It was in the middle of winter when Moscow landed several hundred paratroopers at the neighboring country's main airport with orders to seize the capital, kill the president and install a puppet regime. With tanks also crossing the border, the Kremlin expected that country to fall quickly.
That was Moscow's plan for the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Four decades later, Russian President Vladimir Putin used the same overconfident plan for an all-out invasion of Ukraine, where he similarly envisioned a quick conquest of Kiev followed by national capitulation.
"There is a grimly direct parallel between how a group of old men in the Kremlin made the bad decision to invade Afghanistan and how another group of old men in the Kremlin made the decision to invade Ukraine," says Russia expert and historian Mark Galeotti. "In both cases, the military thought the invasion was a bad idea, but it was outvoted."
The Russian invasion of Afghanistan cost the lives of 15.000 Soviet soldiers and led to ten years of chaos that ended only after its withdrawal. In Ukraine, where an estimated 100.000 Russian soldiers have already been killed or wounded in just 10 months, it can be said that the Kremlin continues to misread the national mood even more dramatically.
Russian forces failed to capture the capital, Kiev, and Ukrainian troops have since driven them out of more than half of the territory they initially occupied. Still, Moscow appears unmoved: Ukraine has repeatedly warned that Russia is planning another ground attack on the capital even though its ability to launch a major ground offensive has been greatly reduced.
What other lessons can be learned from the Ukraine conflict and how might it play out in 2023? One important insight, according to military officials and analysts, is that "the great war is back" and with it the need for countries to have the industrial capacity and huge stockpiles of weapons to sustain high-intensity fighting.
Western allies have sent Ukraine military aid worth over 40 billion dollars. The US will also send the Patriot air defense system as part of a new $1,85 billion arms package.
However, the West, fearing an escalation of the war that could lead to direct conflict between NATO countries and Russia, has so far resisted sending the modern tanks, long-range missiles and aircraft that Kiev has also requested.
"The key question for 2023 is how much military aid the West will continue to send to Ukraine - and what kind," said Domitila Sagramoso, an expert on Russian foreign and security policy at King's College London.
There is a grimly direct parallel between how a group of elderly men in the Kremlin made the bad decision to invade Afghanistan and how another group of elderly men in the Kremlin made the decision to invade Ukraine. In both cases, the military thought the invasion was a bad idea, but was outvoted
The third lesson for Moscow is the importance of quality over quantity. Good logistics, large numbers of troops and adequate military equipment - be it drones or tanks - "are worth nothing if the intelligence structure of the troops, the leadership ... are not adequate ...", said Ben Barry, a former brigadier in the British army, and now a senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
Instead, Russian forces continue to display "low morale and poor standards of combined arms tactics and battlefield leadership," Barry said.
To remedy this, Putin in October appointed General Sergei Surovikin to command Russian forces in Ukraine. Surovikin, a veteran of the war in Syria, is "probably the most competent commander that Russia has appointed," said Dara Masikot, an expert on Russian military strategy at the Rand Corporation.
Surovikin strengthened the Russian front lines with recruits sent as part of the mobilization of approximately 300.000 soldiers. He also managed a successful withdrawal from the strategic city of Kherson, where Russian forces were in danger of being captured.
Those stronger defensive positions reduce the chances of a successful Ukrainian winter counteroffensive that cuts the land bridge along the coast of the Sea of Azov and connects Russia to Crimea, although Western military analysts still think a breakthrough is possible.
"The Ukrainian forces ... are certainly facing their own problems. They have suffered a large number of casualties, many soldiers are not adequately trained, some units are extremely exhausted and need more weapons and ammunition,” said one Western military adviser.
"However, they have an incomparable advantage over their opponents when it comes to morale and resolve and are much more effective than the Russians in mobilizing."
The fourth lesson is the importance of civil society in sustaining the war effort. Ukrainian software developers have created apps to help their troops target Russian positions, chefs are preparing food for Ukrainian soldiers on the front lines, and volunteers are continuing to raise funds to buy military supplies such as first aid kits and night vision goggles.
"Much of the success of the Ukrainians on the battlefield depends on a heterogeneous and self-confident civil society, capable of supporting the soldiers," says Timothy Snyder, a historian at Yale University.
A Gallup survey in October showed that 70 percent of Ukrainians want the fight to continue until victory, and more than 90 percent believe that victory means the liberation of all the territory that Russia has conquered, including Crimea.
In contrast, Russian public support for the war halved between June and November to 27 percent, according to an unverified internal Kremlin poll published by the Meduza portal.
The fifth and perhaps most important lesson of war is that it is fought on multiple fronts, not just with tanks, rockets and guns.
Putin launched a relentless wave of rocket and drone attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure in an attempt to break the national will and trigger a wave of refugees into Europe.
He has threatened further cuts to Western gas supplies for the winter, and while Ukraine supplies grain under a deal brokered by Turkey and the UN, the Russian navy continues to control the Black Sea, threatening much of Ukraine's food export routes.
"Putin's message seems to be that the shooting will continue, but I can continue this as long as I want," Galeotti said. "It is a political strategy designed to distance Ukraine from the West. The way this war is going to be fought is not just about military equipment.”
Even if both sides, exhausted by the conflict, agree to a cease-fire in the coming year, Putin's aggression against Ukraine can still continue by those other means. "The character of modern war may be changing, but so is the nature of peace," Galeoti added.
"That's something the West should think about."
Prepared by: A. Šofranac
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