European Union leaders are slowly realizing the geopolitical necessity of accepting Ukraine, Moldova and the countries of the Western Balkans as future EU members, but the struggle to reform the bloc to accommodate enlargement will be agonizing.
Russia's invasion of Ukraine has put EU enlargement back on the agenda after two decades in which governments stalled the admission of six small Western Balkan states with a combined population of 20 million. Those countries were given a "European perspective" back in 2003, but since then they have done little to reform and have felt unwelcome in Brussels for a long time. Vladimir Putin is also counting on frozen conflicts and unresolved disputes in Moldova, Georgia, Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina to destabilize Europe's borders.
Aware of this struggle in the gray areas between Russia and the West, the European Commission this month recommended opening accession negotiations with Ukraine, Moldova and Bosnia when they meet key conditions, and granting Georgia the status of a candidate country.
Barring last-minute obstruction from pro-Russian Hungary, the leaders of the 27 member states will agree on these next steps toward eventual expansion at a summit in December. However, it remains extremely unclear whether a review of the EU's decision-making, administration, budget and financing procedures will begin to prepare for the admission of up to 10 new members in the coming years.
European Council President Charles Michel reiterated in Kiev this Sunday that both the EU and candidate countries should be ready for enlargement by 2030 - a goal widely seen as ambitious, and which many diplomats fear has led to unrealistic expectations in Ukraine. The candidates are far from meeting EU standards in the areas of the rule of law and the fight against corruption.
Integrating Ukraine, an agricultural giant of 40 million people that was far poorer than the poorest current EU member even before the devastation wrought by the Russian invasion, will be a huge economic and political challenge. Without radical internal changes, such as the abolition of veto rights on foreign, tax and foreign policy, the EU may not be able to agree unanimously on the admission of new members, nor to function effectively after their accession. "We cannot have the same rules for 30 or so countries. That will be impossible," said Maria Ledo, a high-ranking official in Spain, which currently holds the EU presidency.
Germany and France, the two central powers in European unity since the 1950s, favor qualified majority decision-making. They also published a report by independent experts proposing a Europe of concentric circles, in which an inner circle of states can make deeper integrations if the others do not want to join them.
However, few EU countries are willing to consider changes to the Lisbon Treaty, fearing years of negotiations and the risk of losing a referendum on ratifying the outcome. The majority wants any changes in the voting system and the budget to be implemented by activating unused clauses in the existing agreement.
It is estimated that the admission of Kyiv under the current rules would cost 186 billion euros from EU funds over seven years. Without additional tax resources, this would threaten the EU's two main spending programs - the common agricultural policy and funds intended to reduce inequality between the richest and poorest regions.
Several small and medium-sized EU states reject any thought of giving up their veto rights, fearing that Paris and Berlin will push them out if they lose their blocking power. This includes not only the unusual team when it comes to the rule of law and democracy, Poland and Hungary, but also countries with preferential tax regimes for multinational companies, such as Ireland and Luxembourg, or those with frugal electorates, such as the Netherlands and Sweden.
Few countries are also willing to give up the symbolism provided by a national representative on the commission, even though commissioners are bound by oath to serve the common European interest, not their homelands. However, an executive body of 35 members would be dysfunctional when there are only 15 real positions in the commission and the agreement does not allow for a hierarchy of high and low commissioners.
Admitting new members without changing voting rules and spending policies risks paralyzing the union politically and turning some of its current biggest net recipients into net contributors to a budget that would face huge adjustment costs for Ukraine.
In an internal document prepared for the EU Council of Governments last month, it is estimated that the admission of Kyiv under the current rules would cost 186 billion euros from EU funds over seven years, about half of which would go to payments to farmers. Without additional tax resources, it would threaten two main EU spending programs - the common agricultural policy and funds intended to reduce inequality between the richest and poorest regions.
The message was clear: the EU will have to fundamentally reshape the way it subsidizes agriculture and the development of its poorest regions in order to be able to afford Ukraine's admission without alienating farmers and other stakeholders in existing members, even if Kyiv's access to EU funds were phased in over ten years.
Politicians in Western European countries that lost referendums in 2005 on a proposed EU constitutional treaty are particularly worried about possible public resistance to the sacrifices that will be required to allow Ukraine to join.
Federalists in the European Parliament, led by former Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt, want to start the process of a comprehensive reform of the agreement next year. They are calling on governments to convene a convention of national and EU legislators and government representatives to work on a new voting system, wider EU competences, a simplified commission and, of course, their own right to initiate legislation.
Many seasoned EU observers, who doubt that the enlarged union could function effectively under current arrangements, insist that institutional reform must either precede or go hand in hand with the accession process. It may sound like the “broadening versus deepening” debate that preceded the “big bang” of eastward enlargement, admitting 10 new members in 2004. However, this time, the geopolitical pressure to unite the European family under one EU roof is even stronger, and the will for reforms has rarely seemed weaker.
The article is taken from "The Guardian"
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