On the twentieth anniversary of the October 5 events that ousted Slobodan Milošević from power, Serbia is facing similar or even the same problems as then: fragile democratic institutions, intolerant public discourse, irreconcilable political divisions, unresolved national disputes from the 1990s.
In the end, Milošević's close allies from 1990 returned to power.
The paradox of the transition in Serbia is that even now, as well as on the eve of October 5, 2000, a situation has been created in which it is almost impossible to change the government in regular elections.
How did the coup happen?
During the 1990s, the opposition tried to threaten Milosevic's rule, although it was in an unequal position.
The regime at that time was first seriously shaken in the demonstrations on March 9, 1991, and then by the victory of the opposition in the local elections in about 40 large cities in 1996, which the authorities did not recognize at first. Three months of protests followed, after which the election results were confirmed by Lex specialis.
After the NATO bombing and the war in Kosovo in 1999, citizen dissatisfaction grew and Vojislav Koštunica, as a candidate of the opposition bloc DOS (Democratic Opposition of Serbia), defeated Slobodan Milošević in the elections in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on September 24, 2000.
However, the then authorities again refused to accept the results, which led to massive demonstrations that culminated on October 5 in Belgrade, after which Milošević admitted defeat.
The circumstances under which the until then undisputed Serbian leader agreed to step down are still not fully known to this day, but in many ways they influenced the later trends in Serbia that are still current today.
Historian Dubravka Stojanović tells Radio Free Europe (RSE) that it was some kind of coup, although even that is not a sufficient explanation.
"Because no coup or limited revolution, such as the Russian one, would have succeeded and been sufficient if it had not been mature in society. There was a mature and branched opposition that worked and prepared the ground for a decade. Of course, we should by no means forget the difficult legacy of wars, sanctions, isolation and finally the bombing, which all together affected the mass mood of the people towards Milosevic.
That is, everything that led to the success of the opposition in the elections of September 24, 2000," Stojanović points out.
According to her, the question arose as to how to confirm that victory since Milosevic was not ready to admit defeat.
"There are many hints and even some generals like (Nebojša) Pavković testified that there were orders for the army to attack the people. Therefore, the question arises as to what happened on the streets on October 5, which for me is one of the main arguments for the thesis about the coup. Namely, that famous fraternization between the police and members of the army and the citizens happened very quickly on the streets of Belgrade," says Stojanović.
She believes that this strengthens the thesis "that the apparatus of power, certainly some other parts and the elite, have come to the conclusion that Milošević's survival threatens them".
"Especially with the Hague Court, opening the issue of war crimes, and that it is necessary to distance themselves from it and go to the side of the opposition", says Stojanović.
Ripe changes
Dimitar Bechev, a professor at the University of North Carolina and the author of, among other things, the book "Rival Power: Russia's Influence in Southeast Europe" (Rival Power: Russia's Influence in Southeast Europe), tells RSE that although the opposition during Milošević's rule was not had a level playing field, managed to gather critical mass and energy for change.
"The changes on October 5 didn't just happen, out of nowhere. It should be remembered that the opposition came to power in key cities in the local elections in 1996, then managed to mobilize citizens in various ways, so October 5 was only a point of confusion, i.e. a turning point. We can guess what kind of agreements were made behind the scenes, but the broader picture is clear that the majority wanted changes," Bećev points out.
In any case, the question arises as to what would have happened had it not been for the agreement of the then opposition and parts of the old security apparatus.
Dubravka Stojanović believes that there would be bloodshed.
"Milošević was ready to defend his own government at the cost of all our lives. So, I believe that there would be some kind of civil war. In this sense, we could say that it was very wise to make some kind of prior agreement and ensure a peaceful and, as it were, celebratory transition that happened on October 5. But, today we know that that apparatus remained and eventually came to the head of Zoran Đinđić and in that way further consolidated his power until today," Stojanović points out.
It reminds of the tragic experiences of civil wars in other countries.
"There is no country that has come out of civil wars in good shape. Here, we see a Spain that, almost a century after its civil war, is only now beginning to face it and raise the question of monuments and common graves. So, most certainly, democracy in Serbia would not be better if there really was a bloody conflict over its future", specifies Stojanović.
Did October 5th happen?
Many believe that one of the reasons for the later turbulence that Serbia faced, the blockade of reforms and the eventual return to power of Milošević's allies - the absence of October 6, that is, the dismantling of the institutions of the previous regime, so that the structures of the "deep state" continued to function.
The opposition faced various restrictions, Leonard Cohen (Cohen), professor emeritus at the Canadian Simon Fraser University and author of two books on the Balkans: "Broken Bonds" (Broken Bonds) and "The Viper in the Bosom: The Rise and the fall of Slobodan Milosevic" (Serpent in the Bossom: The Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milosevic).
"The opposition did not have structural mechanisms, tools and power at its disposal. "Succeeded in getting together in order to overthrow Milošević, who was weakened after the NATO intervention, but not to agree and carry out a lustration and remove the old political apparatus", emphasizes Cohen.
At the same time, Dubravka Stojanović believes that apart from the 6th, there was also no 5th of October, as a synonym for essential changes.
"Well, I said that there was no October 5th in the sense that the victory of the people did not happen. So, that coup happened, that is, the victory of the security forces who agreed with the opposition parts. We see until today that some kind of agreement that the security forces would go over to the side of the opposition, and that they would no longer question them afterwards. That was Kostunica's policy immediately, already on October 5, that there must be no discontinuity, lustration, removal of all those cadres who in 1990 participated in the destruction of Serbia and everything around Serbia," emphasizes Stojanović.
The conflict between Kostunica and Đinđić
This issue of continuity and discontinuity soon led to a conflict between two key figures, Vojislav Koštunica and Zoran Đinđić, who in the meantime became the Prime Minister of Serbia.
"We saw that very soon after the escalation of that conflict, the so-called the strike of special units of the Red Berets, which closed one of the most important Belgrade bridges, the Gazela. Kostunica naturally justified their protest, which forced Djindjic to make some very dramatic and fatal changes in the security apparatus.
Therefore, I think that all those events afterwards, and first of all the blockade of the Gazelle by special units led by Zvezdan Jovanović, later the assassin of Djindjic, are in fact indicators that October 5 did not happen.
In other words, that those security forces, who had many reasons to fear because of their role in the war, provided themselves with that agreement not only survival, but also continuity of control," believes Stojanović.
One of the problems was that DOS brought together 19 parties and organizations of various political orientations, so it acted incoherently.
Dimitar Bećev points out that this was necessary in order to overthrow a powerful politician like Milošević.
"Such coalitions are not unique to Serbia. In recent local elections in Turkey, a broad coalition was also created in which left-wing, then Kurdish and nationalist parties entered. The same thing happened in local elections in Hungary in the opposition's effort to oppose Orban.
After all, in the demonstrations against Vučić, parties of various orientations gathered, which in other circumstances would have been opposed to each other. However, such coalitions are very fragile, short-term and eventually fall apart, which also happened in Serbia," says Bećev.
DOS formally disbanded in the fall of 2003, after Prime Minister Đinđić was assassinated in the spring, on March 12.
Serbia, a divided society
Lenard Cohen points out that after the fall of Milosevic, he thought it would be an opportunity to turn a new page in the history of Serbia under the leadership of Vojislav Koštunica and others.
"However, it turned out that Kostunica is not a person who can fulfill those expectations. He did not act as a moderate conservative leader who can bring together political groups on the left and right," adds Cohen.
According to him, Serbian society is historically imbued with strong authoritarian features supporting a strong leader who follows national interests.
"Also, Serbia is a divided society in which there is a very weak political center. It has historically gravitated as a center-left. However, there was a lack of consensus between the moderate left and right, which is the basis of modern liberal leadership and politics. Unfortunately, divisions with extremes on both wings of the political spectrum and with an emphasized role of leader," Cohen believes.
Without dealing with the legacy of war
The new authorities faced many challenges, first of all the establishment of democratic institutions, the resolution of the Kosovo issue, cooperation with the Hague Tribunal, then the economic reconstruction of a country severely affected by wars, international sanctions, and corruption.
However, they too were soon exposed to criticism for corruption, first of all for predatory privatization, then for pressuring the media and other undemocratic actions.
Dubravka Stojanović believes that one of the biggest mistakes of the DOS government is that it never fundamentally questioned Serbia's war program from the 1990s.
"I think that's key and it's something that we're still living in living mud because of." So, we are still not only riveted by those issues, but they are constantly dragging us down, whether it is Kosovo or Republika Srpska, and now Montenegro.
So, in 2000, no one, not even Djindjic, said what Serbia was doing in those wars of the 1990s, what was the responsibility of the Serbian side, what were the war goals, which, mind you, were publicly stated. Milošević did not hide his war aims at all," Stojanović points out.
She believes that if this had been done then, with the new policy towards Kosovo, Serbia would be a much healthier society today.
"We are still close to the EU for a month, next month our closest brother is the Chinese president and then suddenly Donald Trump appears who solves all the issues. Therefore, these wanderings in foreign policy also open up space for external interference in the internal affairs of Serbia", he assesses. Stojanovic.
However, many believe that the hands of the then united opposition, later the new government, were tied, since that block also included disgruntled nationalists who believe that Milosevic betrayed Serbian national interests.
"It is a key issue and it was apparently Djindjic's assessment that this is not the time to open these issues. But soon the Hague Tribunal appeared, which brought indictments against Milošević, (Radovan) Karadžić and (Ratko) Mladić as early as the 1990s.
So I always had the impression, maybe wrong, that at that moment of some political catharsis in 2000, society was perhaps the most ready to hear what it needed to hear and was the most aware of the depth of the abyss in which we found ourselves, especially after the bombing." points out Stojanović.
Strengthening of radicals
In any case, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) enjoyed enormous support only at the beginning.
Thus, in the elections for the Assembly of Serbia in December 1990, she won about 64 percent of the votes, and the Serbian Radical Party only slightly more than eight percent.
Public opinion polls show that the last time DOS had convincing support from citizens was after the murder of Zoran Đinđić.
However, in the parliamentary elections at the end of that year, the political configuration was significantly changed, as the Serbian Radical Party won 27,6 percent of the vote, becoming the strongest group in the Serbian Parliament, despite the DOS campaign to overthrow the party of Vojislav Šešelj, who was then detained in The Hague, Serbia returned in the 1990s.
The divided members of DOS, which appeared individually, were significantly behind the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) of Vojislav Koštunica, which received 17,7 percent.
However, they managed to overcome their differences and form a government with Koštunica at the helm.
A similar scenario was repeated in the 2008 elections, as the Radicals were once again the strongest party - 29,4 percent - and were close to power because they had an agreement with Koštunica and the Socialist Party of Serbia on the formation of a parliamentary majority, but Milosevic's former party made an unexpected move. by joining the coalition with Tadić's Democrats, who won 38,4 votes in a joint performance with several other parties.
Dimitar Bećev reminds that in all post-socialist countries the opposition came to power at some point.
"Boris Tadić managed for some time, thanks to international support, to delay the moment when the radicals, or later the progressives, took over the helm of the country. Thus, in 2008, he remained in power with a narrow majority thanks to a coalition with the Socialists. Therefore, it was expected that at some point Vučić and (Tomislav) Nikolić would come to the head of the state.
"After Seselj left for The Hague, the radicals, then the progressives, successfully mobilized supporters since sometime in 2004," recalls Bećev.
In 2008, the Declaration on Political Reconciliation between the Democratic Party and the Socialist Party was signed with the aim, as stated, of overcoming historical divisions in Serbian society.
However, Dubravka Stojanović believes that Boris Tadić wanted to secure power.
"And that was provided to him by the socialists. I was, of course, strongly against it at the time and we saw that it was in fact just an opportunity skillfully used by Ivica Dačić to further strengthen and position himself as a factor without which there is no government in Serbia. But, again, I think that that moment is not crucial, but that so-called continuity after October 5 and the fact that there was no truly essential reckoning with the Milošević period," emphasizes Stojanović.
Charges of national treason
The issue of Kosovo also had a great influence on the internal political scene of Serbia. Vučić and Nikolić, when they were in the opposition, accused Tadić of treason even for shaking hands at the airport in passing with the President of Kosovo, Hashim Thaci, while they later started a dialogue with Pristina.
The nationalist and especially the ultra-nationalist card has always been strong in Serbia, says Leonard Cohen.
"Vučić plays that card extremely successfully. He does not want to recognize Kosovo until he gets what he wants from the EU. "Tadic faced problems and restrictions because that nationalist card was used against him and Vučić, as an opposition politician, skillfully used it," Cohen points out.
Admittedly, according to Dimitar Bećev, Tadić also flirted with nationalism, which revived after the declaration of Kosovo's independence in 2008, enabling Russia's influence in Serbian politics.
However, Vučić is in a better position when it comes to negotiations with Kosovo because it is more difficult to accuse him of betrayal, unlike Tadić, who is suspected from the very beginning of betraying national interests.
"The notion of national betrayal is, unfortunately, very strongly rooted in Serbian political culture, although the younger generations might want to support a leader who would offer a reasonable solution and face the reality when it comes to Kosovo. For that, a new generation of wise politicians is needed," says Cohen.
Robbery privatization
During the 2000s, Serbia also faced enormous economic problems.
Most of the Serbian economy at that time was in an undefined ownership status with state and social ownership.
Therefore, the new authorities began the transformation of companies and financial institutions.
Dubravka Stojanović says that catastrophic mistakes were made.
"One of the worst privatizations was carried out, even though Đinđić himself said that, fortunately, we have many experiences from Eastern Europe in mind and we will not repeat them. On the contrary, we did it in one of the worst ways. We have completely destroyed our industrial production", Stojanović points out.
She cites corruption as the reason, but also the absence of a clear vision of which way Serbia should go.
"In the end, we are in a dead end with very problematic Chinese loans, in large debts, with unclear investments, non-transparent contracts regarding the most important things such as NIS (Oil Industry of Serbia) or Air Serbia. Therefore, these are all the consequences of unclear, corrupt and bad decisions made since 2000", states Stojanović.
Tadic's imitation of Milošević
In addition to the burden of the Kosovo issue and dubious privatizations, the then authorities were also criticized for the above-mentioned pressure on the media, as well as the method of electing judges.
Dimitar Bećev believes that Tadić failed to significantly reform Serbia.
"It can be said that he reproduced part of the system from Milosevic's time. According to the Constitution, Serbia is defined as a parliamentary republic. However, Tadić, like Milošević, in practice created a powerful presidential system, which Vučić renewed after the presidential elections in 2017. This means informal rule by bypassing institutions," Bećev assesses.
The arrival of progressives in power in 2012.
Tadić and his gang, although exposed to more and more frequent criticism, instead of correcting the policy, still count on the blank support of the citizens in fear that the radicals, i.e. the progressives, will not come to power, which, according to many opinions, took revenge on them in the 2012 elections, in which she won. The Serbian Progressive Party, which was created by separating from the Serbian Radical Party.
Lenard Cohen points out that the liberal intelligentsia also contributed to Vučić's rise due to indifference and criticism towards Tadić, partly with reason.
"Therefore, Tadić bears the blame because he failed to mobilize a stronger political center that would ensure his legitimacy in order to politically survive the coup by Vučić and Nikolić, who at that time were establishing the Serbian Progressive Party," says Cohen.
Bećev believes that it is a combination of the successful mobilization of progressives with the missed opportunities of the then authorities led by Boris Tadić.
By the way, it is often stated in the Serbian media that Tadić played one of the key roles in the formation of the Serbian Progressive Party with the aim of moving the extreme part of Serbian radicals towards the moderate, pro-European right and pacifying the political scene in Serbia, which was very antagonistic.
Dubravka Stojanović has reservations about that thesis, pointing out that it can now be said that this turn brought Vučić to power.
"But I believe that something like that would have happened otherwise. Because if we look at other European scenes, for example the National Front in France, that's where Marine Le Pen came up with the idea of somehow cleaning up her movement, changing its name, making it more acceptable.
Here, we see now in Germany that the AfD is also punishing some of its extreme members, excluding them from the party. So I believe that the radicals themselves would have come up with that idea, although the party would not have split, but if they moderated their speech a little, wouldn't they fare better", believes Stojanović.
She adds that maybe Tadić's move was tactically wise, but that the main problem is that the necessary reforms were not implemented after October 5, 2000.
"This left an empty space for the activities of socialists, progressives and everyone else. That, in my opinion, was a key mistake", emphasizes Stojanović.
Changed international circumstances
In contrast to the 1990s, when Serbia was treated as a world pariah, at a time when, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, enthusiasm for liberal democracy grew everywhere, at the moment when Vučić came to power, the international environment changed significantly with the strengthening of populism, before especially in Hungary and Poland.
Dimitar Bećev believes that this further strengthened Vučić's position.
"Apart from ideological reasons, the impact of the global financial crisis from 2008 should also be taken into account. At the same time, Vučić knew how to skilfully play on pro-European rhetoric with certain economic and structural reforms, without essentially changing the political ideology.
Unlike Milosevic, who was rigid, Vučić presented himself in a new light as a reformist in combination with authoritarian nationalism. It is the same model applied by Orban, or Nikola Gruevski when he was in power in North Macedonia. That hybrid type of politician has proven to be very adaptable and resilient," Bećev points out.
Leonard Cohen recalls that Vučić supported Milošević's policies in the 1990s.
"After all, we are witnessing the emergence of politicians in a new guise, pragmatic ones who formally opt for the European Union, but who function in a historical, cultural and economic context that is not favorable for essential reforms. Therefore, all this did not contribute to a step forward, but to regression, that is, to the re-strengthening of authoritarianism and populism," emphasizes Cohen.
Dubravka Stojanović points out that the situation in the world does not favor democracy in Serbia.
"We have now seen what it means when suddenly Grenell (Richard, adviser to the American president for dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia) and Trump intervened and brought Serbia into an awkward diplomatic situation according to a whole series of factors in the world.
We have Europe in a deep crisis, Xi Jinping with a very aggressive national policy, Erdogan, we have a whole series of crisis areas that strengthen these autocratic regimes. We are coming to an economic crisis due to the corona virus, which will further strengthen these autocratic regimes," says Stojanović.
She adds that Serbia used to be mostly alone at a turning point, but which now coincided with a world turning point.
"Of course we all want this to be an incentive for all democratic forces who will say that only united can we overcome all these problems, and that only freedom can be the right solution.
But, unfortunately, previous historical experiences were not good and showed that moments of major crises are precisely moments of strengthening of authoritarian and totalitarian orders. In that sense, Serbia would fit in well with world trends", believes Stojanović.
In Bećev's opinion, Vučić is a politician "in the right place at the right time".
"A lot of things went in his favor since 2012, so it can be said that the wind was blowing at his back," states Bećev.
A one-party state
As a result of such a policy, Dubravka Stojanović believes that pluralism has been extinguished in Serbia.
"We are witnesses today that we have not only returned to the one-party state in which we have lived since the 19th century, but to a one-party state. I repeat, not only because of the way the Serbian Progressive Party rules, not only because of the failed opposition boycott policy, but because pluralism has somehow been extinguished, which is also the responsibility of the democratic government after 2000," Stojanović points out.
She therefore agrees with the assessment that the situation is worse now than in the 1990s when it comes to the space for expressing a different opinion.
"It's a paradox of the Serbian transition, but it's also a true picture of that broken society and the previous system and the 1990s and everything that happened.
If we look at the media, it was freer in the 1990s. The non-governmental sector was full of enthusiasm and very good actions, and now it has completely died down. And, of course, if we look at the party scene, we hardly feel today's opposition. Therefore, we do not know what their programs are, nor what exactly they want, nor how they see key issues such as Kosovo, Europe, Russia, further economic development", Stojanović assesses.
For her, the key question is why Serbian society allowed the populist government to completely destroy institutions like an "octopus".
"Why didn't it offer more resistance? Why did that famous fear immediately take over? Why didn't anyone fight for those freedoms supposedly won on October 5. That's where my fear comes from, that even on October 5, no one asked for real freedom, but for a change of government that became too burdensome and dangerous for everyone," Stojanović points out.
Between boycott and rebellion
Due to the violation of democratic norms, in the report of Freedom House, Serbia was classified for the first time since 2003 in the category of "hybrid regimes" and not "partially consolidated democracies".
Citizens are increasingly apathetic, so only 15 percent of them believe that the changes on October 5, 2000, were the beginning of a democratic transformation, according to a 2014 survey by the National Institute for Democracy (NDI).
Leonard Cohen points out that many young people, especially those with a liberal orientation, are leaving the country en masse, so that the electorate that would support this new political option is getting narrower.
"Young people leave because of the arbitrary role of the state and the bureaucratic apparatus, because in state companies and agencies, the main criterion for getting a job is often not knowledge, but political orientation and loyalty. That's why if they want to progress, they have to go abroad. This means that the potential electorate that would support moderate politics is narrowing," Cohen points out.
The opposition boycotted the parliamentary elections this year, stressing that there are no conditions for equal competition. Therefore, many believe that the only way to change the government is the outpouring of citizens' discontent on the streets, that is, some "new, October 5".
Dubravka Stojanović recalls that all rulers in Serbia from Karađorđe to Đinđić, except for Josip Broz Tito, were forcibly removed.
"According to that, it is our longer continuity for which both the government and the opposition are responsible. Of course the government always more. But also the opposition that does nothing to fight for those institutions, to try to bring about change in a peaceful way.
In my opinion, that was the fatal mistake of this boycott because Vučić now has absolute power. He is preparing the presidential elections, which of course he has to win with, what Milošević would say, 104 percent of the votes," Stojanović points out.
She believes that the opposition is also pushing Serbia into a physical confrontation, which is always risky.
"And which, which is also extremely important, by no means guarantees a subsequent democratic transition, which we saw on October 5. So, we would once again have some pioneers, saviors, some who would so magically give us freedom in something they called a revolution. And again, we would have a very non-transparent situation that could give absolute power to those liberators and winners," Stojanović points out.
Bad experience with revolutions
In the opinion of Dimitar Bećev, if there are no institutional mechanisms for sanctioning the responsibility of politicians and equal conditions for political competition, then street demonstrations are probably the only channel for expressing the dissatisfaction of the opposition and putting pressure on the government.
"It will be very difficult for the opposition to shake Vučić's regime because he is very sophisticated, enjoys considerable support and still has legitimacy in the West.
However, even if the opposition does not manage to shake the government, it will surely try repeatedly to express its discontent on the street. Therefore, the Serbian political scene will be even more polarized and will lead to increased political instability despite the regime's promise to ensure predictability," Bećev believes.
Leonard Cohen is skeptical about the idea of a new "5. of October", i.e. the revolution against Vučić's regime, because in his opinion those protesting on the street do not have a clear idea of how to overcome serious social problems.
"Therefore, quality leadership, timely support from the EU and a combination of several other factors will be needed to enable a democratic transition. At this moment, there is no room for much optimism, because Vučić effectively controls all the levers of power.
In order for a change of government to occur, a group of skilled and persistent young leaders are needed who would achieve this through joint efforts," Cohen believes.
Serbia, like other countries, was hit by the economic crisis and other problems. However, in Dubravka Stojanović's opinion, it is difficult to articulate citizens' dissatisfaction.
"So, we are not at zero, but below zero," she is convinced.
It also indicates that the Turkish opposition managed to win in Ankara and Istanbul under difficult conditions, as did the Hungarian opposition in Budapest and other big cities.
He adds that the recent success of the Montenegrin opposition, which performed in three columns, is also instructive.
"Accordingly, it is not impossible. However, after this boycott it becomes more difficult. So I'm afraid that there is more real an outpouring of anger from citizens like we saw on the streets in July. So, suddenly because of some government measure, in this case the return of the curfew, the citizens exploded.
These are dangerous situations and they can not only lead to victims, but also to an extremely uncertain outcome. So we don't have good experiences with revolutions. No one has that good experience," concludes Stojanović.
Bonus video:
