Today's local elections in Kosovo are taking place at a time of unusual tension. What was supposed to be a routine democratic process has turned into a test of the state's ability to maintain its institutions, integrate the Serbian minority, and manage the consequences of decisions made in the name of sovereignty.
The stakes are high. The Kosovo Constitution, the 2013 Brussels Agreement, and the 2023 Brussels Agreement and Ohrid Annex guarantee Serb representation in institutions. Yet the politics of the Serb minority are dominated by the Serbian List (SL), a Belgrade-backed party associated with violence, parallel structures, and clientelistic control. For Prime Minister Albin Kurti, excluding SL risks further alienating the minority; including it would legitimize impunity and undermine the credibility of his sovereignty policy.
That is the dilemma at the heart of these elections. Western partners continue to pressure Pristina to ensure Serb participation as a sign of stability, even if the only realistic means to do so is through the Serbian List. For the European Union and the United States, the party has become a fig leaf of representation—an undemocratic monopoly tolerated in the name of peace. For Kosovo, it comes at a price: EU sanctions remain in place, dialogue with Washington is suspended, and the electorate is divided over whether sovereignty is strengthened or the state weakened.
For Kurti, today’s elections are a political gamble. His main achievement was dismantling Serbia’s parallel institutions and extending Pristina’s sovereignty to the north. Supporters hail it as a long-overdue move, while critics argue it came at too high a price – that it has left Kosovo increasingly isolated abroad and its citizens bearing the brunt of sanctions. The prime minister is therefore treading a narrow path: if Serb turnout increases under the auspices of the Serbian List and that party regains control of northern municipalities, his authority could be called into question and Kosovo’s isolation extended. If Serbs boycott again, institutional positions will remain unfilled and the community further alienated. Neither outcome offers a sustainable solution.
The Serbian List has become a fig leaf of representation for the European Union and the United States - an undemocratic monopoly tolerated in the name of peace. For Kosovo, this has come at a cost: EU sanctions remain in place, dialogue with Washington has been suspended, and the electorate is divided over whether sovereignty has been strengthened or the state weakened.
The dominance of the Serbian List explains why the stakes are so high. Other Serbian initiatives are registered for the elections, but they are politically marginal and cannot campaign freely due to pressure from Belgrade. The party’s former vice-president, Milan Radoičić, admitted to organizing the attack in Banjska 2023, in which a Kosovo policeman was killed – dramatic evidence of how a party claiming to represent citizens can use paramilitary violence against the state itself. In addition to that incident, the Serbian List has long relied on intimidation, clientelistic recruitment and nationalist rhetoric that glorifies figures with criminal connections. Such practices leave Serbs with little choice beyond Belgrade’s intermediaries and expose the gap between formal representation and genuine democratic will.
Pristina did not remain passive in the face of this challenge. When Serb representatives collectively withdrew from Kosovo institutions in late 2022, the government insisted on early elections, which were held in April 2023. With Serbian parties boycotting the vote, Albanians were elected mayors with a turnout of less than 3,5 percent. Kurti presented this as a necessary affirmation of sovereignty and quickly moved to dismantle parallel structures under Serbian control and install Kosovo police and administrators. However, the lack of legitimacy provoked protests, led to the imposition of sanctions, and stalled dialogue with Washington. The episode also highlighted the government’s determination to consolidate statehood and the limited space it has to do so without international repercussions.
The institutional crisis has since deepened. The parliamentary elections of February 2025 left Kosovo without a functioning assembly. The post of vice-president, which is constitutionally guaranteed to a representative of the Serb community, remains vacant, and the Constitutional Court must now decide whether the assembly is legally constituted. The decision will have tangible consequences: it could delay reforms, halt the implementation of the 2013 and 2023 agreements, and undermine the credibility of the state as a system that respects its own constitutional framework. For citizens already tired of sanctions and political gridlock, a sense of fragility is growing.
In these circumstances, these elections are fraught with high expectations. In Serb-majority municipalities, turnout will determine whether the Serbian List regains control or whether institutions remain empty-handed. In either case, Pristina’s sovereignty will be tested. A SL victory would embolden Belgrade’s mediators; a new boycott would underscore the government’s failure to meaningfully integrate Serbs into state structures.
For the government, the choice is agonizing. Including the Serb List risks normalizing impunity and undermining the rule of law. Exclusion, on the other hand, threatens to prolong institutional weakness and further alienate a community whose participation is crucial to stability. In any case, Kosovo’s leaders must maneuver between the expectations of their citizens and the pressures of their allies.
For Brussels and Washington, these elections present their own dilemma. In Georgia and Moldova, Western actors have drawn clear lines against Moscow’s proxies. In Kosovo, however, they treat the Serbian List as essential to participation, tolerating a monopoly for the sake of appearances. By accepting representation through a party compromised by violence and clientelism, Western politics risks damaging Kosovo’s institutions and its own credibility as a democracy.
The security dimension further raises the stakes. NATO’s mission in Kosovo (KFOR) has increased its presence in the north, bracing for intimidation, targeted attacks or unrest near polling stations. Any escalation would reverberate across the region, destabilize the dialogue with Belgrade and test the alliance’s ability to keep the peace on Europe’s periphery. The belief that violence pays would embolden peace-breakers in other parts of the Balkans.
The elections in Kosovo are therefore not just a local contest. They will show whether the country can reconcile sovereignty and inclusiveness, and whether it is capable of resisting the grip of a party that undermines both. They will also show whether the West is prepared to consistently defend its own principles, or whether stability will once again overshadow democracy under the fig leaf of representation.
Translation: A. Š.
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