Supreme Court ruling “obviously arbitrary”: Constitutional Court accepts Kristjan Dukaj's appeal

The Constitutional Court stated that it is not assessing whether Dukaj "satisfied" with the probationary period, but rather whether the proceedings before the courts were fair.

18099 views 5 comment(s)
The Constitutional Court issued its decision on November 25th (illustration), Photo: Luka Zeković
The Constitutional Court issued its decision on November 25th (illustration), Photo: Luka Zeković
Disclaimer: The translations are mostly done through AI translator and might not be 100% accurate.

The Constitutional Court accepted the appeal. Kristjana Dukaja and overturned the Supreme Court's verdict, finding it manifestly arbitrary because it lacked "sufficiently clear and relevant reasons", so the case was remanded for a new decision.

Dukaj is a former employee of the Municipality of Tuzi, whose employment was terminated after he was assessed as "unsatisfactory" during his probationary period, and he previously won a final dispute against the Municipality due to mobbing in the office of the then Mayor of the Municipality. Nika Đeljošaj.

The decision was made by the First Chamber of the Constitutional Court on November 5, 2025, composed of the President of the Constitutional Court Snezana Armenko and members - Faruk Resulbegović i Momirka Tešić.

Dukaj filed a constitutional appeal challenging the Supreme Court's ruling of January 26, 2023, issued in an administrative dispute he initiated to determine the legality of the decision of the Tuzi Municipality that assessed him as "unsatisfactory on probation", and his employment was terminated on that basis.

In his appeal, he claimed, among other things, that the competent authorities, in the process of evaluating the probationary period, exceeded the deadlines prescribed by the Law on Civil Servants and State Employees and the Rulebook on the Criteria and Manner of Assessing the Probationary Period of Civil Servants and State Employees.

He stated that he entered into an employment relationship on February 20, 2020, and that the head of the authority, in accordance with Article 54 of the Law, had to issue a decision on the assessment of the probationary period no later than 15 days before the expiration of the probationary period, or, as he indicated, by the beginning of February 2021, with the position that the deadlines prescribed by law cannot be extended.

He also specifically pointed to Article 7 of the Rulebook, according to which the immediate supervisor must, along with the proposal for the evaluation, make an official note on the employee's introduction and, with the consent of the superior, submit it to the head of the authority no later than 20 days before the end of the probationary period. Dukaj claimed that this deadline was not met either, as the official note was made on February 8, 2021.

The Constitutional Court emphasized that it was not delving into whether Dukaj essentially “satisfied” or “did not satisfy” the probationary period, but rather considered the case from the aspect of the right to a fair trial.

The Constitutional Court's key objection relates to the reasoning of the Supreme Court, which, in the Constitutional Court's opinion, remained on a general conclusion about legality, citing relevant provisions, but without a specific analysis of the appellant's decisive allegations.

The Constitutional Court assessed that the Supreme Court had to clearly and precisely examine the claims that the deadlines under Article 54, paragraph 2 of the Law and Article 7 of the Rules are preclusive, i.e. whether upon their expiry the authority loses the possibility to lawfully issue a decision on the evaluation of probationary work, especially considering that the disputed decision terminated Dukaj's employment.

Due to the absence of such an analysis, the Constitutional Court concluded that the contested judgment does not meet the standards of a reasoned court decision and that it can be classified as “manifestly arbitrary”, because the court must explicitly determine itself according to arguments that may be decisive for the outcome of the dispute.

The decision also states that the annulment of the verdict does not mean that the Supreme Court must make a different decision on the merits in the retrial, but that it must make a decision that meets the constitutional and convention standards of a fair trial - with relevant and sufficient reasons.

Dukaj previously led a separate proceeding against the Municipality of Tuzi for harassment at work, and the Podgorica Basic Court in that proceeding determined that he suffered mobbing while working in Đeljošaj's office, and the Municipality was ordered to pay him 4.000 euros.

Bonus video: