Secret German documents on the breakup of Yugoslavia

Since the beginning of the year, the documents of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the process of recognition of the independence of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991 have been available to the public. Do they confirm the thesis that Germany is guilty of the breakup of Yugoslavia?

Is Germany to blame for the outbreak of the worst wars in Europe to date since 1945? Does German politics bear the responsibility for the collapse of a state, for years of bloodshed with numerous massacres, for more than 120.000 dead and hundreds of thousands of exiles and refugees? If the accusers were right, it would mean that the Federal Republic of Germany is an aggressive rogue state that recklessly starts wars.

This is roughly what the legend that has been spreading for decades in various variants claims, but basically it always says that in 1991, Germany "with the premature recognition of Croatia and Slovenia" initiated the bloody disintegration of Yugoslavia. Depending on the advocates, that narrative extends to the present day, so Berlin can be made partially responsible for the current disputes in the Balkans.

Among those who advocate such accusations are minds such as the American linguist Noam Chomsky. He claims that the Bonn policy of 1991 was a "recipe for civil war" in Yugoslavia. For years he bluntly insinuates that Helmut Kohl and his foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, as a kind of continuation of Hitler's conquest policy, revived the alliance that Germany had from 1941 to 1945 with the criminal and murderous Croatian Ustasha state. Germany allegedly wanted a war in the Balkans in order to regain supremacy in Southeast Europe on the ruins of a multi-ethnic socialist state.

Not every absurd claim is worth debunking, but Chomsky is not alone in this belief. Books, articles and supposedly scholarly articles on the "German destruction of Yugoslavia" form a difficult-to-review collection of blame-shifting with hundreds of texts. It is not surprising that former actors, such as French President François Mitterrand or British Prime Minister John Major, later fed different versions of that legend in memoirs or interviews.

Since 1992, Paris, and above all London, played a fatal role in Bosnia and Herzegovina and later tried to divert attention from it. When "Mond" was convinced in 1991 that the German-Croatian Nazi bells were being heard again or when the British publicist Miša Gleni in the "New York Review of Books" accused Germany of recognizing Croatia and Slovenia in a political act of "dubious moral value" and disregarding democratic standards, these were examples of journalistic writing in a way that is still present today: Germany is to blame. Even in the German-speaking world, that point of view has its supporters to this day.

But the proponents of the thesis about the destructive German special role have been deprived of one central source until now: the files stored in the political archive of the German Foreign Ministry were not available. They have only been open since the beginning of the year, after the usual 30-year blocking period - and anyone who examines the material will see that there is no indication whatsoever to support the claim that Bonn deliberately led to the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991.

Quite the opposite: hundreds of reports on the situation on the ground from the German embassy in Belgrade and the consulate general in Zagreb, notes, transcripts of meetings in the minister's cabinet, minutes of Kol's and Genšer's conversations with Serbian president Slobodan Milošević, his Croatian counterpart Franjo Tuđman and other actors in Yugoslavia, suggest that Bonn for a long, long time did not want to see that the Yugoslav state, valued for decades as a non-aligned factor of stability, could not be saved, but also because the authorities in Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana, for various reasons, did not even want to save it at all.

It is true, however, that the German position changed under the influence of the escalation of the conflict. The position that was still firmly defended at the beginning of 1991, that Yugoslavia must be preserved at all costs, gradually lost support, although above all the German embassy in Belgrade held to the fiction that the Yugoslav state could somehow be patched up even against the will of its largest people. Since it was proving to be more and more illusory day by day, in the fall of 1991, another line prevailed. Kohl and Genšer came to the conclusion that the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia would represent the lesser evil in the Yugoslav dilemma. After that, they were ready - and on that point the fable about independent German action is somewhat accurate - to defend their position against objections from Washington, London and Paris.

Preservation of Yugoslavia is the interest of the West

However, at the beginning of 1991, Bonn followed a different line. Among the many documents that prove this is a note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated January 4, 1991, made as part of the preparation for the upcoming Franco-German consultations, which were supposed to include the harmonization of positions on Yugoslavia. It states the German position: "In the interest of European stability, the interests of the West must continue to be focused on the preservation of Yugoslavia." This was also the case at the end of the month when the German ambassador in Belgrade, Hansjerg Ife, wrote a report to Bonn in which he summarized the fifty-minute conversation that led with Franjo Tuđman in Zagreb.

In his standard coded telex, which was received in Bonn on January 30, the ambassador reports that after the talks, Tudjman flew to Vienna, "where he was received by President Waldheim and Chancellor Vranicki." In Bonn, at that time, they still strictly refused to meet with Tuđman at the highest level, so as not to be accused of interfering in Yugoslav internal affairs. Ife suggests that it might be a good idea for Bonn to follow Vienna's example and consider "relaxing the current standard". However, it is not well received. One official - probably Michael Libal, head of the Balkans department at the German Foreign Ministry - comments on the proposal with his hand with the remark: "Austria is NOT the benchmark for us!"

And Tuđman's attempts to reach a direct meeting with Kol and Genšer through a detour failed. This is evidenced by the report of the German ambassador to NATO in Brussels, Hans-Friedrich von Plec. On February 26, he reported to Bonn that at the NATO ambassador's "private lunch" there was talk of NATO Secretary General Manfred Werner facing Tudjman's request for talks "through 'private channels' (apparently through Bavarian representatives)". "His - negative - reaction was met with undivided approval," reports Von Plec.

Even when Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence on June 25, 1991, Bono's attitude remained negative. On the same day, Ambassador Ajf in Belgrade and Consul General Hans Julius Bolt in Zagreb received instructions from Bonn under the title "Statement for journalists". All questions about the German point of view had to be answered: "The German federal government, together with its partners in the European Community, has always advocated for the preservation of the unity of Yugoslavia on a democratic basis and with respect for human and minority rights... The issue of recognizing the independence of Slovenia and Croatia is currently not sets."

For internal use in discussions with Yugoslav politicians, Bon also proposes the following argument to diplomats: considering that it is not possible to predict whether the other Yugoslav republics will accept the separation of Croatia and Slovenia, "early recognition would represent interference in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia. In any case, the exercise of the right to self-determination cannot be viewed separately from the obligation to refrain from unilateral actions to the detriment of other members of the multi-ethnic state and to strive to find an amicable solution with them." Two days later, the situation report stated that Genscher and the Italian the Minister of Foreign Affairs Giani de Mikelis assured the Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs Budimir Lončar by phone that "only Yugoslavia will be recognized. Both ministers support the process of democratization in Yugoslavia and its territorial integrity."

"Disintegration and re-establishment of Yugoslavia." Theses and Antitheses"

But internally, already at that time, a change in thinking began to occur within the German Ministry. Confirmation for this is the text entitled "Dissolution and re-establishment of Yugoslavia." Theses and Antitheses", which has 13 pages and is classified as "Secret. For official use only". That document, which is quite unusual, is neither dated nor signed, nor is it recorded which department it comes from. In addition, there is no list of people that would indicate how wide the circle of people who received it was. However, considering how the document was archived, it can be assumed that it was written in June and that it came from the Planning Staff.

It is a sort of Foreign Office think tank that has an official license to think unfettered, unorthodox and free. Freed from the limitations and considerations arising from everyday work, the smart heads gathered there should think unconventionally and analyze all possible scenarios of the foreign policy development of a situation. In that text, the arguments for and against the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia are compared.

Against the recognition of the breakup of Yugoslavia, that is, the advocacy for some kind of "restoration" of Yugoslavia, the assessment that in that case war threatens. It must be ensured that Croats and Serbs "do not again succumb to the temptation and try to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the Muslims who live there", it is stated. In addition, it is important to include Serbia: "An isolated Serbia will probably show even less inclination to revise its policy in Kosovo than Serbia, which, together with other republics, is trying to get closer to Europe." That is why Yugoslavia, "in some form", it must preserve, because, "with the exception of central Serbia, the areas where Serbs, Croats and Bosnian Muslims live are so intertwined that the creation of pure national states is impossible," the argument states.

Change of attitude

In the months that followed, however, those arguments presented in the document, according to which the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia would be a lesser evil, gained more and more weight in Bonn. Among other things, there was a drastic decline in the authority of the Yugoslav government, which almost no longer has any influence on the republics. At the same time, the anonymous authors are anything but enthusiastic about the end of Yugoslavia, which was on the horizon: "It is certainly clear that it would be easier for the international community, and especially the European Community, to deal with one Yugoslav state, rather than with a series of smaller, necessarily unstable and in some cases (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia) of barely viable successor states", it is stated.

But then the text adds: "If this becomes the guiding principle of our behavior towards certain Yugoslav peoples, without at least showing understanding for the concerns and wishes of non-Serb peoples, we could find ourselves under the suspicion that we are cynically siding with the stronger one, i.e. Serbia." That is why Croatia must recognize the Serbs' right to "real political autonomy" on their territory, "which guarantees physical protection, and economic and cultural development in unhindered contact with their compatriots in the Republic of Serbia."

This change of attitude can be understood first of all when one bears in mind the development of events in Yugoslavia in the second half of 1991. As a reaction to the Slovenian declaration of independence, the "Yugoslavian People's Army", which was already heavily dominated by the Serbs, tried in the so-called ten-day war to regain control over Slovenia and the Yugoslav borders. Genscher was outraged. The deployment of the army "is not justified by anything, absolutely nothing", he said on July 1, before the meeting with Slobodan Milosevic in Belgrade.

Tuđman in Bonn: No red carpet

One of the consequences of the gradual change of course in Bonn was that Tudjman's attempts to meet with Kol and Genšer were no longer flatly rejected. After talks in Vienna, Budapest and London, and after being received in Italy by President Francesco Kosiga and Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti, Tuđman was able to come to Bonn for talks on July 18. But at the same time, they wanted to ensure that he could not understand it as a confirmation of Germany's readiness to recognize Croatia's desire for independence. In a submission to the chancellor's office dated July 4, Department 215 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is responsible for Yugoslavia, drew up proposals in this regard and warned that it is important to "avoid any semblance of recognition. Mere conversations, which we are ready for in principle with everyone, cannot by themselves bring recognition."

It is then suggested that Tudjman be received at the lowest possible level of protocol: "Meeting at the airport by the protocol officer (not the chief protocol officer). There is no red carpet. Police command vehicle [without honor escort (motorcycles)], no Croatian markings on the vehicles, no Croatian flags. If necessary, accommodation in a hotel (not in Petersberg - official hotel for guests of the German state, see translation). Assumption of costs. A conversation with the federal chancellor (without food)." In the "Proposal for Discussion", which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs drew up for Genšer, it is also suggested that if Tuđman asks for German recognition of Croatia, the best answer would be that the topic is not on the agenda. , because recognition would represent "interference in the intra-Yugoslav process of clarification".

However, documents from the following weeks clearly show that Bono's position, given the flood of news about bloody clashes, military actions against Croatian and Slovenian civilians, terror of Serbian and Croatian volunteers, non-compliance with ceasefire agreements and the failure of various rounds of negotiations, from in the late summer of 1991, turned more and more in the direction of recognition. This was also related to the effect that the bloodshed in the Balkans had on media reporting, public opinion, and the mood in the parties, including most of the opposition. In particular, the deputy chairman of the parliamentary group of the Social Democrats (SPD), Norbert Ganzel, led a campaign both in public and behind the scenes about how it is necessary to stop denying the inevitability of Yugoslavia's disintegration.

Croatia and solving the issue of minorities

After the army began to violently intervene in the conflict in Croatia as well - allegedly "to separate the conflicting parties", but in fact always on the side of the Serbian volunteers - on August 26, Genšer invited the Yugoslav ambassador in Bonn, Boris Frlec, to his home. "If the armistice is not respected immediately, the German government will have to reconsider the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia." In that case, she will advocate for it within the framework of the European Community," Gensher threatened the diplomat - with which he agreed. The armed forces of Yugoslavia "are no longer a people's army, considering that Slovenes, Croats and Macedonians are no longer represented there. So, we are talking about a purely Serbian army that is carrying out aggression against Croatia," replied Frlec, a Slovenian, according to the transcript of the conversation. Shortly thereafter, he resigned from the Yugoslav diplomatic service in protest.

According to another archived transcript, Helmut Kohl told the newly appointed Croatian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Zvonimir Šeparović, during a conversation in Bonn on October 8, 1991, that "in long conversations, he managed to convince French President Mitterrand to take action on this issue." However, it would be crucial for Croatia to solve the "minority issue". And indeed, for the German government, the recognition of Croatia (the Slovenian case was less problematic) now depended on whether the Serbian minority there would receive extensive rights - through a constitutional law that the parliament would approve with a two-thirds majority. For this purpose, Genšer "offered" Croatia to send a German expert as an advisor in November.

Given that Bonn had in the meantime really become the main proponent of Croatia's aspiration for independent statehood, Genšer's offer was such that it was unwise to refuse it. Berlin-based international law expert Kristijan Tomušat was sent to Zagreb with a translator to examine the Croatian draft law and, if necessary, request amendments. The model of South Tyrol served as an example to strive for. After the law was revised several times, Tomušat finally praised it in a detailed report to Bonn as "completely balanced and fair". On December 1991, XNUMX, deputies in Zagreb adopted the constitutional law "On the Rights of Ethnic and National Communities or Minorities in the Republic of Croatia", which was presented to them as something that had no alternative.

German run out

Three days earlier, Ambassador Aif, who was still looking for arguments to somehow keep Yugoslavia together, sent a warning telex to Bonn: "At least part of the Croatian leadership seems to associate international recognition with the expectation of international military aid, which, among others, openly asks Reissmüller in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. From our point of view, this should be clarified in the discussions about future relations." Johann Georg Reimsmüller, then one of the publishers of the "Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung", was a favorite opponent of Ife, whom the ambassador referred to critically in numerous reports to the Ministry. Reissmuller, who knew that country from the time he was a correspondent in Belgrade, recognized before many others that "Yugoslavia" was just a backdrop.

This contradicted Ijf's view of the situation, who wanted to remain an ambassador for the whole of Yugoslavia. Without mentioning Reissmiller, the ambassador already complained on September 9 in a telex classified as "citissime" (urgent): "One-sided reporting makes it much more difficult for us to have a positive political impact on the intra-Yugoslav conflict. The embassy advises that the issue be thematized in an appropriate manner in front of the well-known German media there."

This did not change the course of events, especially after the "Yugoslav People's Army" bombed Vukovar to the ground in November. On the night of December 17, 1991, twelve countries of the European Community decided to jointly recognize Slovenia and Croatia on January 15, 1992. Then there really was a German outburst, when Germany, on the order of Helmut Kohl, announced the decision on recognition already on December 23.

This angered many in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including the head of the department, Mihael Libal. Twenty years later he wrote in a letter to the editor of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: "Announcing our decision three weeks earlier, which was accompanied by an inappropriate triumph, proved to be a great psychological mistake. Germany overlooked that it gave additional arguments to the critics and detractors of German policy." However, those three weeks had no impact on the actual conflict in Yugoslavia.

Yugoslavia has no future

It goes without saying that the archives of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs cannot be the only key to understanding Germany's role in the breakup of Yugoslavia. The legacy of Helmut Kohl, the archives of political foundations, Ke Dorse, the Foreign Office or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia could provide additional information. This is suggested, for example, by a report by Wolfgang Ischinger dated May 14, 1991.

Ischinger, the German ambassador in Paris at the time, reported a conversation with Mitterrand's advisor Pierre Morel, who complained that "in parts of the German press there is sympathy for the efforts of the Croats and Slovenes", just as there are in Vienna on the part of the forces "which lack the necessary restraint ". Paris apparently fears too much German influence in the southeast, Ambassador Ischinger reported.

However, as expected, after evaluating more than 2.500 pages of files, there are no indications in the archives of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs to support the claim that in 1991 Germany pursued a systematic policy of destroying Yugoslavia, thereby continuing some earlier German great-power policy. The facts say otherwise: in Bonn in 1991, only after several months of hesitation, the conviction prevailed that Yugoslavia had no future - just like the Soviet Union, which was already falling apart.

*Michael Martens is a German journalist specializing in foreign policy topics. During the 1990s he lived and worked in Ukraine, Russia and Central Asia. Since 2000, he has been working for the German daily "Frankfurter Algemeine Zeitung" (FAZ), and since 2002 he has been the newspaper's correspondent for Southeast Europe. As a publicist, among other things, he published the books "In search of a hero: the story of a soldier who did not want to kill" (Clio, 2013), and "In the fire of worlds: Ivo Andrić - one European life" (Laguna, 2020). He is currently working on a book about the breakup of Yugoslavia, seen through the prism of documents from the archives of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs that were not available to the public until recently. As part of the work on that book, this text was also created, which Deutsche Welle publishes at the same time as the "Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung".

Mihael Martens is a German journalist specializing in foreign policy topics. During the 1990s he lived and worked in Ukraine, Russia and Central Asia. Since 2000, he has been working for the German daily "Frankfurter Algemejne Zeitung" (FAZ), and since 2002 he has been the newspaper's correspondent for Southeast Europe. As a publicist, among other things, he published the books "In search of a hero: the story of a soldier who did not want to kill" (Clio, 2013), and "In the fire of worlds: Ivo Andrić - one European life" (Laguna, 2020). He is currently working on a book about the breakup of Yugoslavia, seen through the prism of documents from the archives of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs that were not available to the public until recently. As part of the work on that book, this text was also created, which Deutsche Welle publishes at the same time as the "Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung".

(Deutsche Welle)