Always on the agenda of the EU, but never the main point

The war in Ukraine has highlighted both the importance and limitations of the EU. Putin decided to invade the neighboring country in order to prevent its integration, slowly but surely, into the institutions and market of the union. At stake is the EU's much-discussed power of attraction. Ukrainian refugees seek safety in member states west of their country's borders. In response to the invasion, Kyiv submitted a formal application for membership and expects a response from the European Council at a summit on 23-24. June on whether Ukraine will receive candidate status. The EU additionally strengthens its geopolitical muscles: it supplies weapons to Ukraine and imposes sanctions on Russia due to its aggression.

At the same time, the EU is failing on other fronts. It has problems persuading countries aspiring to EU membership to abide by its sanctions. Serbia is an example of that. Although Belgrade supported UN Security Council resolutions condemning Putin's invasion and even introduced several symbolic measures against Russia's ally Belarus and the family of former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, it refused to suspend the flights of the national airline Air Serbia to and from Moscow. As in 2014, the Serbian government also refuses to apply trade and financial sanctions. Nor is it expected to cancel the import of Russian natural gas, which is the goal set by the European Commission, because Belgrade recently secured a new agreement on supplies with Moscow. The situation is the same in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the leader of the Serbs, Milorad Dodik, currently a member of the country's three-member presidency, practically vetoed any punitive measures against Russia. While Brussels is baring its teeth at the Kremlin, EU enlargement has failed to motivate the Western Balkans to follow Brussels' lead.

However, there is more bad news. Enlargement should strengthen democracy and help strengthen the rule of law in the EU. The new member states would apply the reforms and the union would reward them. However, there is scant evidence that this is happening or was ever the case, even at the height of EU influence in the 2000s. Hungary and Poland, which joined in 2004, are typical examples of democratic backsliding: progressive collapse of the rule of law, undermining of media freedom and harassment of civil society. In the Western Balkans, it is more appropriate to speak of democratic stagnation. Although the situation varies from country to country, international monitoring bodies that monitor the performance of non-democracy fields generally do not record large improvements or dramatic declines. The exception is, of course, Serbia, which in the Fridom House report fell from "free" to "partially free" in 2019. It does not seem that the EU accession negotiations, which have been ongoing since 2014, have affected the country's domestic trajectory. In the elections on April 3, 2022, President Aleksandar Vučić won a new five-year presidential mandate, although the opposition achieved success in the parliament and in the capital, Belgrade. Nevertheless, Vučić's dominance over the political system is still almost complete.

Insufficient commitment

The most obvious explanation for the deadlock is the EU's lack of commitment to the Western Balkans. The region has a strong position on the agenda of the union, but it has never been a focal point. Between the Eurozone crisis in the early and mid-2010s, the crisis in Ukraine in 2014-2015, the refugee wave in 2015-2016, the coronavirus pandemic and now Russia's aggression against Ukraine, there is always another nature that puts the so-called EU's inner courtyard on the union's to-do list.

As a rule, the internal consolidation of the EU exceeds its foreign policy ambitions, unless there is a direct connection between the two. Arguably, there is no such connection in the Western Balkans: the region does not produce a sufficient amount of instability to disrupt or threaten the EU. The status quo, while imperfect, seems bearable for the 27-member bloc. The war in Ukraine could change that as fears of spillover into Southeast Europe spread, but it is too early to say whether the EU will open the door wide, even to Western Balkan leaders like Montenegro.

Neighbor disputes

In addition, there are bilateral disputes involving member states and candidates, disputes that further muddy the waters. The dispute between Bulgaria and North Macedonia over history and national identity is the most recent example, but there have been more in the past (for example between Slovenia and Croatia and between Greece and North Macedonia). There is no doubt that such disputes will continue to usurp enlargement policy in the future. The EU does not have any formal mechanism to address them and it is also unlikely that policymakers will heed calls for institutional reforms such as the introduction of qualified majority voting. It is best for the Western Balkan countries to engage in informal mediation, with large member states such as Germany taking the lead. But even then, the chances of success are relatively limited unless the parties to the dispute are genuinely interested in reaching a compromise. Additionally, member states can play a negative role in ways other than using the veto. Let's remember Hungary's encroachment into the media and economy of the Western Balkans, as well as other close ties that Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has with the region's political elites.

Multi-layered Europe

On the 1990th of May, which is known in the EU as Europe Day, French President Emmanuel Macron gave a speech in which he repeated the proposals from the early XNUMXs about the European political community - ie. about a Europe of concentric circles where the six states of the Western Balkans would be pushed into the outer circle with Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and possibly the United Kingdom. Although the Balkans could eventually join the EU, it would remain outside it in the short or medium term. On the plus side, the region could be entitled to some of the benefits of integration into the single market and access to the EU budget. The negative is that he would not enjoy the privileges of membership, including access to decision-making power. Of course, Macron's vision is not universally accepted in the EU. However, it is symptomatic of the day and age in which we live.

In a Europe of concentric circles, the countries of the Western Balkans face the risk of being forever stuck in the waiting room. They could orbit around the EU's center of gravity, but not cross the border from non-membership to membership. As a result, the incentive to align with European conditions - whether in the areas of democracy, economic governance or foreign policy - would be reduced.

The status quo, while imperfect, seems bearable for the 27-member bloc. The war in Ukraine could change that as fears of spillover into southeastern Europe spread, but it is too early to say whether the EU will open the door wide, even to Western Balkan leaders like Montenegro.

And the long-term prospects for expansion are also uncertain. The war in Ukraine could end in a stalemate. The EU has a responsibility to support the legitimate Ukrainian government and the territory it controls in all possible ways. Ukraine would then practically become even more deeply integrated into the Eurosphere. Such a scenario for Ukraine, involving deepening institutional and legal ties but not full membership, could be applied to other states, including post-Brexit Britain, post-Erdogan Turkey and the Western Balkans.

There is no motivation for expensive reforms

In the Balkan corridors of power, everyone pays lip service to enlargement, but few truly believe it. Joining the EU in those countries is and has always been an elite-driven process. Political leaders tailor policies and advocate reforms in line with EU requirements in the hope that Brussels, and eventually their voters, will reward them. However, since the EU in 2009-2010. abolished the visa regime for citizens of the Western Balkans (except for Kosovo) for travel to the EU, she has exhausted the concrete initiatives she can offer these countries.

In order to stay in power or compete domestically, Balkan leaders are forced to build, maintain and support themselves and their party's clientele through public sector employment, subsidies and other material benefits.

The extra financial aid one can get for being an exemplary student is not reason enough for the government to embark on expensive reforms, such as those to ensure that the judiciary is free from political interference or that the media can investigate one's business partners. The ultimate prize, EU membership, is out of reach even if such reforms were to take off. As a result, Balkan politicians, regardless of country or political color, are status quo players. They will only do the minimum to remove one or two obstacles on the way to the EU, but they will take great care not to jeopardize their position on the domestic scene.

Socialization is also important. This region has been involved in European integration since the early 2000s. There have been numerous initiatives, formats and institutional innovations, starting from the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe to the new French accession negotiation methodology adopted in 2020, and from the Stabilization and Association Agreement to the Berlin Process to the annual EU-Western Balkans summits. The elites of the Western Balkans have learned to speak the language of the EU, but this does not mean that they will produce results.

Captive state and de-democratization

EU policy is undermined by state capture. It is clear that corruption and subjugation of public institutions to personal or group interests is a fairly common phenomenon throughout the post-communist world, and it is not alien to the EU members either. Honestly, corruption and state capture are not a priori incompatible with the EU.

However, in the Western Balkans there are factors that make them worse. One of them is certainly ethnopolitics. In multi-ethnic societies, such as BiH or North Macedonia, power-sharing agreements mitigate conflicts, but at the same time enable the misuse of rare resources and the disruption of public policies. In order to stay in power or compete domestically, leaders must build, maintain, and support themselves and their party's clientele through public sector employment, subsidies, and other material benefits. Entrenched corruption undermines the EU's transformative influence, offers opportunities for other international actors (such as China, Russia and Turkey) to cooperate with local players and undermines trust in democracy. Such an environment is fertile ground for populist leaders and/or ethnocrats such as Albanian President Edi Rama, Dragan Čović, leader of the largest Croatian party in BiH, and Ali Ahmeti, who heads the Democratic Union for Integration, a party supported by Albanians in North Macedonia, which is since 2002, he has been part of the ruling coalitions in Skopje almost without interruption - as well as Dodik and Vučić.

BiH, which suffers from a chronic constitutional crisis, should serve as a warning. In that country, Dodik wrested power from the central government to strengthen the Republika Srpska, a majority-Serb entity within Bosnia. On the other hand, Čović advocates extensive electoral reform, allegedly to protect Croatian interests. In both cases, nationalism serves politicians to consolidate power and gives them even greater freedom to manage resources. In the meantime, reformist leaders, such as former North Macedonian Prime Minister Zoran Zaev, must adapt to political realities and place insurgents in their governments.

Ruling coalitions committed to change, like the governments in Montenegro since the August 2020 elections, can be unstable and prone to internal conflicts.

Disgruntled public

Research shows that public support for EU membership varies significantly across the region, with Albania and Kosovo typically high and Serbia low. An Ipsos survey in Serbia published in April 2022 showed that 44 percent of respondents are against Serbia's entry into the EU, and only 35 percent are in favor - which is the first time that negative attitudes prevailed.

However, in other parts of the Balkans, support for joining the EU is strong. The problem is that pro-EU majorities do not have enough electoral momentum to bring reformist leaders to power - or even to force the current government to implement laws and policies that will reduce the gap between them and the Union.

Moreover, Europhiles feel betrayed by EU leaders and institutions. They resent the fact that prominent officials such as European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen treat Vučić uncritically and seem to give him the green light when it comes to domestic politics. Paradoxically, Euroscepticism is growing among groups that strongly support the EU and want it to take a stronger role in enforcing the values ​​and principles it advocates.

At the same time, the captivity of the state and the lack of responsibility (due to the fact that the judiciary and the media are hostages or are heavily influenced by the current authorities) creates a counter-reaction through civil society.

Environmental protests in Serbia are just the latest example in a long line of civil movements that gained momentum in the 2010s thanks to the advancement of social media. Other examples include the so-called "colorful revolution" in North Macedonia in 2016, protests related to the unique civil registration number (JMBG) in BiH in 2013, and rallies against President Milo Đukanović in Montenegro in 2015. In almost all of these events, the EU was an observer. In some cases, the protesters believed that the Union - whether it was true or not - was on the side of the governments they opposed. It all boils down to the essential question of whether Europe is on the side of the status quo in the Western Balkans or is serious about its proclaimed mission of transformation.

Prospects for the future

It is not unreasonable to expect that the war in Ukraine will lead to EU momentum in the Western Balkans. Faced with the Russian challenge, the Union will take steps to consolidate its position and prevent disruption. The European Union Force (EUFOR), the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, has been reinforced, as has the European Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX). Furthermore, Serbia is forced to comply with EU sanctions against Russia after the invasion of Ukraine. The start of accession negotiations with North Macedonia and Albania will be another logical step, however, the current government in Bulgaria, a member of the EU, would have to veto the start of those negotiations. (Perhaps Bulgaria could be motivated in the interest of the stability of Southeast Europe or through EU initiatives of economic compensation to Bulgaria, the commitment that Bulgaria will enter the Eurozone, or even constitutional amendments in North Macedonia as requested by Sofia). However, the opening of EU membership negotiations is largely a symbolic step. This would not automatically translate into an improvement in the situation on the ground in areas such as the economy, the rule of law or good governance.

Paradoxically, Euroscepticism is growing in the Balkans among groups that strongly support the EU and want it to take a stronger role in implementing the values ​​and principles it advocates.

The EU is facing difficult issues in the region, and there are no quick solutions. It is best to play the card of creating a common goal with the democratic movements in the Balkans.

However, these alliances will not materialize quickly, and even if they do, they may prove short-lived in the face of the enormous obstacles that EU policy needs to address.

Much depends on the evolution of the EU itself. The continuation of the democratic decline would cement the position of the Western Balkans outside the Union. Bosnia and Kosovo, still potential candidates, would suffer the most. Denied a visa-free regime and excluded from membership in international bodies such as the Council of Europe, Kosovo is exposed to the risk of instability. However, Serbia will also remain in limbo and will not be in a position to gain EU membership until an agreement is reached in the dispute with Kosovo.

In contrast, if the geopolitically thought-out EU were to receive one of the few countries in the Western Balkans within its ranks in the next ten years, it could bring about a long-awaited change in the region. It is clear that democracy, prosperity and the rule of law will not automatically flow from membership, and much will depend on the conditions and dynamics on the domestic scene. However, being integrated into the EU is a necessary condition for the advancement of what the Union itself considers its essential mission: spreading its values ​​and principles to the countries and societies on its periphery in the interest of political stability and economic growth.

Dimitar Bečev is an expert for Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe

carnegieeurope.eu

Prepared by: A. Šofranac, N. Bogetić