

Data from the latest census also speaks about religiosity, according to which only about 2,5 percent of atheists and agnostics in Montenegro are religious.

In the first wave of the WVS survey, conducted from 1995 to 1999, religion was “not important” to Montenegrin citizens in 32,5 percent of cases, and “not important at all” in 13,3 percent. It was “partially important” and “very important” in 27,5 and 23,8 percent of cases, respectively.

The Church also resolves state issues: From one of the liturgies in 2020
The Church also resolves state issues: From one of the liturgies in 2020photo: Luka Zeković

Significant changes occurred in the next wave of measurements from 2000 to 2004, when religion became "partially important" to the Montenegrin population in 45 percent of cases, and "very important" in 18,9 percent. The percentage of those who "do not care" falls to 30,5 percent, while for only 3,6 percent religion is "not important at all."

The latest wave of measurements, conducted from 2017 to 2022, shows an "explosion" of religiosity - for Montenegrin citizens, religion becomes "very important" in 63,1 percent of cases, and "partially important" in 22,8 percent. On the other hand, it is "not important" for only 7,7 percent of citizens, or "not important at all" for 5,5 percent.

Montenegro has a long history of relying on informal rules, such as 'codes of honor', rather than on institutional systems, as their existence and credibility are highly questionable. This historical context has created fertile ground for generations to cling to religious and traditional models of regulating social relations. This is especially true in times of political and economic uncertainty.

The fact that trust in religious organizations is high was also shown by an earlier study by the Center for Civic Education (CCE) "Dealing with Insecurities in Traditional Frameworks". According to this study, 58,7 percent of young respondents trust their religious organization completely or a lot. At the same time, for almost three quarters of young people (72,4 percent), family approval is important when choosing a partner, as well as religious beliefs, or religion (56,4 percent).

The importance of religion in the latest wave of research is the highest
The importance of religion in the latest wave of research is the highestphoto: Printscreen WVS

The WVS groups countries on the map according to cultural similarities, often related to religion, economic development, and history. For example, Protestant countries, such as Sweden and Norway, are secular-rational and self-expressive, while Islamic countries emphasize traditional values.

The map reveals how societies evolve from basic needs to an emphasis on freedom, rights, and participation, tracing changes across generations. It is used to analyze global cultural trends and predict social change...

Cerović: Once closer to Scandinavia, today to Zimbabwe, Turkey and Iran

Commenting on the WVS findings, psychologist and communicologist Radoje Cerović assessed that the movement of the value system in Montenegro is particularly characterized by a return to traditional values ​​between 2004 and 2023.

Montenegro's position on that map in 2023
Montenegro's position on that map in 2023photo: Printscreen/WVS

"This can be partly explained by a combination of psychological, socio-economic, cultural and political factors. This trend represents a dramatic decline from the level of secular-rational values, which was close to Scandinavian countries, towards values ​​characteristic of societies such as Zimbabwe, Turkey, Iran and Lebanon," Cerović told "Vijesti".

Far from Scandinavia
Far from Scandinaviaphoto: Printscreen Wvs

He mentions several factors that he believes are key to a return to traditional values ​​in Montenegro, and the first one he cites is socio-economic stratification and fragmentation of society:

“The growth of objective socio-economic stratification, with the additional subjective feeling of injustice and inequality, leads to a decrease in trust and the ability to collaborate within society. This is particularly pronounced in the context of Montenegro, where socio-economic differences affect all spheres of life. Many economists, for example Željko Bogetić, have emphasized the importance of the concept of 'trust' for every aspect of economic and social development. Trust in Montenegro is also declining due to perceptions of elitism, corruption, and political polarization.”

Devastation of the education system and lack of credible institutions

According to Cerović, the next factor is the “devastation of the education system.” He warns that the PISA test results show a drastic decline in the quality of education, especially in the natural sciences:

"Instead of encouraging critical thinking and curiosity, the school system is becoming frighteningly stressful and formally abstract. This is turning young people away from science and rational thought, contributing to a return to traditional and religious values ​​as 'safe havens'."

As one of the factors that contributed to Montenegro's return to traditional values, he also cites the "historical lack of stable and credible institutions of society." Cerović assessed that Montenegro has a long history of relying on informal rules, such as a "code of honor," instead of the institutions of the system, because their existence and credibility are highly questionable.

“This historical context has, over generations, created fertile ground for attachment to religious and traditional models of regulating social relations. This is especially true in moments of political and economic uncertainty. The historical moment of the socialist system led to the perception of equality and justice, and strengthened 'trust' to perhaps the greatest extent in history. What happened after that was a path in the opposite direction with clear and obvious consequences. Not only did inequality explode, but also the depreciation mechanisms, whose role was to mitigate the consequences of inequality (social benefits, pension systems, public health, public education, meritocratic systems of public administration, and the like) proved to be completely inadequate, haphazardly conceived, and ultimately incapable of countering negative trends.”

Clerical nationalist ideologies

Cerović warns that society is being further polarized by nationalist and clerical nationalist ideologies, which create a sense of belonging with ever smaller groups based on religious and ethnic, but also ideological, identity.

"Not only has this division not stopped - as the ruling parties have been claiming since 2020 - but it has only now become the dominant social discourse."

Cerović also points out that Montenegrin society is losing internal trust:

"It is fragmenting horizontally (socio-economic stratification), but also vertically (by various identity units) and entering a state of competition - mechanisms of competition, antagonism and distrust are activated. This blocks any potential for development of both the individual and society, because people strive for collectivist and traditional values ​​as mechanisms of security."

Cerović assessed that changes in the perception of values ​​through transition and generational differences also played an important role. He also said that the post-communist transition "was abrupt and unfair", and that it brought "stress and insecurity, which strengthened collectivist values".

"These value systems have the function of ensuring a basic and minimal level of togetherness in uncertain times, but they are fundamentally incompatible with the development of society that we are witnessing in some Western European countries, and especially Scandinavian societies."

As he said, generational differences also play an important role in Montenegro's return to traditional values.

“Younger generations, although more exposed to global trends of digitalization and migration, in Montenegro do not yet show a high level of self-expression values, which is the second major dimension of this research. Self-expression as the antithesis of a value system based on ‘survival’ is a measure of the maturation and emancipation of society. This attachment of Montenegrin society to ‘survival’ values ​​is a consequence of the limited quality of education, lack of economic opportunities and a conservative social environment that shapes worldviews.”

Cerović also lists global trends and influences:

"Although global trends such as digitalization and migration may cause a temporary adoption of more liberal values, they significantly strengthen traditional values ​​in societies like Montenegro, where distrust of 'new' attitudes, opinions and trends that are perceived as foreign or distant leads to a fear of losing one's own identity and a sense of chaos and disorientation."

Propaganda, illusion and the church as a labor bureau

The "Vijesti" interlocutor particularly emphasizes the influence of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC), which "uses existing social problems, such as inequality, corruption, and institutional weaknesses, to attract young people."

If the state is unable to correct an injustice, there is the Serbian Orthodox Church and its 'brotherhoods', etc. The mechanisms of hypnotic and subliminal communication, which have been developed and perfected over centuries, which very effectively affect emotions and the subconscious, are mechanisms that no form of modern communication has realistically surpassed in efficiency...

"Through capillary propaganda, religious thinking is presented as a contemporary form of rebellion and courage. This creates the illusion that a return to conservative values ​​is some form of modernity and rebellion. This effectively manipulates spirituality and develops the influence of traditional ideologies."

According to him, "religious propaganda and religious proselytism (intrusive, aggressive recruitment, ed.) feed on shortcomings in social systems."

"Poor educational systems that are unable to develop an inclination and love for natural sciences and rational thinking, a sudden increase in so-called 'spiritual' content in the media, as well as the almost complete absence of scientific and popular science content from the media are another important factor. Harsh socio-economic stratification and the lack of adequate social policy create a sense of an unjust and frustrating life, and the church offers support and a close environment, in exchange for suspending rationality and obeying religious principles. Unjust and unmeritocratic employment systems, besides being frustrating in themselves, open up enormous space for church propaganda, especially at a time when the government has enabled the Church to recruit and establish it as a parallel employment bureau for the chosen ones."

Cerović also mentions the problem of mental health services, which leads to people often seeking help from clergymen, rather than doctors:

"Formalistic, bureaucratic cold channels of access to the existing offer of mental health services in health centers and mental health centers, along with insufficient privacy protection in public health, seriously reduce the number of people who turn to psychiatrists, and the non-existent regulation and absence of laws and the Chamber in the field of clinical psychology means that a huge number of people turn to various clergymen and Church representatives for help. They not only accept to 'work' with these people in serious trouble (and thus deeply indoctrinate and manipulate them), but also actively discourage them from the idea of ​​turning to mental health professionals. The sense of guilt and sin that they sometimes instill leaves deep traces on the emotional lives of people."

He assessed that shortcomings in the system of access to and financing of health services free up space for various religious organizations to animate and attract people with humanitarian work.

"If the state is unable to correct an injustice, there is the Serbian Orthodox Church and its 'brotherhoods' and the like. The elaborated and centuries-old mechanisms of hypnotic and subliminal communication, which very effectively affect emotions and the subconscious, are mechanisms that no form of modern communication has realistically surpassed in efficiency. The atmosphere of the church, spiritual music, religious jargon and language, scents and robes, all of this is part of a very efficient system of shaping attitudes and emotions, and is a powerful tool for persuasion and indoctrination. Ultimately, no one wants to deny the Church the right to act, but when the state deliberately and consciously cedes to church institutions the space that secular state systems and institutions should cover, such social consequences are entirely expected."

When asked whether he sees the reason for the return to traditional values ​​in Montenegro only in the Serbian Orthodox Church or in religion in general, Cerović says that "the Serbian Orthodox Church is by far the most powerful religious organization in Montenegro, and that its activities far exceed the usual and expected methods of religious proselytism."

Serbian Orthodox Church by far the most powerful religious organization: Cerović
Serbian Orthodox Church by far the most powerful religious organization: Cerovićphoto: Private archive

"It has proven to be very efficient and aggressive in initiatives ranging from lobbying and using its own privileged position for enormous political influence, to intelligence and military propaganda activities to which the Montenegrin public has often been exposed, both in the 1990s and today. The Church's non-taxability, as well as its complete operational and financial non-transparency, leave it with enormous scope for secret and inappropriate actions."

According to the results of the census held in December 2023, the majority of Montenegrin citizens declared themselves to be Orthodox Christians - 71,10 percent (443.394). Followed by members of the Islamic faith - 19,99 percent (124.668), while Catholics make up 3,27 percent of the population (20.408).

Politics is (not) important

Besides, as the data from the first wave of the WVS world map for Montenegro shows, religion was not important to many of its citizens in the period from 1995 to 1999, nor was politics important to them. 36,6 percent of citizens had such an attitude towards politics at that time.

But, unlike religion, which in the following years becomes more important to citizens, politics plays an increasingly smaller role for them.

Thus, in the second wave, in the period from 2000 to 2004, 48,1 percent of them stated that politics "is not important", while in the last wave, from 2022, citizens in Montenegro stated that politics is "not important at all" for them (31,4 percent).

According to this latest wave, for 40,9 percent of citizens, trust in the judicial system is "not too high." The same answer, when it comes to the Government, is given by 34,9 percent of them. It is similar with trust in political parties and parliament, with 38,4 percent and 38,6 percent of citizens stating that it is "not too high."

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