The Russian state increasingly has to use the services of criminal networks, writes Mark Galeoti (58), a historian and expert on Russian secret services and organized crime in a report entitled: "Troublesome Times: The Russian Underground After the Invasion of Ukraine." This honorary professor at the University of London (UCL) published his research as part of the "Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime" project.
Before the invasion of Ukraine, organized crime in Russia was linked to gangs in Ukraine: Russians and Ukrainians together formed the largest criminal syndicate in Europe, until the war destroyed those ties.
"By February 2022, Russian and Ukrainian criminal groups constituted the most powerful criminal ecosystem in Europe and controlled a profitable smuggling route between Russia and Western Europe," Galeoti quoted from another Global Initiative report. When the war started, the leading figures of the Russian underground joined the private army "Wagner".
The winners and losers of the war
The war changed the entire status quo and, above all, shifted the balance of power between individual groups, writes Galeoti:
"The main winners are structures with connections in Belarus, Armenia and Central Asia, while the losers include large transnational criminal networks such as the Solntsevskaya and Tambovskaya brotherhoods."
These are the two most famous mafia structures in Russia - the first is from Moscow, and the second is from St. Petersburg.
Galeoti says that now alternative trade and smuggling routes have become more important - some countries in the Middle East, Central Asia and Turkey are singled out: "Overall, this war may not be good for Russian gangsters, but that is not true for everyone".
Me to you - you to me
It is cynical that the ties between the state and the criminal underworld in Russia are based on mutual aid, explains Mark Galeotti. For example, criminal structures are increasingly involved in the procurement of microchips and other technologies necessary for the Russian defense industry. In his report, Galeoti quotes a Europol official:
"If you help smuggle microchips, the FSB can turn a blind eye when you're dealing in drugs or people."
In other words: what the state does not want or cannot do on its own, it leaves to organized crime.
He says that in addition to the procurement of sanctioned goods, this also includes simpler espionage, assassinations or intimidation of the Kremlin's enemies, especially abroad: "I'm afraid there will be more to put pressure on the Russian diaspora."
In addition, the function of criminal groups is to serve as guardians of the "black funds" of the state. Since the beginning of the war and the isolation of Russia by the West, it is "more difficult for Russian state actors to finance operations in Europe", explains Galeotti and says that - the more the state has to use the services of criminals, the more the boundaries between the underground and institutions are lost.
As an example, he cites the "state" export of Ukrainian grain from the occupied territories or the export of oil by tankers that turn off their transponders and thus bypass Western sanctions.
More and more crime in the country
At the same time, Mark Galeoti states that the number of criminal offenses is increasing drastically in Russia, especially those involving the use of violence. Even the official statistics of the Russian MUP state a 30 percent increase - only for 2022.
That's probably not the whole truth either. Geleoti points out how unbelievable those same statistics are when citing surprisingly low crime rates in Chechnya and other North Caucasus republics. The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs recently decided not to publish such statistics anymore.
"If Putin decided to confront organized crime, he would have the resources to do so," says Galeotti, noting that the Russian state currently shows no interest in doing so. At the same time, problems related to crime are growing in Russian society: for example, the number of war veterans who are inclined to join the criminal world is increasing.
What is Russia turning into?
In the end, Galeotti identifies two main risks for Russia: the first is "Donbasization", i.e. lawlessness and unscrupulousness as in the occupied Ukrainian territories, and the second is "nationalization of crime", i.e. turning Russia into a mafia state.
However, he believes that the term "mafia state" is a journalistic cliché because it does not capture the "overall complexity of the system" in Russia.
Galeoti suggests that modern Russia be compared to a medieval monarchy, where rival boyars battled for the emperor's favor and where "the letter of the law has much less value than pragmatic alliances".
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