Belgrade, Banja Luka, Ljubljana: Three faces of Israeli strategy

The opening of the Israeli Chamber of Commerce office in Banja Luka a few days ago represents "an economic and cultural step and a bridge for investment and cooperation," is the official position of the chamber.

However, the opening of the office cannot be seen as an isolated case, because in the space of just a few days, Ljubljana received the first resident embassy of Israel, following the restoration of diplomatic relations with the Janez Janša government.

Another layer of political relations is intertwined in these moves: Israel's relationship with Serbia, all within the broader context of American policy towards the region.

Serbia as a partner with the greatest capacity

Serbia has become more than just a passing European address for Israel in recent years. Intelligence-sharing agreements, cooperation in the field of unmanned aerial vehicles, and contracts with Elbit have made Belgrade one of Israel's most important partners in the Western Balkans.

This cooperation has multiple levels. Serbia offers Israel political space, an industrial base, and security cooperation, while Serbia, through its relations with Israel, gains access to technology and a partner with strong ties to the United States. Therefore, the relationship between the two countries cannot be reduced to arms trade or bilateral diplomacy alone.

At the same time, the cooperation is taking place at a sensitive time. Some Western governments, under pressure from the war in Gaza, are trying to limit relations with Israel in the field of defense. In such an environment, Serbia appears as a non-EU partner with greater freedom to develop military-technical ties with Israel, but also as a country whose relations with Israel have their own political and economic logic.

Real interest

However, the question arises as to what Israel's real interest in the Western Balkans is in such relations. Vuk Vuksanović, a lecturer in foreign policy and grand strategy at the Department of War Studies at King's College London, believes that Israel's foreign policy revolves around two themes. The first is an attempt to influence the EU's position on the Palestinian issue by increasing its influence among Eastern European EU member states or candidate countries. The second relates to changes in Israel's national security doctrine.

"Israel is trying to expand its periphery and establish diplomatic and security partnerships with new regions and countries. The Balkans are on that list as the European region geographically closest to the Middle East and North Africa. Israel is also trying to partially counter the influence of Turkey and Iran with its presence," Vuksanović tells DW.

In this context, Turkey's role is not negligible. Ankara has been building a military and political projection of power in the Western Balkans for years, from defense industry cooperation to intensive diplomatic initiatives. At the same time, Israel has further strengthened its position in the Eastern Mediterranean through new military agreements with Cyprus and Greece, creating a three-way axis that balances Turkish influence in the region.

Kobi Mikael, a senior research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) in Tel Aviv and the Misgav Institute in Jerusalem, also believes that Israel's approach to the Western Balkans is not an isolated policy, but part of a broader, recalibrated national security strategy.

"The events of October 7 and the ensuing war highlighted a key lesson for Tel Aviv: the urgent need to diversify defense supply chains and reduce reliance on traditional procurement routes that may be subject to political restrictions."

"In this context, the Western Balkans, and Serbia in particular, have emerged as essential partners," Mikael tells DW. He also points out that Serbia's importance to Israel stems from three main drivers. The first two are a two-way defense and industrial partnership, and strategic autonomy.

"The third relationship is underpinned by a deep historical resonance stemming from shared suffering during World War II, which fosters strong mutual trust, both at the political and social levels."

Relationship difficulty

In this calculation, Republika Srpska does not have the economic or security weight that Serbia has. Its value is primarily symbolic and political. Banja Luka represents a space in which it is possible to publicly demonstrate closeness to Israel at a time when the same gesture in Sarajevo or in much of Europe would be politically much more difficult due to strong pro-Palestinian sentiments.

However, Vuksanović points out that Israel has been one of the main diplomatic protectors of Republika Srpska for almost fifteen years. Banja Luka sees in Israel a way to strengthen its negotiating position vis-à-vis the central government in Sarajevo, as well as vis-à-vis the West.

"Israel primarily sees Republika Srpska as an actor through which it can influence Sarajevo's politics. This relationship was conceived in 2012 when then-Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman was a guest of Milorad Dodik, and then Republika Srpska vetoed Sarajevo's decision and caused Bosnia and Herzegovina to abstain in the United Nations during the vote on Palestine's membership," Vuksanović recalls.

Slovenia: Change of government also changes attitude towards Israel

If Republika Srpska is an example of a minor actor using relations with Israel as political leverage, Slovenia is a somewhat different case. It shows how quickly a change of government can affect a country's foreign policy.

Until last year, the government of Robert Golob was among the most vocal critics of Israel in the European Union. The coming to power of Janez Janša changed this approach. The Palestinian flag was removed from the government building, the entry ban on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was lifted, direct flights between Tel Aviv and Ljubljana were restored, and the arms embargo was lifted.

This week, Israel opened its first permanent embassy in Ljubljana, which was accompanied by citizen protests.

The Slovenian case is important because it shows that relations with Israel can change quickly when the political majority changes. In this sense, Ljubljana represents a different type of partnership from Banja Luka and Belgrade. It is an EU member state whose actions have direct weight in the Union's institutions.

For Professor Mikael, the cooperation between Israel and Republika Srpska is "warm and pragmatic."

"While Tel Aviv appreciates Milorad Dodik's strong pro-Israel stance and shared concerns about radical Islamism, Israel remains aware of the West's broader sensitivity when it comes to Bosnia's internal stability. On the other hand, Belgrade is an unassailable pillar of Israel's strategy in the Balkans. Israel sees Serbia as the primary political, economic, and industrial power in the region," Mikael concludes.

The broader picture of Israeli engagement is also visible in the examples of Albania and North Macedonia, where Israel and Tirana, respectively Skopje, have deepened security and technological cooperation, including intelligence sharing and projects in the field of cyber-defense. These relations, although less media-exposed than those with Serbia or Slovenia, show that Israel is systematically building a network of partners of varying weight. From large regional actors to smaller, but strategically positioned states.

Identification required in Washington

Republika Srpska is not primarily seeking Jerusalem-based legitimacy from its closeness to Israel, but rather Washington-based legitimacy, which was evident from Milorad Dodik's visit to Jerusalem this week, on the occasion of the celebration of the 250th anniversary of the independence of the United States.

Relations with Israel also represent a channel for Banja Luka towards American political circles close to the Israeli right, which they do not hide in Banja Luka.

This is confirmed by Kurt Basuner, an analyst at the Democratization Policy Center (DPC) in Berlin. According to his information, the FARA registers contain registered agents with long-term ties to Israel, including the Republika Srpska office in Washington.

“The agreements published on the FARA website listed the priorities of the RS: lifting sanctions, removing the High Representative and reinterpreting Annex 10, and reviewing the constitutional order – which clearly aims for the independence of the RS. Given the open support of the US government for extreme right-wing political forces in Europe, parallels with the policies pursued by the Netanyahu government – ​​once aimed at Orban’s Hungary, but also encompassing Serbia and the RS – and now the Janša government in Slovenia, become visible,” says Basuner.

It seems, says Basuner, that the Israeli government sees the Balkans as a relatively safe foothold for entering an increasingly critical Europe, with "national-conservative" and far-right forces as allies.

The EU as an absent party

In all of this, the European Union acts as a commentator, not a shaper. Slovenia shows that even a member of the Union can take a different course when it assesses that its relations with Israel and Washington are more important than full political alignment with Brussels.

This does not mean that Belgrade and Banja Luka have the same position as Ljubljana. Slovenia operates from EU institutions, Serbia as a candidate for membership, and Republika Srpska as an entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina. Their capabilities and goals are therefore not the same, but all three cases show that Israel in the Balkans is developing relations with actors of different political weight and international status.