For more than a decade, the European Union's approach to the Western Balkans has been driven by calculated pragmatism - prioritizing the stability of the region to prevent major disruptions on the continent, while EU aspirants have remained trapped in the accession lobby. Instead of insisting on real reforms, Brussels has opted for partnerships with hardliners who can guarantee short-term stability.
But now, one of the authoritarian leaders to whom the EU has given the most indulgence, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, is facing the most serious challenge to his rule - and with him, the EU's strategy in the region.
Brussels must decide whether to continue betting on it, despite the potential consequences for Kosovo and Montenegro. It is a choice between continuing a policy of stabilocracy or ultimately accepting integration based on merit.
In Belgrade, the EU is also facing its biggest wave of resistance to itself: unlike in Georgia or Moldova, Serbian protesters, disappointed by the EU's appeasement of Vučić, did not wave European flags or seek support from Brussels. However, Brussels' indulgence of Vučić may soon become unsustainable.
Although there is cautious optimism that Montenegro could be the first to join the EU, its political stability is often undermined by Serbian interference.
Serbian Prime Minister Miloš Vučević resigned last week in what was widely seen as a strategic concession to growing internal instability. His resignation followed mass student protests, the largest in Serbia since the fall of Slobodan Milošević.
The immediate trigger was public anger over the tragedy at the Novi Sad train station in November, when a canopy collapsed and killed fifteen people. But this is just the latest wave of discontent. Five months ago, citizens took to the streets to protest a lithium mining deal between Serbia and Germany. The agreement was hailed in the West as a way to reduce dependence on China, but for many Serbs it symbolized yet another example of irresponsible governance, environmental risks, and the prioritization of foreign interests over the well-being of the local population.
In this context, the EU faces a dilemma. As the largest economic power in the region, it cannot simply dismiss the Serbian government. However, its indulgence towards the Vučić administration has had unintended consequences. By refusing to apply pressure, Brussels has given Belgrade significant leverage, while encouraging it to expand cooperation with Russia and China, knowing that there will be little opposition. The EU has offered economic incentives but no real implementation mechanisms – it has been all carrots and no sticks.
Yet Serbia is not just another troubled state; its direction shapes the entire Western Balkans region.
Nowhere is this clearer than in the case of Kosovo, whose path to the EU remains hostage to the stalemate in the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue. Despite Kosovo’s significant efforts at democratization, the EU continues to demand unilateral concessions, even after the attack in Banjska 2023, when Serbian-backed paramilitaries killed one Kosovo police officer and wounded two others. While Brussels has insisted on de-escalation, it has avoided imposing serious consequences on Belgrade. Meanwhile, Kosovo remains the only Western Balkan country without EU candidate status, further reinforcing the perception that EU accession depends less on merit and more on geopolitical expediency.
Montenegro, often seen as a frontrunner in the EU accession process, is another example. While there is cautious optimism that it could be the first to join the EU, its political stability is often undermined by Serbian interference. Nationalist rhetoric continues to shape Montenegro’s political discourse, making it difficult for it to focus on the reforms demanded by the EU. A truly European Montenegro would be a success story for the region and for the EU, but the country remains vulnerable to the same external pressures that have held back its progress for years.
A change in the EU's direction is still feasible.
First, Brussels must reintroduce tougher measures, especially against Serbia. Ignoring election fraud, media suppression, and creeping authoritarianism has served neither the Western Balkans nor the EU well. While Brussels seeks to project power globally, tolerating the collapse of democracy in its own backyard only undermines its credibility. The idea of linking EU funds to real reforms is often mooted, but without implementation it remains meaningless.
Second, the EU could support efforts to prosecute officials accused of crimes, such as the Banjska attack or electoral fraud. It should also prioritize continued support for Montenegro and Kosovo, as Serbia's interference in the region is not a factor of stability, but an obstacle to progress.
By refusing to pressure Vučić, the EU is empowering the Serbian government. If Brussels is serious about supporting democracy in the Western Balkans, it must empower Serbia's citizens - not their authoritarian rulers
Finally, the EU must acknowledge that Vučić’s regime is losing legitimacy. It remains unclear whether Vučić will be able to weather this storm – whether by intensifying repression and thereby turning to Russia, waiting for the tide to pass with divide-and-rule tactics, or trying to regain credibility and legitimacy by calling early elections. What is certain is that the recent protests mark a generational shift – one that Brussels can no longer ignore. The Serbian government, in its current form, is not a strategic partner for the EU. If Brussels truly supports democratic values, it must stand with Serbian citizens, not their authoritarian rulers.
This moment represents a rare opportunity for the EU to reclaim its transformative power in the region. The youth of the Western Balkans, who have grown up in an era of globalization, connectivity, and democratic aspirations, could be the catalyst for long-awaited change. These young people have seen firsthand the benefits of democratic standards - if the EU empowers them, they could propel the region towards a future that is in line with Brussels' long-term strategic interests.
But will the EU act? So far, its response has been tepid. And as in the case of the war in Ukraine, it risks being overtaken and overshadowed by the maneuvering of the Donald Trump administration. US President's special envoy Richard Grenell has already issued messages of support for Vučić.
The EU must decide whether to seize this moment and support those who are truly working to close the chapter of instability, or to let another opportunity slip away.
Assigned by A.Š.
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