It will come as no surprise if this month the international media and analysts turn a deaf ear to the anniversary of the Dayton Peace Accords, which ended the bloodshed in Bosnia and Herzegovina some thirty years ago and reestablished the state. Like the later NATO intervention in Kosovo, Dayton now seems like distant history, a reminder of the golden days of American dominance. The Western Balkans, once a beneficiary of external support, are now increasingly seen as a potential source of stability. As the six countries of the region queue up at the gates of the European Union, they are increasingly talking about their contribution to European security and defense.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 made collective defense a priority for Europe. But more than three years after the war began, the main question is how local actors can contribute to joint efforts to contain Russia on NATO and the EU's eastern flank, strengthen resilience to hybrid threats, and take responsibility for peacekeeping missions closer to home.
In several countries, the primary role of the military, intelligence services, police and law enforcement agencies is to preserve the power of ruling structures and protect clientelistic networks, rather than serving the public interest. Transnational organized crime has long developed symbiotic relationships with the "guardians of the state" - whether it is NATO members and EU candidates, such as Albania and Montenegro, or Eurosceptic Serbia.
Like neighboring Montenegro, Albania contributes to NATO battle groups in Latvia and Bulgaria, deploying around 500 troops to NATO - and EU - missions at any given time. Efforts are underway to attract foreign investment in the domestic defense industry, modernize the military, increase cooperation with other allies - despite occasional tensions - and develop artificial intelligence technologies. Tirana also plans to expand dual-use logistics capacities and build new storage and training facilities to better support NATO missions. In North Macedonia, the Krivolak training ground - one of the alliance's main training sites - hosted a major military exercise this summer.
Even Serbia, Moscow’s closest ally, is taking advantage of the European awakening when it comes to defense. Last May, Russia’s foreign policy intelligence service accused Belgrade of supplying ammunition to Kiev through intermediaries. Although Belgrade denies that such deals existed, it implicitly takes credit for helping Ukraine.
The Western Balkans are home to around 200 defence companies, mostly based in Serbia and Bosnia. They have the capacity to produce ammunition compatible with both NATO standards and former Warsaw Pact specifications – perhaps even more efficiently than some companies within the European Union. For example, a €1 billion ($1,2 billion) joint venture between Bulgaria’s VMZ and Germany’s Rheinmetall has an annual ammunition production target that is only a fifth of Bosnia’s estimated production capacity. This could significantly support Ukraine’s supply from the EU. However, the industrial potential is often hampered by political paralysis and fragmented governance.
Looking beyond ammunition, the Western Balkans should be able to use common European mechanisms, programs, and financial instruments to strengthen their defense industries. This includes the European Defense Fund, long-term loans under the European Security Action Facility, and the European Defense Industrial Program (EDIP). The EDIP regulation, which has not yet been finalized, provides for around €1,5 billion ($1,7 billion) in grants for the period 2025-2027. Links with the European Defense Agency (EDA), which deals with research, capability development, and industrial cooperation, could also be further strengthened.
In 2014, Serbia became the first country outside the European Union to establish formal working relations with the agency. Albania and North Macedonia have signed Security and Defence Partnership Agreements with the EU, which explicitly foresee cooperation with the European Defence Agency (EDA). Ideally, all six Western Balkan countries should become members of the EDA, perhaps without voting rights until they join the European Union. There is growing interest among EU member states - including France, Italy and others - in deepening security cooperation with the Western Balkan countries, particularly in the areas of dual-use infrastructure and the defence industry.
Of course, there are obstacles.
One of them is the division of the region between NATO members, potential members such as Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and a neutral Serbia. As long as Serbia pursues a “multi-faceted” foreign and security policy and continues to import military equipment from Russia and China, cooperation will encounter difficulties. The transition to Western platforms - such as the French Rafale fighters - will take time. The lack of trust between Serbia and its neighbors will hinder cooperation in the field of defense industry, as well as the joint fight against hybrid threats. The latter requires much stronger ties between intelligence services, police and other state institutions across borders.
An even more serious obstacle is the state of the security sector across the region. In several countries, the primary role of the military, intelligence services, police and law enforcement agencies is to preserve the power of ruling structures and protect clientelistic networks, rather than serving the public interest. Transnational organized crime has long developed symbiotic relationships with the “guardians of the state” - whether it is NATO members and EU candidates, such as Albania and Montenegro, or Eurosceptic Serbia. Despite some positive developments, these chronic problems continue to hinder effective integration into EU and NATO mechanisms.
The last issue worth mentioning is the economy. It is difficult to attract strategic international investment to small economies unless they act together. The Western Balkans have not yet managed to create a success story in which a major European, Turkish or American manufacturer would open a plant in the region. This shortcoming could be partially compensated by domestic demand, linked to the modernization of the military.
Yet defense spending remains below 2 percent of GDP, well below the 3,5 percent target agreed at the NATO summit in The Hague last June. The geographical location of the Western Balkans, far from Russia’s borders, and the absence of historical memory of direct Moscow control, influence security perceptions and defense planning. As a result, the business case for investing in the region can seem rather weak.
The Western Balkans are on track to become a net contributor to European security, but much remains to be done to achieve this goal. Western Balkan governments should join forces to develop joint projects, attract foreign investment in the defense industry, and leverage increased security spending within the European Union. Three NATO members - Albania, North Macedonia, and Montenegro - should take the lead in this process. They should invest in partnerships with EU members to modernize their militaries and security sectors, and gradually integrate into the Union's new defense initiatives.
carnegieendowment.org
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