Most of the discussion in Washington about the Donald Trump administration’s approach to global affairs has focused on Ukraine, China, the Middle East and, most recently, Greenland. Very little is said about the Western Balkans. Yet shifts in American foreign policy in the region could disrupt the fragile status quo there. The current state of affairs in the Western Balkans and the delicate geopolitical balance have prevented Bosnia and Herzegovina from sliding back into civil war, while the conflict between Serbia and Kosovo has been frozen for the past 26 years.
Serbian nationalists, in particular, are pinning their hopes on Donald Trump's return to the White House. They are optimistic that his administration will align Washington more closely with Belgrade and Republika Srpska.
Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić and Republika Srpska President Milorad Dodik want the United States (US) to stand up to other Western governments and institutions that strongly support Kosovo's independence and the centralized structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), as established by the 1995 US-brokered Dayton Peace Agreement, which rigidly divided the war-torn country into two main entities - Republika Srpska and the Federation of BiH, both governed by a central government with a rotating presidency among the three main communities: Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs.
In the name of defending Serbian interests and promoting the goal of Serbian unification, Dodik has been undermining the Dayton Agreement for years by obstructing BiH state institutions through various actions that the US and other Western governments consider dangerous and destabilizing.
In practical terms, this would mean easing US restrictions on pro-Russian Serbs who seek Serbian unification and oppose sanctions against Moscow. These restrictions and pressures include sanctions against Dodik and ultranationalists, including Serbian Vice President Aleksandar Vulin, who previously headed the Serbian Security and Information Agency and is known for his ties to Moscow and his persecution of opponents of President Vladimir Putin among the Russian émigré community in Serbia.
Additionally, the previous US administration recently imposed sanctions on NIS, the Serbian oil and gas company majority-owned by Gazprom. It is not hard to imagine that Trump could ease pressure on Serbia over its relationship with Russia while remaining silent on human rights issues in Serbia.
Serbs who believe in a “Greater Serbia” claim territories in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere outside Serbia’s present-day borders. During the 1990s, then-Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević’s pursuit of a Greater Serbia was a major factor in the wars that tore the region apart.
Although Vučić has said his government has no interest in redrawing international borders, many of Serbia's neighbors suspect that Belgrade is patiently seeing the realization of a Greater Serbia as a longer-term goal. The 13-page declaration - adopted by Serbia and Republika Srpska in June 2024 - lays out a vision of Serbian dominance that would bring parts of Kosovo back under Belgrade's control and undermine Bosnia's sovereignty.
Vučić and Dodik want the US to stand up to other Western governments and institutions that strongly support Kosovo's independence and the centralized structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Immediately after Trump's election victory last November, Vučić had a "very cordial" phone conversation with him, invited him to Belgrade, and praised him for knowing "a lot about Serbia," emphasizing that Trump's approval rating in Serbia is higher than in any other European country.
Richard Grenell, the special presidential envoy for peace negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo from 2019 to 2021, was a key figure in maintaining friendly relations between Washington and Belgrade during Trump’s first term. During Joe Biden’s presidency, Grenell visited Belgrade several times. Grenell was awarded the Order of the Serbian Flag in 2023, and Vučić praised him for “bearing witness to the truth about the events in Kosovo and elsewhere in the region.”
Regardless of Grenell's role in Trump's second administration, Kosovo probably has reason to be concerned about Trump 2.0. The US recognized Kosovo's independence in 2008, and today most members of the United Nations (UN) do so - including the vast majority of European countries. However, Serbia, Russia, China and a long list of mostly non-Western countries recognize Kosovo as part of Serbia.
Because of Russia and China's positions on the UN Security Council, it is virtually certain that the UN will not formally recognize Kosovo's independence. Trump has previously threatened to withdraw US troops from KFOR, the NATO-led peacekeeping mission, which has alarmed officials in Pristina.
However, even if Trump carries out this threat, it would not necessarily represent an existential crisis for Kosovo. KFOR should be able to continue its operations in the event of a US withdrawal, largely because Pristina has prepared the scenario for this possibility by strengthening relations with Turkey in recent years.
Following the violence that erupted between KFOR and Serbia in May 2023, Ankara sent a battalion of commandos to Kosovo. The Turks also sold “Bayraktar” drones to Pristina. In late 2024, the Machinery and Chemical Industries Corporation (a Turkish state-owned military company) and Kosovo signed an agreement to build an ammunition production factory in Kosovo.
Dodik stated in late 2023 that a Trump victory in the 2024 elections would represent a “better geopolitical situation for Republika Srpska” and that under such circumstances he would declare the Serbian entity’s independence. After Trump’s victory, Dodik declared it a “victory” for Republika Srpska as well, and wore a MAGA cap in front of his presidential palace. Banja Luka maintains good relations with Moscow, which is using the tense situation in Bosnia to its advantage, viewing Republika Srpska as the “Balkan Transnistria” – an allusion to the Russian-dominated part of Moldova.
Also, the pro-Russian enclave within Bosnia keeps NATO and the European Union in a state of concern about instability in the Western Balkans - a tactic the Kremlin can always use to divert attention from Ukraine - and creates a problem that prevents Bosnia from joining NATO.
At the same time, Western sanctions on Dodik have brought Republika Srpska closer to China. RS and China signed a cooperation agreement in 2016 that formalized their ties, and China has invested in infrastructure projects and power plants across the Bosnian Serb enclave for years.
Russia is using the tense situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina to its advantage, viewing Republika Srpska as the "Balkan Transnistria"
Washington and London have imposed sanctions on Dodik for corruption and actions that threaten Bosnia's fragile balance. The US, under President Barack Obama, first imposed sanctions on the pro-Kremlin Bosnian Serb leader in January 2017 for failing to respect the rulings of Bosnia and Herzegovina's Constitutional Court. Dodik hopes Trump will ease US pressure on him, giving him a free hand to obstruct the Dayton Accords.
Decision-makers in Banja Luka are optimistic that Washington could distance itself from most EU and NATO members that see preserving the Dayton Accords as key to stability and security in Southeast Europe and instead align its policy with Hungary on the Western Balkans. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who has close ties to Vučić, Dodik and Putin, has made Hungary the most favorable EU country to end Western pressure on Dodik. Orban, Vučić and Dodik have formed a three-way brotherhood, and some predict that Trump will become the fourth figure in the alliance.
If the Bosnian Serb strongman manages to convince Washington to lift the sanctions, “he will certainly be encouraged to continue with his agenda,” said Vladimir Trapara, a senior fellow at the Belgrade-based Institute for International Politics and Economics. While Dodik may be talking about separatism to rally his supporters in RS, it is unlikely that he would ever make such a bold move given the various practical circumstances, including the risks of another war in the Balkans.
Trapara distinguished between Dodik's populist agenda and his “real political goals.” The Bosnian Serb leader tends to play the separatist card to gain support from Serb nationalists when it suits him politically, then focuses on administrative issues when emotions are not so high.
Known for his transactional approach to foreign policy, Trump is likely to seek major diplomatic and business deals in the Western Balkans. Trump family business ventures in Serbia include Affinity Partners (his son-in-law Jared Kushner's investment firm), which received a 99-year permit to build a luxury hotel in Belgrade on a site that was bombed by NATO in 1999, as well as investments of about $XNUMX billion in luxury hotels and villas on the Albanian coast.
Orban, Vučić, and Dodik have established a triple brotherhood, and some predict that Trump will become the fourth figure in that alliance.
Such business interests could play a role in the Trump administration's approach to the region, potentially complicating the situation, given that interests in Albania may conflict with policies increasingly favoring Belgrade. After all, Trump is known for making foreign policy decisions based on the highest bidder and through personal connections, rather than through traditional institutions.
As for Bosnia’s territorial integrity, the authorities in Banja Luka seem to believe that the Trump administration could put the Dayton Agreement’s implementation mechanisms on the back burner. Trump’s general lack of interest in so-called transatlantic values, combined with his good relations with Orban and Vučić, could encourage decision-makers in RS to place high hopes in Trump 2.0.
“While Belgrade may not be pursuing overt territorial ambitions, Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy could provide opportunities for a subtle push for nationalist goals,” said Petar Milutinović, a fellow at the Belgrade-based Institute for European Studies. “Dodik, in particular, could use the perceived US withdrawal to intensify calls for RS independence.”
However, things could turn out differently - and assumptions that Trump's transactional approach to foreign policy is inevitably positive for Serbia are oversimplified. Albania and Kosovo are investing money in lobbying in the United States to advance their interests, which includes persuading Washington to advocate for Kosovo's independence, strengthening the Albanian-US alliance, and keeping pressure on Belgrade.
There could also be a role for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, given Ankara's close relations with Sarajevo, Tirana and Pristina.
“The good relations between Erdogan and Trump, if used wisely, have the potential to improve the United States’ ties with Bosniaks and Albanians, which are currently quite dysfunctional,” explained Jahja Muhasilović, a geopolitical analyst and associate professor at the International University of Sarajevo.
If Trump succeeds, as he has promised, in freezing the war between Russia and Ukraine, with parts of Ukrainian territory remaining under Russian control, the consequences will be felt across Europe. Such a diplomatic agreement on Ukraine could make the West appear weak, especially if it is accompanied by the lifting of some sanctions against Russia. Pro-Russian Serbian nationalists could interpret such a scenario as “a victory for Moscow’s strategy,” which would intensify their anti-Western rhetoric and calls for regional reorganization, such as seeking secession for RS or undermining Kosovo’s sovereignty, Milutinović said.
Dejan Šajinović, a Bosnian columnist and editor of Nezavisne Novine, said Belgrade feels most comfortable when there is a balance of influence in the region, with both NATO members and Russia making certain concessions to Serbia. “When either side gains more power, the balance is disrupted, and that usually means some kind of instability in the Balkans,” he said.
Trump’s unpredictability suggests that the optimism of Dodik and other Serbs may be unfounded. At the same time, continued Russian influence in Southeast Europe will limit the ability of Belgrade and Banja Luka to reach out to Washington. With Trump’s return to the White House, Serbian nationalists should therefore think carefully about what they wish for.
The author is CEO and founder of Gulf State Analytics
The article was published in the magazine "Forin polisi"
Prepared by: A.Š.
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