The narrative according to which Germany, with its premature recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, is to blame for the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), and even the disintegration of Yugoslavia, still persists in some circles. This was confirmed by a discussion held in Munich.
"The very fact that we are still discussing the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia by Germany more than thirty years after that event shows that something was wrong with that event," said Johannes Heindl, a former diplomat and official, in his final presentation. of the German Embassy in Belgrade in the period from 1989 to 1991.
That was just one of the theses expressed at the round table entitled "German foreign policy and the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991." which, organized by the German Society for Southeast Europe and the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, was held this Tuesday, May 2, in Munich.
It shows to what extent there is still deep-seated distrust towards that move by the German political leadership at the end of 1991.
"Shock Grades"
The host of the discussion and a good connoisseur of the situation in Southeast Europe, journalist and author Mihael Martens, in the introduction pointed out what kind of theses the world public has been facing in the last thirty years when it comes to the role of Germany in the process of the disintegration of Yugoslavia - like, he says, that of the American commentator on social events, Noam Chomsky, who saw the continuation of cooperation between Nazi Germany and Ustasha Croatia in the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia.
That the German recognition of Croatia and Slovenia caused the war was also believed (for a while) by the then US Secretary of State Warren Christopher.
However, such, as was heard in Munich, superficial evaluations, were soon overturned by many scientific works.
"Today, no one serious puts forward such theses," said Martens.
As it was said, this was also confirmed in the first papers that used as sources the materials of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs that have recently become available to the public, and among other things, a study by Martens himself from January of last year.
The war in BiH was being prepared much earlier
At the start of the debate in Munich, Austrian author and journalist Norbert Mapes-Nidik softened the thesis he put forward in his recently published book "War in Europe: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Overburdened Continent", according to which the recognition of Croatia by Germany in late 1991 hastened the beginning war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
"The recognition of Croatia and Slovenia pushed the leadership in Bosnia and Herzegovina into a corner and it was forced to make a decision on independence," said Mapes-Nidik and concluded that the then Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany and a kind of "engine" of the process of recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, Hans- Dietrich Genscher, "didn't think of Bosnia and Herzegovina at all".
However, during the discussion, the participants agreed that the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was being prepared long before Germany recognized Slovenia and Croatia on December 23, 1991.
"Signals that war was coming were present much earlier. Rašković and Karadžić had already openly talked about the merger of Serbian territories in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Weapons were shared. The recognition probably prevented even worse war destruction," said a participant in the debate. , historian from the University of Graz, Armina Galijaš.
She recalled the circumstances under which the decision on recognition was made: "It should be remembered that at the moment when the decision was made, the war was raging: Vukovar was destroyed, Dubrovnik was bombed. We didn't sit in a conference room and think about how to proceed. It was raging is war," emphasized Galijaš.
Germany did not perform separately
Historian from the University of Munich, Mari-Žanin Čalić, was the only one among those present to criticize Germany's leading role in the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia.
She believes that the recognition of those two republics of SFR Yugoslavia at that moment "made impossible some mechanisms of possible later pressure on the warring parties".
Martens, on the other hand, pointed out that it was not about "soloing" Germany, mentioning the fact that all the countries of the European Community at the time were in favor of recognizing Croatia and Slovenia. Germany's only sin, he believes, was that it made that move three weeks before the agreed date.
There was no doubt about the act of recognition itself: even in September 1991 Lord Carrington, who led the peace negotiations of the European Community, advocated for it.
Mihael Martens explains the German emphasis in the Yugoslav crisis on the basis of geographical proximity and connection through many citizens of Yugoslavia who lived and still live in Germany, in contrast to France or Great Britain.
Professional diplomat Johannes Heindl took his profession into protection due to possible omissions committed during the Yugoslav crisis.
"Diplomacy was powerless and faced a task that exceeded its capabilities," Heindl said.
"Asymmetrical conflicts were not on the list of specialties of Western diplomacy, which for years was focused on the Cold War division," he concluded.
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