Is Ukraine's sudden counter-offensive a key turning point in the war, a sideshow or a strategic mistake by Kiev? In the short term, it has mostly been successful, but it is the medium and long term that is important. Does it have wider consequences for Western policy towards Russia in general and the war in Ukraine in particular?
The war has changed direction several times since the Russian invasion in February 2022, and no outside analyst has guessed everything. This requires a certain amount of humility. As in most wars, it is impossible to know exactly where each side's breaking point lies, either in terms of capability or resolve, and it is difficult to predict how third parties will react to new events. However, there is not much reason to believe that the Ukrainian invasion of the Kursk region will have a significant positive impact on the fate of the country.
Of course, the offensive has already brought obvious benefits to Kyiv. It boosted Ukrainian morale and helped ease concerns that Kiev was trapped in a war of attrition against a larger adversary it could neither defeat nor outlast. It brought the war back into the headlines and strengthened voices calling for increased Western support. It revealed serious weaknesses in Russia's intelligence capability and readiness and could embarrass the Russian president Vladimir Putin, although there are no signs that the invasion has dampened his resolve or slowed Russian attacks in the Donbass.
He is happy that Ukraine is seeing some successes on the battlefield, but it is unlikely that this operation will affect the outcome of the war. On the positive side, the attack showed considerable initiative on the part of Ukraine and an impressive level of operational secrecy, which saw the invading forces encounter insufficient numbers of poorly trained Russian defenders. In some respects the attack was reminiscent of the successful Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kharkiv in the fall of 2022, which also achieved tactical surprise and faced outnumbered and inexperienced Russian troops.
Unfortunately, these incidents tell us very little about Ukraine's ability to gain territory against the well-prepared Russian defenses that prevented the Ukrainian offensive a year ago. Moreover, the Kursk operation may result in higher Ukrainian than Russian losses, which is not a trade-off Ukraine can sustain. It would be a big mistake to conclude that recent successes on the Kursk front mean that additional Western aid will allow Ukraine to regain Donbas or Crimea.
This last point is crucial, as both countries face quite different circumstances. Both sides lost a lot of soldiers and equipment, but Ukraine lost far more territory. According to published reports, Ukraine has now occupied about 400 square miles of Russian territory and forced approximately 200.000 Russians to leave those areas. These figures make up 0.0064 percent of Russia's total land area and 0.138 percent of its population. By contrast, Russia now controls roughly 20 percent of Ukraine and reports say the war has forced nearly 35 percent of Ukraine's population to flee their homes. Even if Kiev manages to keep the territory it recently seized, it will not provide much in the negotiations.
It follows that the fate of Ukraine will be determined mainly by what happens in Ukraine, not by the Kursk operation. The key factors will be the willingness and ability of each side to continue to make sacrifices on the battlefield, the level of support Ukraine receives from others, and whether an agreement can ultimately be reached that leaves the unoccupied parts of Ukraine intact and secure. In this regard, the United States and Europe should continue to support Ukraine, along with serious and unsentimental efforts to negotiate a ceasefire and eventual resolution. Unfortunately, US officials seem to have forgotten how to get even close allies to agree to a cease-fire, even when those countries are dependent on US support and a cease-fire is clearly in America's interest.
The Kursk offensive poses at least two other challenges, but it is important to draw the right lessons from them. The first and most obvious lesson is a reminder of Russia's limited reach and its disappointing military performance. Since 2022, some have tried to convince us that Putin is determined to restore the Russian Empire, and perhaps even the Warsaw Pact, and that Ukraine is just the first step before launching new attacks on the existing order. Given Russia's many mistakes in this war, and given that even its successful attacks have been slow, can anyone still believe that Russia poses a serious military threat to the rest of Europe? Threats have been used to bolster support for Ukraine, but reliance on scare tactics usually leads to poor strategic decisions.
Another thing, several commentators - including the Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky - have suggested that Kiev's successful invasion of Russia shows that existing red lines and other restrictions on Ukrainian operations should be dropped and that the West should allow Ukraine to fight Russia however it chooses. If Ukrainian troops can occupy Russian territory without provoking Russian escalation, the argument goes, this proves that Putin is a paper tiger and that his previous threats of escalation (including some not-so-subtle references to nuclear weapons) were bluffs that have now been exposed.
Behind such arguments is the intention to get more and better weapons for Ukraine and to remove restrictions on their use, and I do not blame the leaders of Ukraine for pushing this idea. But the claim that there is no risk of escalation regardless of what Ukraine does should be firmly rejected. States are most prone to escalation when they are losing a war; in fact, Ukraine's decision to invade Russian territory can be seen as a risky attempt to turn the tide of a war that was going against them. In contrast, Putin has no incentive to escalate if his forces continue to win in the Donbass. The danger of Russia escalating only occurs if Moscow faces a catastrophic defeat, but that is not currently the case.
The problem is not only the constant threat of escalation within the ongoing war. We should ask ourselves whether we are morally content to aid a war effort whose declared goals are probably unattainable, while avoiding a serious diplomatic effort to end the struggle. The likely result of our current policies is that more people will die for no apparent political purpose. The pressure to negotiate a solution to the war between Russia and Ukraine is one of those cases where self-interest and morality align. The West and the Ukrainians have missed opportunities to prevent or end this war through negotiations, and Ukraine's recent military success should be seen as an opportunity to begin serious ceasefire negotiations, not as an excuse to prolong a costly war that Ukraine can survive, but is unlikely to win.
Stephen Walt is a Foreign Policy columnist and professor of international relations at Harvard University. Article taken from Forin Polisi.
Translation: S. STRUGAR
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