Real change in Serbia will only come when a credible opposition party or coalition that can win the elections appears. In the West, they look through the fingers of the president Aleksandar Vučić because they still need a reliable interlocutor in Belgrade on the issue of Kosovo, BiH, migration, and because he keeps the presence of China and Russia at a tolerable level.
Administration of the President of the USA Joe Biden he treats Vučić as an interlocutor because he does not see an adequate replacement anywhere, while at the same time disciplining him and warning him how far he can go, he said in an interview for "Vijesti" Vuk Vuksanovic, senior researcher at the Belgrade Center for Security Policy and associate of the foreign policy institute IDEAS at the London School of Economics and Political Science.
The authorities of Serbia often point out that it beats the countries of the former Yugoslavia in terms of economic progress. Is the economy of Serbia as powerful as it is presented?
The focus of the Serbian government is playing with statistical data related to the economy and triumphant comparison with its neighbors. Croatia is particularly interesting in this regard. However, Serbian economists often dispute official statistics and point out that they are used for political spin. At the moment, the economy is not doing so badly, considering the shock of the pandemic. However, the question of all questions is whether this will be the situation in the next four to six months. Due to the election cycle, the government is trying to prevent any economic shock before the election. The way he is struggling to secure a favorable gas price with Moscow and the panic caused by the current electricity supply crisis are indicators of this behavior.
Political relations between Serbia and Montenegro are at a very low level. Do you think it affects other areas of cooperation?
Cooperation in areas such as the economy, education, health will continue as normal because these are areas where not only governments but also citizens are referred to each other. However, the political relationship remains a major and unresolved issue because despite the change of government in Montenegro, the relationship has not improved.
In the spring of 2022, Serbia is going through an election cycle - presidential and parliamentary elections, as well as elections in Belgrade. Are there conditions for free elections, and in connection with that, what are the chances of the united opposition?
If the opposition hopes to get fair terms from a coalition that controls all institutions and will mobilize all possible resources to win the elections, they can forget about it. For the opposition, the only option is trench warfare for every vote. Just as the opposition in Turkey achieved successes against Erdogan in the elections in Istanbul and other large urban centers. However, so far the leaders leading the Serbian opposition have not succeeded in animating and winning over those voters dissatisfied with the Serbian government. It is possible that for some of them these elections will be the last chance.
How important is it for the opposition to come up with a common candidate for president and who, in your opinion, should it be?
From the point of view of political pragmatism, a common candidate would certainly be a logical move, especially when you have such a powerful opponent from the other side. I don't have the name of a potential candidate, but we see that the opposition is having trouble agreeing on other issues as well. For example, related to the referendum on changing the constitution in January 2022, where some are calling for a boycott, and some want to come out and vote against it.
Do you think that Vučić softened his stance on the unpopular Rio Tinto mine to reduce pressure before the elections and that the project will continue in the second half of 2022?
That is absolutely the primary reason for that decision. President Vučić saw that it was a hot issue for the public. However, it will not be easy to stop the project, we have even seen a statement from Rio Tinto that the project is continuing. However, I think that this will not be the end of this crisis, since Rio Tinto is no longer just a symbol of environmental protests in Serbia, but also a symbol of the fight against the arbitrariness of the government. It is difficult for Vučić to reverse the decision because he is attracted by profit, and there is also the interest of the US in preventing Serbian lithium deposits from falling into the hands of the Chinese. The machine is very difficult to stop, and the resistance in Serbian society turned out to be very strong. I expect Rio Tinto to be an explosive issue in 2022 as well.
Can public pressure lead to Serbia progressing in terms of democratic responsibility?
It turned out that civil society and civil disobedience at this stage are the only brakes on the arbitrary moves of the government. Even before the environmental protests related to Rio Tinto, we had environmental protests in Belgrade, after which the government temporarily closed a mine and a company owned by Chinese companies due to non-compliance with environmental standards. The draft law on internal affairs, which was supposed to legalize the use of biometric surveillance, was withdrawn due to the resistance of civil society organizations. However, these are only correctives. Real change will not happen until a credible opposition party or coalition emerges that can win the elections.
What would you highlight as positive moves by the government in the last 10 years?
It's hard to say. Maybe the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina in Brussels or the economy.
Does the West still look down on Vučić because it believes that relations with Kosovo can be normalized with his help?
In the beginning, the main motive was Kosovo. However, they still need a reliable interlocutor in Belgrade on other issues, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina. We should not forget the issue of migration, as well as the fact that, at least for now, he keeps the presence of China and Russia at a tolerable level. The Biden administration, for example, has a very specific approach. They absolutely treat him as an interlocutor because they do not see an adequate replacement anywhere, while at the same time they discipline him and warn him of his limits by imposing sanctions on his associates and allies.
Rio Tinto is no longer just a symbol of environmental protests in Serbia, but also a symbol of the fight against the arbitrariness of the authorities. It is difficult for Vučić to reverse the decision because he is attracted by profit, and there is also a US interest in preventing Serbian lithium deposits from falling into the hands of the Chinese.
What do you think about the accusations of some MEPs that the European Commission became politicized during the mandate of Oliver Varhelji (enlargement commissioner) in the interests of the axis between Vučić and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán?
It's not the first time I've heard that information. I think that it certainly has some foundation in the truth, that Hungary, as an EU member, protects the interests of the Serbian government in Brussels. Oliver Varhelji is undoubtedly useful as a lobbyist for both Belgrade and Budapest.
What drives the partnership between Vučić and Orban?
The dominant explanation is that it is the compatibility of political regimes, since both countries qualify as hybrid regimes or, as some call them, illiberal democracies, countries that have elections but no rule of law. However, that is only one of the reasons. Orban as a figure, is much more ideologically committed to the idea of illiberal democracy, and wants to be an international brand in that field. Vučić, on the other hand, is a pragmatist who is interested in retaining power. Therefore, there are other motives. Fear of a new migrant crisis is a cohesive factor. Also, Hungary would like to have another friendly government in the EU, and with the membership of Serbia, it would cease to be an external border of the EU (with the exception of the smaller border with Ukraine). The Serbian government responds that Hungary is lobbying in its favor in Brussels. We should not forget the Hungarian community, which is part of the ruling coalition in Serbia. Orban invests in the Hungarian community in Serbia, which suits Vučić, since Hungarian parties are part of his government, while Orban can promote himself to his public as a patriot who cares about Hungarians abroad.
Why do right-wing groups in Serbia see the state as an ally?
Because the ruling coalition sees an interest in the existence of right-wing groups that it can control. They can be used as a form of pressure and intimidation of opponents of the government. At the same time, they are also useful on the international level, where Vučić can tell the West that if they undermine him, someone worse than him can come to them. A similar tactic, albeit slightly toned down, is what he is Slobodan Milosevic once used with Vojislav Šešelj. The key question is what about those right-wingers who are not under government control and how much of a threat they are.
You said that the Serbian authorities fear that the leadership of the Republika Srpska could drag them into an unnecessary conflict and that the leaders of the RS fear that Belgrade could betray them in some big settlement with the West. How likely is the fall of Milorad Dodik in that way?
Such a development would not be the only, nor sufficient, factor that could lead to a fall Dodika in the Republic of Srpska, but it would certainly be part of the calculation. We can already see that Vučić is distancing himself rhetorically from Dodik, because at the moment when he is running for re-election and when he has Kosovo, he does not need the West knocking on his door because of Dodik. In addition, the public in Serbia can be satisfied with the fact that Serbs in Bosnia have their autonomy through the existence of Republika Srpska and it is totally irrelevant to them who is in power in Banja Luka. As for Kosovo, on the other hand, the elections in Serbia continue to be lost there. With that, I can absolutely imagine a scenario where Vučić cuts his ties with Dodik in order to buy himself credit in the West, and to ease potential pressures related to Kosovo and the decline of the rule of law. He would also get rid of a disobedient ally and potential competitor, since Dodik is trying to impose himself as a kind of leader of the Serbs in the region, even if only symbolically.
You also said that there is no axis between Belgrade, Moscow and the Bosnian Serbs, and that a major settlement between Belgrade and Sarajevo is not excluded? Can you clarify?
This was primarily related to breaking the conventional wisdom, which is very present among certain regional and international commentators, that Banjaluka acts on the basis of instructions from Belgrade, and that Belgrade acts on the basis of instructions from Moscow. However, the debate regarding the crisis in Bosnia before the UN showed a different picture. Russia is the one that energetically stood behind Dodik, because it wants to obstruct the West and to ask for something in return. Serbia, for the reasons I have already described, was balanced and cautious during that debate. Even on that occasion, Bakir Izetbegović publicly emphasized Serbia's balanced position. However, that was not the only signal. Izetbegović spoke about the joint declaration of condemnation of both Srebrenica and NDH crimes against Serbs in today's Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as his willingness to come to Belgrade and talk with Vučić. All this led me to believe that there is an idea of an agreement that would resemble some kind of reconciliation between Serbs and Bosniaks, but which would also lead to an agreement on the reorganization of Bosnia in a way that suits both Serbs and Bosniaks, as well as relations between Belgrade and Sarajevo. That idea is frozen for now. Izetbegović was criticized in Sarajevo for a potential conversation with Vučić. There was an affair related to the mural Ratko Mladić in Belgrade, and Izetbegović also made some statements that were not well received by the government in Belgrade. However, I am still more optimistic about the possibility of an agreement between Belgrade and Sarajevo than in the case of Belgrade and Zagreb.
Polls have shown that Serbs consider China to be a bigger friend than the European Union, which has given Serbia the most financial support. Do Chinese investors have a privileged position and is Serbia threatened with debt slavery to China?
The Serbian government sees in China a source of easy cash for the economy, but also a powerful instrument of political promotion. The positive view of China is largely a product of that reality. Consequently, the Serbian government is also ready to turn a blind eye to inadequate standards (eg environmental and labor standards) that China brings. Among China experts, there has long been a concept of "debt trap diplomacy," where a country that receives Chinese loans becomes politically dependent on China because it cannot pay off its debts. This has already happened to Montenegro, but Western banks came to the rescue. Whether this will happen to Serbia also depends on whether its economy will grow so much that it can absorb its debts to China. For now, the risks to which Serbia is exposed in relation to China concern environmental pollution, violation of workers' rights and non-transparent contracts.
What Vučić promised Putin, we will find out when it is too late
Will Serbia pay dearly for the cheap gas it currently receives from Russia?
I'm sure they will. The current price applies only for the next six months, until the heating season is over and the elections are held in Serbia. Then comes the trauma of new price negotiations. The key question is what Vucic had to promise Putin to get this gas price for the next six months because I am convinced that Putin used the meeting in Sochi to discipline Vucic. We won't find out until it's too late, but some concessions could be very risky for Belgrade, such as, for example, a new purchase of Russian weapons, which risks making Serbia a target of American sanctions.
Turkey's capacities in the Balkans are limited
What is the policy of Turkey towards the Balkans?
Neo-Ottomanism is no longer talked about. That concept did not go down well, primarily in the Middle East. However, despite this, the Balkans is striking in that it is the only region where Turkish foreign policy has seen some success, at least when compared to the problems Turkey has in the Middle East, the eastern Mediterranean, and elsewhere. Turkey will use every opportunity to strengthen its political influence and to strengthen economic partnerships. Turkey has even managed to profit by strengthening its relationship with Serbia since late 2017, profiting by showing that it is not a country that tries to be solely a proxy for Muslim communities in the Balkans. However, Turkey has limited capacities, is overburdened by conflicts in other regions, its own internal problems, and can only be as successful as the West allows it to be.
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