America in the Western Balkans has two or three personal and several thematic problems. In this first group, the biggest problem is Aljbin Kurti. Problem number two is Milorad Dodik. Aleksandar Vučić is a candidate for problem three, but he still has enough room for maneuver to avoid the status of a problem and become part of the solution with his attitude towards the previous two problems.
Among the thematic problems for contemporary American policy in the Balkans, we highlight: 1) ensuring that no country in the region becomes an ally of Russia, if they cannot avoid the neutrality and non-engagement of Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina; 2) de facto integration of the region into the western, so-called "Euro-Atlantic" institutions, without de iure membership in them and 3) ending the processes that are still a legacy of the wars of the nineties. Of course, it goes without saying that the goal above all is the preservation of peace.
In the context of the war in Ukraine, the democratic character of the allied countries is no longer so important. We could say that it is a shame that it is so, but it is so. America is willing to tolerate autocratic leaders as long as they are its allies. After all, what else could she do. Its capacity for "regime changes" in other countries, especially large ones, is significantly lower now than it was until 2014.
Even the European Union - whose Commission was supposed to be "increasingly geopolitical" since its formation - gave up on the transformation of Poland and Hungary, two previously criticized and sanctioned members, in order to preserve the unity of the EU during the war in Ukraine. Democracy - especially liberal democracy - is a bonus if it happens, but not the goal for America to intervene. The era of Clinton's "liberal interventionism" is behind us. Even the democratic - therefore, liberal interventionism-prone - Biden administration understood this.
The fears of some of the most prominent political analysts in Serbia, who otherwise have a very good compass and excellent intuition, about the victory of Biden over Trump and the appointment of Christopher Hill as ambassador to Serbia, proved to be unfounded. The exact opposite could happen: that the war in Ukraine - and the associated return to geopolitics - might be a chance for Serbia to emerge from a long period of stigmatization and partial isolation. But much depends, as always, on herself and on further developments beyond her control.
Vučić would not be America's first choice, but in the light of the new geopolitics, he still has a pass, until someone is found in whom America can more clearly and firmly trust
America today does not want instability in any part of Europe. It already exists in Ukraine and does not want to spread to the Balkans or to the countries of the post-Soviet space, such as those in Central Asia. It is a force of the stabilocracy and an ally of the stabilocrats. This does not mean that she would not like those stabilocrats to be Democrats as well. On the contrary, America believes that the democratic order is much more stable than the autocratic one, because the autocratic one, by its exclusion of a large part of the population (opposition, critical public), actually leads to self-renewing instability.
Autocrats who, like Erdogan, win every time but with 52 percent of the vote, while the opposition gets 48, are more or less unproblematic for America. Those who win by excluding others - be it Kurti's mayors of Serb-majority municipalities or Serbian President Vučić (who currently has no opposition mayors in the country) - cause instability. The de facto one-party system is responded to in the modern world with protests, demonstrations, and sometimes violence.
America holds responsible for these protests not those who protest but those who previously excluded them, leaving them the street as their only option.
From that vision, it is clear that Aljbina Kurti is a problem for America. He defies America, persistently, because of his destabilizing vision. This vision is consistently ethno-nationalist, both in internal politics in which it leads to the exclusion of Serbs and in external politics - in which it advocates the unification of Kosovo with Albania. Kurti has its own history, by which Americans remembered it. He is still remembered today as an associate of Adem Demaći who was the only Albanian political and prominent public figure who refused to come to Rambouillet in 1999, explaining to Christopher Hill, whose task was to bring them all, that America was preparing a trap because it wanted to return Kosovo to Serbia. Hill, of course, didn't forget that. Twenty or more years later, Kurti rejects America again, in the old manner of the Yugoslav leaders of 1990 and 1991.
When James Baker told them in June 1991 that America wanted a "democratic and united Yugoslavia" in which there would be neither separatism nor war for the preservation of Yugoslavia, they all heard only half of the message, and the other half - the one they didn't like. liked - their ears were closed. Who cares what America thinks - that was the answer of Kučan, Milošević, Tuđman and others, especially various Martić and Hadžić, Karadžić and Mladić in those years, when America was a unipolar hegemon, at the peak of its power. The smaller they were, the more defiant they were toward America. That insult to America later cost some dearly, while others were forgiven. It was forgiven those who - after several years of unsuccessful warfare to return what was lost - turned to America for help, accepting client status. They enabled it to return to the big door and to remain in the Balkans, and that means in Europe, stronger than it was during the Cold War.
Autocrats who, like Erdogan, win every time but with 52 percent of the vote, are more or less unproblematic for America. Those who win by excluding others - be it Kurti's mayors of Serb-majority municipalities or Vučić - cause instability
America, like any other great power, does not suffer insults and does not like when its power is not recognized. Kurti's ignoring America could therefore cost him dearly. America already has the impression that the fact that Kosovo still remains unrecognized by as many as four NATO members and five European Union members is a slap in the face to the US itself. If America cannot ensure that even its allies recognize a single Kosovo, that says something about its (in)power. Kosovo is currently one of the failures of American foreign policy.
Even more than twenty years after 1999, the Kosovo issue has not been resolved. Of course, America will not fail because of that failure, nor is the Balkans, and especially Kosovo, in today's circumstances at the top of the list of priorities of its foreign policy. But, after the start of the war in Ukraine, America is counting on the unity of Europe, and for that the issue of Kosovo needs to be resolved. It is also necessary to resolve the issue of the Balkans, and therefore America supports the idea of the Open Balkans as today's most prominent initiative of regional integration. He supports both the German-French initiative and the Berlin process, although less enthusiastically, since other countries are the main ones and America is the secondary one.
In the conditions when Europe needs America - because of the war on the European continent that threatens to become a world war again (as it did twice in the 20th century) - the USA is trying to "finish" unfinished business from the past. Kosovo is one of those jobs. Moreover, it is today the biggest point of discord in European foreign policy, one of the few issues on which there is no consensus among the member states of the Union. Kurti's ethnopolitics, as well as Serbia's refusal to recognize Kosovo, are problems. This is why, I assume, Aleksandar Vučić, in his recent interview with CNN, avoided a direct answer to the question - why Serbia does not recognize Kosovo. He did not want to assume primacy among the problems, leaving Kurti that position. For the same reason, he agrees to agreements that he hopes Kurti will ruin.
Another case similar to Kurti's is Milorad Dodik. His defiance of America is even more explicit. Awarding the order to Vladimir Putin, and then going to Moscow, declaring that because of him Bosnia and Herzegovina will not become a member of NATO, all this places him next to Kurti. In the 1993s, Serbia was held hostage to the radical politics of Croatian and Bosnian Serbs, i.e. the leaders of Serbian Krajina and Republika Srpska, who opposed any compromise, any reintegration into Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Milošević, who was not at all innocent in all this because he initially encouraged and protected them and then armed and financed them - as the verdict pronounced this week in the case of Simatović and Stanišić shows - already in XNUMX he introduced sanctions on Republika Srpska, which rejected the peace plan which Belgrade supported. For Dayton to be possible at all, the leaders of Republika Srpska had to be excluded from it. We also remember how much they opposed the Dayton Agreement, which today the Republika Srpska considers the alpha and omega of everything.
America looks at Vučić also in the light of the mistake - of which it is aware - that it committed in relation to Zoran Đinđić
Serbia paid dearly for their extremism, which it still pays for with stigmatization. That historical lesson should not be forgotten even in the current circumstances. Admittedly, Dodik is not Karadzic - he did not declare secession from Bosnia and Herzegovina, but rather speaks more about secession (and unification with Serbia) than he does in this regard. Serbia never recognized the Republika Srpska, not even in the nineties, since even then it knew what it would mean for itself. The chances that he will ever admit it are extremely small, although in international politics you should never say never. Today, it is probably more in her interest for Srpska to remain in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to influence its foreign policy, preventing its membership in NATO. But Dodik's defiance of the USA is already one of the problems in the "normalization" of relations between Belgrade and Washington.
As for Vučić himself, he is a potential problem for America, which Washington tries to reduce or even avoid, if possible. Moreover, it may be possible (I emphasize: perhaps) that Vučić becomes the solution to the problem, and as long as there is hope that this is possible, America will have an ambivalent attitude towards him, followed by a "carrot and stick" policy. America looks at Vučić in the light of the mistake - of which it is aware - that it committed in relation to Zoran Đinđić. Namely, she believes that she is partially responsible for the tragic fate of that Prime Minister of Serbia, by asking him for a radical and quick change in internal and external policy. When Đinđić showed that he was ready for such a turn - so he extradited Milosevic to The Hague - the West neither supported nor protected him enough. America does not want to repeat such a mistake now. Vučić is aware of this, which can be seen from his statements about the risks he takes and the uncertain future.
The question is whether the success of the pro-Western opposition can happen in Serbia, as it recently happened with Jakov Milatović in Montenegro.
America does not want to risk "losing" Vučić (and Serbia) in favor of Kurti. He doesn't even want to risk the wave of dissatisfaction with Vučić being channeled in an even more nationalist direction, and being led by pro-Russian forces in Serbia itself. Taught by the experience of the 2000s, America assumes that the pro-Western opposition would only be a temporary solution for Serbia, just as from today's perspective Koštunica and Tadić were temporary, who were replaced ten years later by the old Milosevic coalition of (allegedly reformed) radicals and socialists . These fears are further fueled by the fact that the anti-Vuvučić opposition in Serbia today does not have a clear position on either the issue of Kosovo or the issue of foreign policy, but is heterogeneous on those issues. Public opinion has also changed, so the question is whether the success of the pro-Western opposition can happen in Serbia, as it recently happened with Jakov Milatović in Montenegro.
America today wants a Serbia that will not be an ally of Russia, and everything else is less important to it. NATO membership is not crucial, so America does not even insist on it. Membership in the EU is almost unimportant, and it is not realistic - until there is a radical change of attitude in the EU itself towards expansion to the Western Balkans, and America is not afraid of that nor does it believe that it will happen. Vučić is "the Devil they know". He would not be America's first choice, nor is America enamored with him. But, in the light of the new geopolitics, which takes precedence over the politics of "common values" and liberal universalism, he still has a pass, until someone is found in whom America can more clearly and firmly trust. He knows it and counts on it. At the same time, he works to ensure that no alternative appears that would be more acceptable to America and the West than himself. The question is whether the democratic opposition can find someone like that and dissuade them.
The author is a political scientist, professor at the Faculty of Political Sciences in Zagreb
The article was taken from the site velikeprice.com
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