Design the vetting as if it will one day be implemented by your political opponents. If it still works fairly under those circumstances, it has a realistic chance of succeeding, the message is Rezarta Kthupija, a legal expert from Albania, after ten years of experience in the vetting process in the neighboring country.
In Montenegro, vetting has recently been mentioned in particular by the Ministry of Internal Affairs as a synonym for "institutional cleansing from all unauthorized influences." Vetting is a key step in restoring the trust of citizens and strengthening the integrity of the police service, said the Minister of Internal Affairs. Danilo Šaranović.
In recent years, two trends have been visible simultaneously: strategic judicial reform and political-security initiatives that require "urgent vetting".
In May 2024, the government adopted the Judicial Reform Strategy 2024-2027 and the accompanying action plan, with the message that the implementation of this document is important for fulfilling the obligations under Chapter 23 in the accession negotiations with the EU.
The European Commission, in the chapter on Montenegro within the Rule of Law Report for 2025, notes that the strategy is being implemented, but that some of the planned activities have not been fully implemented, and also points to issues of filling judicial positions and institutional arrangements.
In parallel, in July 2025, the National Security Council considered a set of measures following security challenges and in that context, it mentioned as a conclusion the need for an “urgent vetting” of the judiciary, among other measures. This is important because it shows that “vetting” in the Montenegrin context often enters the political agenda as a response to crises and public pressure, and not only as part of a long-term reform plan.
PARALIZED SYSTEM
In a brief historical review of how and why Albania came to judicial reform and the vetting process, Kthupi notes that since the early 1990s, the Albanian judicial system has faced serious allegations of corruption, political interference, and ties to organized crime.
"This situation has produced a paralyzed system, in which judges and prosecutors have often been accused of inexplicable enrichment and unfair decision-making, while public trust in judicial institutions has almost completely eroded," Kthupi points out.
With the aim of reforming the judiciary and restoring public trust, the Parliament established a Special Parliamentary Committee for Judicial Reform. Together with international and domestic experts engaged with this Committee, a report was prepared in 2016 that identified the level of perceived corruption in the judicial system.
"The key issue that can be observed in that report, despite its role in justifying the need for reform, is that, although it accurately described the situation at the time, it did not contain an analysis of the historical institutional behavior that led to that situation. In other words, the responsibility and actions of the institutions that were previously responsible for overseeing and controlling the judicial system were not examined; it was simply stated that the situation is as it is," the legal expert emphasizes.
He points out that attributing responsibility exclusively to the judiciary, without considering the historical conduct of state institutions, represents a risk factor for the future of the system and for the possibility of a return to the same conditions identified in 2016.
“After a ten-year period since the adoption of the legal package that established the judicial reform, it can be said that the results have been both positive and negative,” says Rezart Kthupi.
Among the positive outcomes, he counts increased public trust in the justice system, although in Albania this trust is largely concentrated in the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SPAK) and the Special Court for Combating Corruption and Organized Crime (GJKKO), as well as the dismantling of a culture of impunity for those in positions of power.
The negative outcomes, according to him, primarily relate to the speed and quality of justice delivered to citizens during the implementation of the reform - problems that persist today.
Among the most notable problems that emerged during the vetting process, this lawyer cites the situation in the Constitutional and Supreme Courts of Albania..
“The vetting process started from the top down, so the first judges to be vetted were the judges of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court. The first major negative consequence was the almost complete paralysis of these two highest courts. In 2018, the Constitutional Court had only two active members out of the nine provided for by law, while the Supreme Court had only four members out of 16. This led to the paralysis of both courts, creating a dangerous institutional vacuum and a significant backlog of unresolved cases,” warns Kthupi.
The process then continued with judges of the courts of appeal and courts of first instance. As approximately 40% of judges and prosecutors did not pass the screening, significant gaps in the judiciary and prosecutorial staff emerged.
"These gaps have led to a dramatic increase in the number of cases per judge and prosecutor and, consequently, to extraordinary delays, especially in court proceedings. To compensate for these shortcomings, the High Judicial Council was forced to adopt a new Court Map, concentrating judges in a smaller number of courts as a temporary solution due to the lack of sufficient staff," emphasizes the interlocutor of "Vijesti".
Kthupi warns that no scenario has been developed that would predict how many judges and prosecutors will fail the vetting process, how they will be replaced, and within what timeframe.
“The absence of such planning has caused serious difficulties in the normal functioning of the judicial system, difficulties that persist to this day. For example, the Court of Appeal in Tirana, which is currently the only appellate court in the country, is currently deciding on cases filed in 2018-2019, which represents a delay of almost eight years. Before the judicial reform, this delay was approximately 1,5-2 years. In the Court of First Instance in Tirana, the annual workload of judges has increased from 300-400 cases to more than 1.000 cases per year,” Rezart Kthupi illustrates some of the consequences of the implementation of vetting in Albania.
He emphasizes that the reform of the judiciary and prosecution was accompanied by amendments to the Civil Procedure Code and the Criminal Procedure Code, with the aim of simplifying court procedures, but their practical implementation is still far from the legislator's intention and therefore has not produced the desired effect.
"To date, there is no clear timeframe for the full renewal of the number of judges and prosecutors, nor is there a clear strategy or deadline for reducing the backlog of cases, nor a defined methodology for how this should be achieved," warns the lawyer.
“ARCHITECTURE” VETTINGA
Regarding the “architecture” of vetting, the supervisory body of the vetting process is the International Monitoring Operation (IMO). The IMO is composed of foreign experts delegated by international partners. Its role is to monitor the vetting process, request the implementation of more detailed investigations and ensure compliance with international standards. As a supervisory body, it has no judicial or decision-making powers, but only advisory ones.
The Independent Qualification Commission (IQC/KPK) is a 12-member body (which has ceased to operate at the time of writing), which decides in panels of three members. It evaluates subjects of the law (judges, prosecutors and legal assistants) based on three criteria: assets, personal integrity, and professional competence. The KPK can make three types of decisions - confirmation of office, dismissal from office or suspension of the vetting process in the event of resignation.
Public Commissioners also play an important role, representing the public interest and acting as parties to the proceedings. There are two Public Commissioners, who can participate in hearings, request additional investigations and appeal decisions of the PCC.
Finally, there is the Special Appeals Chamber (SAC/KPA), which is the second and final instance of the vetting system. It consists of seven members and decides in panels of five. It considers appeals filed by vetting entities and public commissioners. The decisions of the KPA are final and enforceable.
“The vetting process begins with the publication of a list of entities by the KPK. The KPK then collects information from various state institutions, including the High Inspectorate for Property Reporting and Audit, the Directorate for the Security of Classified Information, the State Intelligence Service, and the High Judicial Council or the High Prosecutorial Council. Citizens can submit information anonymously. Based on this material, the KPK prepares a report and shifts the burden of proof to the entity,” explains Kthupi.
Hearings are then held, after which the KPK issues a decision. Decisions can be challenged by appeal to the KPA. Dismissed subjects are suspended and receive half their salary until the appeal is decided.
"Objectivity and impartiality were ensured through several mechanisms: the constitutional status of the vetting body, fixed mandates, clearly defined criteria, adversarial proceedings, public hearings, reasoned decisions and the right to appeal, including the possibility of addressing the European Court of Human Rights," adds the "Vijesti" interlocutor.
Rezart Kthupi warns that, despite its legitimate aims, vetting inherently carries the risk of being used as a tool against political opponents or critical voices. This risk, he says, does not necessarily stem from overt political intent, but from the way the process is designed and implemented. Albania’s experience, he argues, shows that this risk can be significantly reduced, but never completely eliminated.
“In Albania, this risk was primarily addressed through institutional design. Vetting was applied universally and mandatory to all judges and prosecutors, without exception. The assessment criteria were clearly defined and limited to assets, integrity and professional competence, excluding political views or judicial beliefs. Decision-making authority was fragmented among multiple bodies, and international monitoring increased the political and institutional cost of manipulation. Transparency, public reasoning of decisions, appeal mechanisms and supervision by the European Court of Human Rights further strengthened the safeguards,” explains Kthupi.
In practice, according to this lawyer, despite political controversies, there is no credible evidence of systematic political abuse of vetting in Albania.
“The decisions affected judges and prosecutors who were perceived to be close to different political camps, and the appeals bodies overturned a significant number of first-instance decisions. The key lesson is that vetting should not be based on trust in individuals, but on an institutional architecture that limits discretion and strengthens accountability,” Kthupi argues.
Based on the experience from his country, Rezart Kthupi recommends that Montenegro first build an institutional architecture that guarantees the greatest possible independence of the vetting body and that the legal framework be prescribed in the highest legal act of the state.
“A country that initiates the vetting process fares better if it does not base it on ordinary laws. These laws depend on political will and can be changed unilaterally. Linking the vetting to laws that require a qualified majority is a guarantee of political consensus and serves as a check against any will to use the mechanism against political opponents,” explains Kthupi.
LAW, NOT A “WITCH HUNT”
According to him, universality and criteria are extremely important. Universality must be unquestionable because it is one of the strongest mechanisms against political abuse. If all judges and prosecutors are universally covered by vetting, then it is impossible to specifically “target” only political opponents through this process.
As for the criteria, they must be clear, narrow and evidence-based.
“This guarantees that decisions will be based solely on evidence and will not include other elements. The more precise the criteria and evidence, the more defensible the conclusions drawn on that basis will be,” adds Kthupi.
He emphasizes that guarantees of fair trial must be clear, real, and not merely symbolic.
“The KPA (Special Appeals Chamber) in Albania has overturned a significant number of decisions of the KPK (Independent Qualification Commission), giving the system greater credibility. On the other hand, the right to appeal KPA decisions to the European Court of Human Rights is an additional guarantee that the process is fair, based on the law, and not a “witch hunt” against political opponents. International supervision is an additional element to preserve the integrity of the process and its development in accordance with international standards,” emphasizes Rezart Kthupi.
And finally, for Rezart Kthupi, the most important condition for success is to minimize discretion and maximize accountability. Vetting works not because decision-makers are “virtuous,” but because the system leaves little room for arbitrariness.
“The Albanian experience shows that even in a polarized political environment, vetting can remain institutionally legitimate if it is universal, rules-based, transparent, appealable, time-limited, and independently monitored,” concludes Rezart Kthupi.
Ensuring the continuity of justice
One of Albania's most serious problems has been the sudden departure of a large number of judges and prosecutors, which has led to serious delays and a backlog of cases, says Kthupi.
"A country preparing for vetting should plan in parallel for recruitment, training and temporary capacity support. Cleaning up the system without ensuring continuity of justice risks undermining public support for the reform itself," he warns.
He emphasizes that capacity management is just as important as integrity:
“Because one of Albania’s most serious problems has been the sudden departure of a large number of judges and prosecutors, leading to serious delays and a backlog of cases. A country preparing for vetting should plan in parallel for recruitment, training and temporary capacity support. Cleaning up the system without ensuring continuity of justice risks undermining public support for the reform itself.”
Who are you Rezart Kthupi?
Rezart Kthupi is a legal expert with extensive experience in the fields of law and public administration. He graduated from the Faculty of Law, University of Tirana.
During his professional career, he served as Legal Advisor to the Assembly of the Republic of Albania, contributing to the drafting, revision and legal analysis of legislative acts. In parallel, he worked as a lawyer and was engaged in public administration for approximately 25 years, gaining consolidated experience in legal, institutional and public policy issues.
His professional profile is characterized by in-depth legal knowledge, institutional integrity and a strong commitment to the principles of the rule of law. His public work is focused on strengthening institutions, improving the quality of legislation and ensuring equal application of the law.
The key lesson is that vetting must not be based on trust in individuals, but on an institutional architecture that limits discretion and strengthens accountability.
Bonus video:
