A few weeks ago, a student asked me to imagine what she would look like European Union in 2035
Most of the time, we are not sure what the next summer will look like, nor whether the bloc's divisions into east and west and north and south will be bridged or further worsened. If a week is a long time in politics, 12 years is an eternity - and a crystal ball is not a scientific instrument.
Nevertheless, some outlines of the future Europe can still be seen today.
First of all, the EU will have more, not fewer, members by the mid-2030s - possibly as many as 36 compared to 27 today.
It will be a bigger, more chaotic, yet fiercer EU, shaped, as always, by unexpected events, and the bloc will struggle to defend its interests and values in a world of great power rivalry.
Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine last year, geopolitics has become the most powerful driving force putting pressure on Brussels and Western capitals to remove longstanding obstacles to further EU expansion. Political pressure to admit all countries west of the new Iron Curtain, including Ukraine, Moldova and the six Balkan states, is likely to be great, provided those countries implement the reforms required of them.
On the other hand, there is little chance that Turkey will enter the EU by 2035, or ever, even if the successor of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is more pro-European and democratic.
A larger EU without institutional reform could be a recipe for weakness or paralysis, but the bloc has the flexibility to adapt and move forward, bypassing its own restrictive rules if necessary.
Since the UK's fateful vote to leave the EU in 2016, no other country has toyed with leaving the bloc. Quite the opposite, Brexit was a lesson for most Europeans that life is warmer and more prosperous inside than outside, especially with revisionist Russia knocking at the door.
Even the loudest populist Eurosceptics in France, Italy, Poland, Hungary and the Netherlands have now stopped advocating exit, because they would rather stay and obstruct or simply refuse obedience, or reshape.
Second, the EU in 2035 will likely still be operating within the framework of the same Lisbon Treaty, and very likely dealing with the same grueling requirement for unanimous decision-making on foreign policy, taxation and the common budget. Bearing in mind that in many countries a referendum is necessary for the ratification of each new charter, changing the charter is simply too politically risky.
To be sure, France and Germany, the EU's historic leaders, said that in order to prevent a growing number of vetoes from paralyzing the decision-making process, a switch to a qualified majority voting system on topics such as sanctions and taxes would be a condition for further expansion. While this could theoretically be done under the current charter, most small and medium-sized states are determined to retain their veto power, either to protect a market advantage such as low corporate taxes, or to avoid servility to what many fear could become a German or French one. - the German Empire.
In the end, I do not believe that neither France nor Germany would dare to block Ukraine's path to membership if that country accepts mandatory EU reforms after the war. However, along with other member states, they will push for long transition periods before new members get the full benefits of membership, whether in terms of access to EU funds, agricultural subsidies, free movement of workers or, possibly, veto rights and their own commissioner.
Think tanks have come up with clever designs for a possible phased-in approach, including a trial period during which newcomers would not have full voting rights - which could be specified in their accession contracts.
However, it is crucial that at the moment there is no such legal procedure, and that would require the unanimous agreement of the current members.
"I think the EU will open a separate line for membership, with a more gradual approach," said Like Fris, a former Danish minister and one of the presidents of the European Council for Foreign Affairs.
Of course, a larger EU without institutional reform could be a recipe for weakness or paralysis, but the bloc has the flexibility to adapt and move forward, bypassing its own restrictive rules if necessary. For example, in its response to covid-19, the EU broke long-standing taboos by jointly buying vaccines and collectively borrowing to finance the economic recovery, and now for the first time it is using common funds outside the EU budget to compensate members who send arms to Ukraine.
Since the "war economy" will require joint war financing, joint issuance of defense debt, these precedents should pave the way for joint purchases of arms and ammunition for Ukraine, as well as joint procurement of weapons to meet the urgent need for EU countries to strengthen NATO defenses against angry and vengeful Russia.
In addition, the EU will move from globalized free trade to a more protectionist and selective economic model well before 2035, diversifying its supply chains for energy, minerals and semiconductors.
The continent will still need the United States as a protective nuclear superpower, but in terms of conventional armed forces, it will have to step back and take more responsibility for its neighborhood as Washington focuses on China.
Such partial integration in response to crises like Putin's war in Ukraine is much more likely than a federalist breakthrough or a nationalist gasification of a Europe built over seven decades of common legal, economic and political construction.
Poland and Hungary may continue to pose a challenge to the EU's shared values, with their continued erosion of judicial independence, media freedom, civil society and civil rights. It is still unclear whether EU financial pressure can reverse these trends. However, it is unlikely that these two Central European outsiders will pull the rest of the EU towards the kind of looser organization of nation states recently advocated by Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki.
On the other hand, a bulkier EU could encourage more countries to move towards closer integration.
"We could have an EU with multiple speeds, or with variable geometry. There is likely to be an informal core group with Germany, France, Italy, Spain and Poland, depending on the political situation in Poland. The commission will continue to be in the center because it makes legislative proposals and can act in crises," said Fris.
Such a core group already exists, not all EU countries are members of the Eurozone or Schengen zone of open borders, and by 2035 there could be a core of countries that cooperate more closely in the field of defense integration.
Lukas Tsoukalis, an expert on European integration and former head of the Commission's research center, fears that the EU will become more marginalized in the era of global strategic rivalry between great powers if it itself does not grow up economically and politically.
In his new book "The Making of Europe", Tsoukalis calls for an uprising, asking the EU to make the transition from soft power to hard power and to become a political and military player instead of being mainly an economic and regulatory actor.
"Becoming an adult requires the internationalization of the euro, more integrated taxation, leading global climate policy and joint defense," Tsoukalis told Politiko. "That probably won't happen with an EU of 27 members, much less with an EU of 35 or 36 members. Therefore, we will have to rely on a coalition of the willing and able. It is inevitable that France and Germany will be at its head".
However, the increasing fragmentation of European political systems, with weaker governments, growing social inequality and divided, explosive public opinion, pose a serious challenge to a more coherent EU. And in 2035, Europe will be an aging continent with a chronic labor shortage, limiting growth and economic dynamism.
Therefore, it remains unclear whether the EU will be able to maintain the "Brussels effect" in expanding its regulatory reach globally thanks to the strength of the single market in the coming less globalized era of economic blocs dominated by US-China rivalry. The ability of the EU to impose its norms and standards on digital giants and new technologies, such as artificial intelligence, where none of the leading global players are from Europe, does not seem promising.
Ultimately, some issues are likely to be too difficult for the bloc to overcome its differences - even by 2035. For example, it's fair to assume that in 12 years, states will still be clashing over immigration and asylum policy, even though their need for migrant workers only grow.
The text is taken from "Politika"
Translation: N. Bogetić
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