Russian President Vladimir Putin has yet to publicly comment on the defeat of his forces in northeastern Ukraine, but he is under pressure from domestic nationalists to take the initiative.
He does not have many options available for a quick recovery, and judging by Western intelligence and open source analysis, most of his potential steps carry internal and geopolitical risks, Reuters writes.
Since he came to power in 1999, Islamic extremists in Chechnya and the wider North Caucasus region have been among the fiercest armed forces Putin has faced. In that case, he chose to escalate by using greater force.
Reuters lists some of his main options in Ukraine.
Stabilization, regrouping, attack
Russian and Western analysts agree that - from Moscow's perspective - Russian forces must urgently stabilize the front line, stop Ukraine's advance, regroup and, if they can, launch a counteroffensive.
In the West, however, there are doubts about whether Russia has enough ground forces or equipment, given the number of casualties it has suffered and the amount of equipment abandoned or destroyed during what Russia calls a "special military operation" to destroy the Ukrainian military .
"There is not enough manpower," said Konrad Muzika, director of the consulting firm Rohan in Poland, after the losses Russia suffered in the northeast.
"The volunteer battalions are weakened, and the recruitment campaign is not giving the expected results. I think the situation will only get worse because fewer and fewer people will want to join. If Moscow wants more people, it should carry out mobilization."
Russia's efforts to increase the number of soldiers it can deploy include the formation of a new 3rd Army Corps, a new force led by Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, and Putin last month signed a decree to increase Russia's armed forces.
Reuters reports that Putin will have to decide whether to accede to demands from nationalist critics to remove or reorganize the top military, including his close ally, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu.
Putin is not inclined to give in immediately under pressure and remove his subordinates, but it happened that, after a certain time, he parted with them.
Mobilization
Mobilizing Russia's reserve forces, which number two million men who have served their military service in the past five years, is feasible but requires time to train and deploy manpower.
The Kremlin said on Tuesday that general mobilization was not considered "at this time".
This would mean a change in the official narrative about Ukraine, and it would no longer be described as a "special military operation" with limited objectives, but as an unlimited war.
That would force the authorities to abandon the policy of trying to ensure that the lives of most Russians go on as they did before February 24, when Putin invaded Ukraine.
Putin will have to decide whether to accede to demands from critics to remove or reshuffle the military's top brass, including close ally Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu
Putting Russia in a full state of war brings with it internal political risks, primarily the risk of public resistance against forced conscription.
It would also represent a kind of recognition that Russia is waging a general war against another Slavic country - and that this war is going badly for Moscow.
Andrej Kortunov, head of the RIAC Organization close to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said that he believes that the authorities are not willing to declare mobilization.
"In big cities, many people don't want to go and fight, and mobilization probably won't be popular," said Kortunov. "Secondly, I think it's in Putin's interest to present this whole thing as a limited operation. The state would like to preserve the status quo as much as possible without making radical changes."
Tony Brenton, the former British ambassador to Russia, told Reuters that it is certainly necessary for months to pass before the mobilization is reflected in Russia's fighting strength.
He trusts in "Russian winter"
Two Russian sources familiar with the thinking in the Kremlin told the British agency last month that Putin hopes that skyrocketing energy prices and possible shortages this winter will convince Europe to force Ukraine to a truce - on Russian terms.
However, some European diplomats believe that Ukraine's recent successes on the battlefield have undermined the efforts of some Europeans to force Kiev to make concessions, while it seems that countries such as Germany have taken a tougher stance towards Moscow in recent weeks and become more determined to overcome energy problems during the winter.
The European Union banned the import of Russian coal and approved a partial ban on the import of Russian crude oil.
Russia, in turn, has sharply cut gas exports to Europe and made clear it could ban all energy exports, a trump card Putin has yet to use.
More devastating missile attacks
After the failure in northwestern Ukraine, Russia targeted Ukraine's power infrastructure with missiles. This caused a temporary power outage in Kharkiv and neighboring Poltava and Suma regions. Water supplies and mobile networks were also affected.
The move was welcomed by some Russian nationalists who would like Moscow to use cruise missiles to more permanently disable Ukraine's infrastructure. That move, as reported by Reuters, would certainly cause international condemnation.
Nationalists have also long called on Moscow to attack what they call "decision-making" centers in Kiev and elsewhere, which would be difficult to achieve without massive collateral damage, according to Reuters.
Damages through the grain agreement
Putin complained that the UN-Turkey-mediated agreement that allows Ukraine to export grain and other food products across the Black Sea is unfair to poorer countries and Russia.
This Sunday, the Russian leader should hold talks with his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, on the changes to that agreement, which brings much-needed revenue to the Ukrainian budget. If Putin wants to inflict immediate damage on Ukraine, he could suspend or cancel the deal, or refuse to renew it when it expires in November. The West and poorer countries in Africa and the Middle East would blame him for exacerbating global food shortages. He would accuse Ukraine.
Peace agreement
The Kremlin says it would dictate to Kiev the terms of any peace deal when the time comes, while Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has said he will use force to liberate his country.
Zelensky said that this includes Crimea, which was annexed by Russia in 2014. Moscow has repeatedly announced that the status of Crimea is settled forever.
Cessation of captured territory in eastern Ukraine in the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic or the Russian-backed Lugansk People's Republic also seems politically impossible for Moscow as it has formally recognized them.
The complete "liberation" of these self-proclaimed states from Ukrainian forces was one of the main reasons given for the "special military operation".
The return of captured territories in southern Ukraine, where Russia partially controls three areas, would also be difficult to "sell" to the domestic public, according to a Reuters analysis.
The southern Kherson region is located above the Crimea and is where the channel from which the Black Sea peninsula receives most of its water is located. Together with the neighboring Zaporizhzhya Oblast, Kherson also provides Russia with a land corridor through which it can supply Crimea, which Moscow has highlighted as a major prize.
A nuclear move
Russian government officials reject Western allegations that Moscow will use tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine, but that, as Reuters writes, still worries some in the West.
In addition to causing mass casualties, such a move could have caused a dangerous escalation of events and formally drawn Western countries into a direct war with Russia.
Russia's nuclear doctrine allows for the use of nuclear weapons if they - or other weapons of mass destruction - are used against it, or if the Russian state faces an existential threat from conventional weapons.
In the quasi-autobiography 2000, Putin recalled how, growing up in a dilapidated apartment building in what was then Leningrad, he cornered a rat with a stick and was surprised when the animal pounced on him and turned the tables.
Brenton, the former British ambassador to Russia, warned that a cornered Putin could opt for the nuclear option if faced with a humiliating defeat without an exit strategy.
"If Russia is faced with the choice of fighting a pre-lost war and the fall of Putin on one side, and some kind of nuclear option on the other, I wouldn't swear it wouldn't choose the latter," Brenton said.
Retired U.S. General Ben Hodges, former commander of U.S. military forces in Europe, agrees that is a risk, but thinks it is unlikely.
"That would achieve nothing on the battlefield, it would be impossible for the US to stand by and not respond, and I don't think Putin or his closest advisers have suicidal tendencies," Hodges said.
At the beginning of the war, he rejected the peace agreement
In a move that suggests Putin had broader goals when he ordered the invasion of Ukraine on February 24, he rejected an interim agreement with Kiev at the start of the war, three people close to the Russian leadership told Reuters.
They said the deal would satisfy Russia's demand that Ukraine stay out of NATO. The Kremlin said the Reuters report "has absolutely nothing to do with reality." He also said that Ukraine's ambitions to join NATO still pose a threat to Russia.
Reuters reported yesterday that Zelensky and his government are studying proposals drawn up by senior officials and former NATO chief Anders Fogh Rasmussen, which envisage Western countries providing Kiev with future security guarantees.
Russia has already condemned the draft document, which also emphasizes Ukraine's continued aspirations "to join NATO and use its provisions on mutual defense."
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