Can Vladimir Putin lose the war in Ukraine and retain power? As Ukraine's counteroffensive undermines Russian positions on the frontline, the issue is attracting increasing attention.
The focus of that debate is the possibility of a coup, whether it is an armed uprising by disgruntled Russian generals or a rebellion within the Kremlin. While not impossible, those options are currently unlikely. In fact, a different kind of danger is possible: a general collapse of the regime, as multiple challenges stifle the capacity to respond and dysfunctionality extinguishes confidence in Putin's leadership.
Defeat in war is rarely good for a career. History is replete with dictators who launched what they thought would be brief victorious offensives only to be ousted from power after their troops were defeated.
There are numerous examples starting from Napoleon III, who hastily took over Otto von Bismarck's Prussia in 1870, to Argentine General Leopoldo Galtieri, who challenged British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher over the Falkland Islands in 1982.
However, collapse at the front does not always spell doom for dictators. Political scientists Giacomo Chioza and Hein Gumans analyzed all wars from 1919 to 2003 and found that, although a military defeat increases the chances of the forced removal of a dictator, in about half of the cases autocrats remain in power for at least a year after the end of the war, and those who succeed they become quite safe again. Saddam Hussein tyrannized Iraq for 12 years after his troops were defeated in Kuwait in 1991. It is rare for Arab leaders to be ousted immediately after losing a war against Israel.
Putin has not lost yet, and Russian troops can still defend part of the territory they have taken. However, this war has already damaged Putin's relations with some of his inner circle. To save face, he shifted the blame for the disastrous invasion to the military and Federal Security Service (FSB) officials, who were supposed to infiltrate Ukraine and gauge the mood of the population.
Eight generals have been "removed, reassigned or otherwise removed" since February, and one has reportedly been imprisoned.
Meanwhile, belligerent officials such as Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov and Yevgeny Prigozhin (who, among other things, controls a powerful mercenary organization) resent military defeats they blame on Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. When Ukraine retaliated this fall, ultranationalist analysts exploded on the Internet, allegedly pressuring Putin to escalate the war. Some have suggested that a coup by hardliners within the army and other security forces is possible.
Traps within the system
However, the obstacles to such a coup are great. Putin has set numerous traps within the system to prevent such a thing. Numerous agencies monitor each other - from the FSB to the Military Intelligence Service (GRU) to the FSO and the National Guard. The military counterintelligence section within the FSB - the largest within the service - has agents in every army unit, naval and air base.
Within the FSB, frequent prosecutions for corruption or treason have created a culture of distrust.
Whether by accident or by design, the top officials responsible for implementing these measures are not officially connected to each other nor do they have many connections within the Kremlin. Three academics recently classified the connections - business, private and family - among the 100 most influential Russians. It turns out that FSB director Alexander Borutnikov is informally connected only to Putin personally.
Interior Minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev is even less connected and has direct ties only to Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin. Security Council Secretary General Nikolai Patrushev and National Guard Director Viktor Zolotov both have small networks. Those in command of the army lack mutual trust to organize a conspiracy, and such plans would be difficult to hide.
As for Kadyrov and Prigozhin, it is hard to imagine that they could put pressure on Putin, let alone organize a coup against him. Both are extremely unpopular and completely reliant on the president for their status. Neither of them has many friends - as opposed to enemies - in important positions. For both of them, an attempt to overthrow Putin would be tantamount to suicide.
Rather than feeling pressure from such nationalists, Putin finds them useful. Their calls to demolish Ukraine's civilian infrastructure likely align with his leanings too - and their outspoken expression of extreme positions helps him test the public's mood. By advocating the use of tactical nuclear weapons, they made Putin's threats real.
At the same time, Putin - always suspicious of mercenary motives - knows that Prigozhin's attacks on Shoigu stem from personal and business disputes; Shojgu canceled the valuable state contracts he had with Prigozhin's companies. These belligerent officials influence Putin by reinforcing his instincts and occasionally shaping his agenda. However, they do not pose a serious threat.
Nor is there a real threat of a coup being launched by relative moderates within the regime. Those who still talk to journalists - unofficially - are depressed and bitter. They complain about the lack of consultation and planning while secretly trying to protect their family members from conscription.
While a coup is unlikely at this point, Putin's regime is more vulnerable than ever to another threat in the form of a crippling collapse as multiple crises cripple decision-making capacity within the Kremlin. War reinforces the system's internal weaknesses, pushing it toward collapse.
Disadvantages of "power verticals"
The political command structure built over the past 22 years has two key flaws. Often referred to as the "vertical of power", the decision-making system in the Kremlin is more like a pyramid, with all lines of authority starting from Putin's cabinet. This means that every big topic has to be solved at the very top in the end. Of course, Putin does not personally decide everything. He often escalates routine matters to a level where elite factions haggle or argue until they are resolved. Russian analysts call it “autopilot”. But when it comes to high-priority issues - or when the chiefs can't agree - Putin steps in and takes "manual control," and television cameras are often there to record his determination.
An overly centralized system can function acceptably in peaceful times. Clear lines of command help even in minor crises. But the need for Putin to personally intervene becomes a serious drawback when the problems are complex and rapidly evolving. The center quickly becomes overloaded, which can lead to a series of errors.
Most of the regime's key people are motivated more by corruption than conviction, but they act on the belief that the system will survive. When that faith disappears, the result is not a coup but procrastination, inaction, and ultimately desertion
In addition to the stresses caused by warfare, Putin must simultaneously deal with losses at the front, conflicts within the elite, economic losses, reduced budget revenues, chaos around mobilization and workers' protests. That list will only get longer. As the load gets heavier, so does the risk of losing control.
Another weak point is Putin's constant need to demonstrate strength. Like most modern authoritarian regimes, his relies on a complex game of trust: most of the regime's key people are motivated more by corruption than conviction, but they act on the belief that the system will survive. When that faith disappears, the result is not a coup but procrastination, inaction, and ultimately desertion.
When Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych fell in 2014, followed by Putin's seizure of Crimea, a key moment occurred when Yanukovych's security team simply disintegrated. As trust in the boss disappeared, so did his defenders.
A crash is of course not inevitable. However, the question is, if it happens, how will it play out. As the problems intensify, they are likely to exacerbate each other. Further defeats at the front would intensify conflicts within the Kremlin factions, both in Moscow and on the Internet. Protests over mobilization would become more frequent as conscripts died at the front, potentially merging with demonstrations over pay and layoffs. While local flashpoints flare, governors may improvise trying to solve problems - their own and those of the regions. Business and criminal groups would try to take advantage of the distraction of the security forces. All of that would knock down support for Putin, which stood at 79 percent at the end of October.
Small and localized protests are not difficult to contain. But as they expand, that task becomes more difficult.
The "true measure" of repression
Violent repression carries two contradictory reactions: fear and anger. The one who prevails decides whether the protests will grow or die down. This, in turn, depends on the degree of violence and the context. Too much force in a given environment can backfire on the wielder, causing rage to overcome fear.
Haitian dictator Jean-Claude Baby-Doc Duvalier learned this the hard way when his police killed three unarmed students in 1985. He was ousted in an explosion of rage within months.
Revolutions rarely destabilize modern states with disciplined police forces and sufficient resources. Protests are important because they can affect the mood within the elite and security forces
Judging what degree of force to use requires great skill and knowledge of the local situation, and sometimes the answer changes quickly. The effectiveness of intimidation also depends on whether it is combined with concessions. However, concessions can lead to new demands - or, if they are considered inadequate, further inflame the situation. For concessions, like repression, it may be too late.
Protests are important not because they can cause a revolution. Revolutions rarely destabilize modern states with disciplined police forces and sufficient resources. They matter because they can affect the mood within the elite and security forces, changing expectations and undermining morale.
With a general drain of confidence in Putin, a coup and revolution might not be necessary to remove him at all. He could see for himself that his safest option is to run for a more acceptable candidate in the 2024 presidential elections - and even cede power before then. Of course, such a maneuver would not save the current team.
The scale of election theft to elect the Kremlin's favorite could be too much for a mobilized public. And that operation could be undermined by opposing regime factions. If none of them were strong enough to direct the outcome, the elections could be - if not fair - at least unpredictable.
As in the case of stock markets, the moment of collapse of authoritarian regimes is impossible to predict. Such regimes can appear strong for years, only to suddenly disappear in an avalanche of defections. The multiple crises and tensions that war brings increase the chances of this, but the ending can cause random errors. It often seems that events are accelerating before collapse, like a drop in confidence spreading within the elite. As the philosopher Seneca said in another context: "Progress is slow, but the road to ruin is fast." The end, when it comes, often surprises even the most knowledgeable.
The article was taken from the magazine "Forin Afars"
The author is a professor of political science at the University of California
Translation: N. Bogetić
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