Why the IOC gave up on esports — and what that really means

The IOC did not make a mistake by looking towards esports, but by choosing a path without sufficient institutional structure. The problem was not entering esports, but entering through the wrong door, reports Sportsin.

IOC and Saudi Arabia ended a 12-year partnership to develop the Olympic esports Games in October 2025, just 14 months after the deal was announced during the 2024 Paris Olympics. Riyadh was set to host the first edition in 2027, but both sides decided to go their separate ways. Olympic Committee he then announced that he would work on a new approach and a new partnership model for the project — a diplomatic way of acknowledging that the first attempt did not have a solid enough foundation.

The real problem: a system without management

The real problem is not that esports is digital, new, or commercial. The problem is that the global ecosystem does not function as an independent sports system. In many titles, the publisher owns the game and controls the licenses, rules, calendars, competitions, access, formats, and even integrity mechanisms. It is both a participant and an authority. The IOC did not destroy the Olympic esports project — it exposed its governance vacuum.

In traditional sports, federations do not own the ball, the field, or the discipline itself as a closed commercial product. In esports, by contrast, the publisher often owns the game, controls the competitive ecosystem, and decides how far outside intervention is allowed. This model may work commercially, but it is difficult to fit into the Olympic structure that requires independence, common rules, accountability, anti-doping control, integrity, eligibility, and national representation. Without independent regulatory oversight, agreed international rules, and recognized governing bodies, esports continues to function more as a commercial product than as a sporting system.

The Saudi model revealed the problem

The partnership with Saudi Arabia was supposed to accelerate everything — funding, host city selection, infrastructure, execution, and visibility. Its early end showed that the project lacked a strong enough backbone. When the strategic partner disappeared, so did the illusion that there was a global structure ready to host the Olympic esports Games. When the funds disappeared, so did the illusion of structure.

This structural weakness is compounded by a leadership problem. The Olympic esports project has been linked to Ng Ser Miang, an IOC member from Singapore and the figure who has been linked to the entire process — with public allegations of a possible conflict of interest related to Virtual Taekwondo, a title developed by Refract Technologies, a company linked to his family circle. The IOC has maintained that Ng acted in accordance with the rules and that there is no evidence against him, but the controversy has damaged the project’s perception of independence. In an ecosystem already plagued by doubts about governance, the shadow has accelerated the loss of trust.

The end of the partnership does not mean that Saudi Arabia has lost interest in esports. On the contrary, the country continues to invest heavily in the sector as part of its strategy for sports, entertainment and economic diversification. The Esports World Cup in Riyadh announced a record prize pool of $70 million in 2025, with 24 games and a clear ambition to transform the country into a global hub for competitive gaming. This shows that the problem was not just money. The problem was governance. Capital can create events, buy visibility and attract publishers, but it cannot replace a recognizable, independent and stable institutional architecture.

Why IESF is the only sustainable path

The alternative that the IOC ignored — or did not sufficiently integrate, at least not in a fully federalized logic — is International Esports Federation (IESF). Her model does not resolve all the conflicts in the sector, as publishers still hold key power, but it starts from a logic more compatible with international sport: national federations, territorial representation, regulated competitions and a common framework. If esports wants the Olympics, it needs governance, not publishers.

The Global Esports Federation (GEF) is, in effect, out of the picture when it comes to leading a credible reconstruction of the Olympic project. The IOC’s strategic mistake was not to enter esports. The move made sense — Olympism needs to connect with a young audience, and gaming is one of the largest cultural communities in the world. The mistake was to try to build an Olympic product on a commercial and geopolitical basis before answering the institutional questions: who governs, who regulates, who represents the athletes, who guarantees integrity, and who makes the rules.

The IOC’s withdrawal should be understood as a reset, not a final verdict against esports. The Olympic future of the sector requires structure before scale, independence before spectacle, and governance before money. Olympic esports did not fail because the concept made no sense. The global esports model failed in the form in which it is currently constructed. And until that changes, esports will have to adapt to the standards of sport — not expect sport to lower its standards.