What Orban's defeat means for the Western Balkans

The global attention paid to the electoral defeat of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on April 12 has shown how disproportionately large his role on the world stage has been. During his sixteen years at the helm of government, this ideological crusader against Western liberalism has managed to use his country’s veto power in the European Union to effectively blackmail much of Europe through strategic partnerships with Russia and China. More recently, Orbán has gained further prominence thanks to his alignment with a US administration sympathetic to Hungary’s domestic conservative agenda and sovereigntist hostility to Brussels. Describing the disproportionate international significance of Orbán’s ideological project, Bulgarian political scientist Ivan Krastev compared the Hungarian leader to the Fidel Castro of the global right.

Yet this global notoriety has often overshadowed Orbán’s role as a regional hegemon and a broker of Russian and Chinese influence in the Balkans. Orbán has never managed to build a sustainable illiberal axis within the EU or in Central Europe, largely because none of his European partners have been as consistently successful in elections as he has. But he has been more successful, by all accounts, as a patron and key support for an already existing illiberal axis south of Hungary’s borders.

Orban has acted as a key political player in the Balkans, supporting leaders like Vučić and building political-economic networks of influence.

Over the past decade, Orban has used his control of the Hungarian state, as well as the support of Russia and China, to build an infrastructure of influence in the Western Balkans to strengthen his political allies - most notably Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić. At the same time, Orban has presented Hungary as an entry point for the region's accession to the European Union, a process that, unlike Ukraine, he has at least formally supported. In doing so, Orban has presented himself as a patron of ideologically close regimes like Vučić's, in which he saw either instruments to pressure Brussels or future allies in a differently shaped European Union.

Orbán’s support for Balkan hardliners has helped to entrench democratic backsliding in the region. At the same time, the Hungarian leader’s efforts have further fueled skepticism about enlargement among other EU member states, which have become increasingly wary of accepting new potential “Trojan horses” like Hungary. The significance of Péter Magyar’s election victory for the Western Balkans lies in the fact that his government will assume Hungary’s role in regional politics, including the ability to influence the enlargement process through veto power. This change in leadership is likely to have consequences for Vučić’s regime in Belgrade, but also for the speed with which the Western Balkan countries and Ukraine will join the EU.

Orban's axis of hardliners

Orbán’s deep strategic cooperation with Vučić was based on both ideological affinity and a shared geopolitical interest in counterbalancing the West by accommodating Russian and Chinese interests. For example, the presence of Russian energy companies in Serbia played an important role in Orbán’s efforts to turn Hungary into a transit hub for Russian energy exports to Europe. As a result, the two countries signed strategic cooperation agreements in the fields of gas and oil, and there were also talks on nuclear energy.

Over the past decade, Vučić and Orbán have both transformed their countries into Chinese manufacturing and trade hubs for the European market, in a process that has included the construction of Chinese-funded railways and roads connecting both countries to the Chinese-owned port of Piraeus in Greece. The importance of Serbia and Hungary to China was further confirmed during Chinese President Xi Jinping's last visit to Europe in 2024, when, in addition to Paris, he chose Budapest and Belgrade as two of the three stops on his tour.

Orban's policies have contributed to democratic regression in the region and increased skepticism within the EU towards further enlargement.

The ties between Hungary and the Western Balkans have also extended to a wide range of investments by Hungarian companies in key sectors in the region. For example, in Albania, over the past decade, Budapest-based IT company 4iG has become a significant player in telecommunications, Hungary’s Wizz Air has become a dominant airline, and OTP Bank has entered the banking sector. According to the Belgrade Center for Security Policy (BCSP), Hungarian foreign direct investment in the Western Balkans has increased from €690 million in 2016 to €1,5 billion in 2020.

This deepening of economic cooperation has gone hand in hand with support for friendly regimes, including investments by Orban loyalists in media in North Macedonia and Slovenia. In 2018, Orban granted asylum to Nikola Gruevski, the former prime minister of North Macedonia. Gruevski had faced corruption charges in his home country, as North Macedonia sought to move toward the European Union by strengthening the rule of law. Orban has also shielded Milorad Dodik, the secessionist leader of the Republika Srpska entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina, from EU sanctions and kept him in power with financial support when others withdrew. Orban was reportedly even prepared to use Hungarian peacekeepers to extract him from Bosnia last year during Dodik’s conflict with the country’s judiciary.

Recent events suggest that Orban’s support may not have been one-sided. During a campaign in which Orban focused on criticizing Ukraine, Vučić announced that explosives had been discovered on Serbian territory near a pipeline that supplies Hungary with Russian gas, and Orban suggested that Ukraine might be responsible. The Hungarian claimed that it was a false flag operation, while even Serbian intelligence services appeared to distance themselves from claims of Ukrainian involvement in order to save face with the West.

What Hungary's victory means for the Western Balkans

The Hungarian led his opposition coalition to victory with an election agenda that focused largely on domestic issues, such as corruption and the rule of law. He is expected to put the same issues at the forefront as prime minister. When it comes to international relations, his main focus appears to be on rebuilding Hungary’s relations with the EU and NATO. During the campaign, the Hungarian stressed the need to “restore Hungary’s credibility… by acting as a constructive, reliable partner that contributes to a stronger Europe.” This will likely start with unblocking EU aid to Ukraine.

However, the Western Balkans were already prominent in the Hungarian’s first press conference after the election. Addressing reporters, he took a belligerent tone towards Vučić and announced an investigation into the incident involving the alleged attempted attack on the gas pipeline. He also claimed to know “who is sponsoring the friendship between Orban, Vučić and Fico,” implying that Russian President Vladimir Putin was pulling the strings in this regional axis. Vučić quickly hit back, calling the statements “stupid” and “foolish.”

Orban's dismissal comes at a time when Vučić is already facing internal problems and a decline in popularity. This could have an impact on the presidential elections in Serbia scheduled for next spring, and it is possible that it will lead him to postpone the expected early parliamentary elections. However, the biggest effect of the loss of his most important ally in Europe will be a further weakening of Vučić's international position. The Hungarian victory also raises questions about the fate of numerous joint regional projects between Serbia and Hungary, especially those related to Russian energy.

A victory for Peter Magyar could bring Hungary closer to the EU, weaken Orban's regional system, and change the balance of power in the Balkans, including the prospect of enlargement.

Any move by the Hungarians to move away from Hungary’s dependence on Russian energy sources will put Serbia in an even more difficult position when it comes to its dependence on Moscow. It could even accelerate Belgrade’s turn to the West in this area. Meanwhile, Croatia – whose Prime Minister Andrej Plenković has seemed pleased with the Hungarian victory – appears to stand to gain. Croatia’s initiative to supply the region with non-Russian oil, via the proposed Adriatic pipeline, as well as with American liquefied natural gas via the Southern Interconnection in Bosnia, is likely to gain momentum.

The positive momentum created by the Hungarian victory could temporarily give a political boost to the prospects for EU enlargement; although the Hungarian expressed skepticism about Ukraine’s candidacy, his criticism was limited to the pace of its accession, and he said that the issue should be decided in a referendum. The removal of one of the authoritarian leaders’ aides, as well as the possibility of Hungary moving away from the status of a problematic state in the area of ​​the rule of law, has further strengthened Brussels’ position in implementing a policy of conditionality towards the Western Balkans. This is particularly important at a time when the EU is threatening Serbia with a freeze of funds for democratic regression and continued ties with Russia, while Brussels has warned that it could slow down Albania’s accession process due to concerns about the rule of law.

However, a political twist in Hungary could soon reveal where member states really stand on enlargement. With the obstructionist factor removed from Budapest, EU countries that may have been sceptical about enlargement will no longer be able to hide behind Hungary’s veto on accession without making their own positions clear. Now Europe’s credibility as a geopolitical actor could soon be put to the test, as its largest members, under pressure from geopolitical circumstances, could be forced to offer more clarity on the terms and conditions under which enlargement can take place.

The author is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council's European Center.

atlanticcouncil.org

Prepared by: A. Š.