The second phase of the Russian invasion of Ukraine is underway. Now it seems that the goal of the war is to establish full control over Donbass and southern Ukraine. If they succeed in this, it would mean the occupation of about one third of Ukraine, cutting off the country from its Black Sea ports, including Odesa.
If fully realized, these goals raise the deeply troubling possibility of a Russian attack on Moldova and its breakaway region of Transnistria. Therefore, the second phase of Putin's war could entail even more serious consequences.
Russia's foreign policy towards its neighbors is closely related to Vladimir Putin's long-term aspiration to turn Russia into a great power like the Soviet Union, whose collapse he considers a geopolitical disaster.
Since it cannot rebuild the Soviet Union, Russia needs friendly political regimes in neighboring countries, or at least regimes that it can influence and prevent them from entering the Western orbit of the EU and NATO.
For a long time, one of the main Russian instruments of such influence were the so-called "de-facto states" in the former republics of the former Soviet Union. These include Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, Transnistria in Moldova and - as of 2014 - the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) and Luhansk (LPR) in the Donbass region. In order to regain control over these renegade regions and their states, Moscow demands that the legitimacy of the puppet regimes there be recognized. In this way, the Kremlin would gain long-term influence over the foreign policy decisions of these countries. That was never acceptable.
Moldova has nowhere near the defense capabilities of Ukraine, despite having a "cooperation agreement" that includes supplying troops to the NATO peacekeeping mission in Kosovo since 2014.
However, this does not diminish the territorial value of those areas. By recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008, annexing Crimea in 2014, and recognizing DPR and LPR in 2022, Russia has at least partially achieved the goal of restoring a dependent zone of influence beyond its borders. That strategy is now evident in Russia's latest moves in Ukraine, including the announcement of an "independence referendum" in the key southern city of Kherson on April 27, 2022.
Moscow's goal to occupy the entire southern Ukraine is the logical conclusion of this strategy. Still, it reflects how much things have changed from Russia's original aspirations. From an ultimatum for Kiev's unconditional surrender in February 2022, to demands that Ukraine recognize the independence of the DPR and LPR and the annexation of Crimea in March, a deal on Russian terms now seems increasingly unlikely.
Destination Transnistria?
If successful, the territory grab the Kremlin is now pursuing would also create a gateway to Transnistria - one of the early de facto states under Russian control - which already seemed possible after the 2014 annexation of Crimea.
There is little enthusiasm in Transnistria for involvement in Russian aggression against Ukraine. However, it is also limited in its ability to resist Moscow's ambitions should Russian troops advance towards them. In that case, Moldova would be even more exposed to Russian aggression, given the fact that it does not have anywhere near the defense capabilities of Ukraine, despite having a "cooperation agreement" with the alliance that includes supplying troops to the NATO peacekeeping mission in Kosovo since 2014.
Moreover, given the significant ethnic Russian and Russophone community, the Kremlin would probably loudly invoke "genocide" to justify military aggression against Moldova and could rely on pro-Russian hardliners to push through the "independence referendum."
Therefore, regardless of real capabilities, the Kremlin has clear goals to achieve its goals from the second phase in conquering a large part of Ukrainian territory and to consolidate its positions and those of its puppets along the entire Black Sea coast.
The consequences of Russian success would be extremely damaging for Ukraine. The control of the central government in Kiev would be limited to one closed, economically devastated territory. Large population centers, including the capital Kiev, would likely be within range of Russian artillery and missiles, and the front lines would remain in unstable low-intensity conflict zones. Meanwhile, a large number of Ukrainian citizens would be subject to the Russian occupation regime that showed its face in places like Bucha.
Keep the pressure on Putin
Such calculations clearly show that Ukraine will continue to do everything in its power to defend these territories. The West will need to continue to support these efforts, and it will need to do more and faster if the strategy of proactive containment — preventing the spillover of war to neighboring countries and gradually reducing Moscow's capacity to fight and hold territory in Ukraine — continues to work.
The Western sanctions program should be expanded - especially when it comes to Russian oil and gas. The supply of military equipment should be increased to enable Ukraine to resist and eventually repel the Russian aggressors. This has its own risks for Ukraine and its Western partners. Russia is likely to increase its airstrikes and expand its list of targets, especially along the Black Sea, as demonstrated by the recent missile attack on Odessa.
The tightening of the sanctions regime will also harm the West. However, the alternatives are worse. Not only for Ukraine, but also for Moldova. Russian success along the lines of the proclaimed objectives of the so-called second phase of aggression against Ukraine will also make direct conflict between NATO and Russia more likely. It would almost certainly encourage Putin to try to achieve by force what he did not get when he proposed a new NATO-Russia agreement in December 2021: the withdrawal of NATO forces from the territories of all 14 countries that have joined the military alliance since the end of the Cold War.
Stopping Putin in Ukraine is the only realistic way to avoid a tragedy of even greater proportions and the spread of the conflict to another country. The sooner the West realizes this and acts accordingly, the more likely it is to effectively stop Russia and preserve the possibility of future peace and stability in Ukraine and beyond.
conversation.com
Translation: N. Bogetić
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