In the halls of Brussels, there is an increasingly prevalent feeling that the political will to help Ukraine overcome Russian aggression is weakening - on both sides of the Atlantic. A senior Western official told me that it may take a "second shock" of similar proportions to Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 to shake Western countries out of their apathy, and prompt Europeans to take more radical steps to strengthen and integrate. of its defense forces. That shock could include a sudden collapse of Ukraine's defense lines, another Bucha-style massacre by Russian forces, or perhaps a victory for Donald Trump on November 5. Any of those events would be a disaster for Kyiv.
For now, the United States is preoccupied with its presidential election and the escalation of wars in the Middle East, which has pushed the Russian advance in the Donbass out of the media headlines. France is beset by a political and fiscal crisis, with Emmanuel Macron's power at home and his influence in Europe waning rapidly. Germany is paralyzed by infighting within its sluggish three-party coalition, which may or may not last until a general election scheduled for September 2025.
Meanwhile, the UK is grappling with its own budget problems as the new Labor government focuses on overhauling the health system and public services, amid a media furore over questionable gifts from political donors. At the same time, extreme right-wing, pro-Russian parties are gaining ground in many European elections, most recently in Austria.
Russia captured more Ukrainian territory in September than in any month since March 2022. Although Volodymyr Zelensky visited the UN General Assembly and Washington to present a "victory plan" and plead for more weapons and freer use of those weapons on Russian territory, the attention of America and Europe has waned. These are dangerous and frustrating times for Kyiv.
Joe Biden, who is increasingly playing the role of "clay pigeon", is avoiding any political moves that could jeopardize Kamala Harris' chances of preventing Trump from returning to the White House. This limits not only his ability to rein in Israel in the fight against Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran, but also his willingness to allow Ukraine to attack deep inside Russia with American missiles or European weapons containing American components. Biden remains concerned that Vladimir Putin could raise the nuclear stakes or retaliate against the West in a way that would widen the conflict and give Trump a propaganda tool against Democrats.
Britain and France, which supply Ukraine with "Storm Shadow" and "Scalp" missiles, cannot allow their unrestricted use against Russian bases without the US green light. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz continues to delay the delivery of the Taurus missile system, which Kiev has long requested to target Russian supply lines and missile launch pads. Scholz's reluctance is a combination of electoral opportunism (the AfD and Sara Wagenknecht's Alliance are against the war), historical reasons (his SPD has always been a party of peace) and fear that Germany will be singled out for Russian retaliation.
In farewell speeches and interviews, former NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg publicly expressed regret that Western allies had not supplied Ukraine with larger quantities of weapons before a general Russian invasion in 2022, arguing that it would have made Moscow's offensive more difficult and perhaps even deterred. This is a retrospective analysis, especially given that Stoltenberg remains unwilling to denounce US caution or openly call for the release of deeper attack capacity.
Retired US Major General Gordon Skip Davis expressed regret that "the Biden administration has delayed again and again." Speaking at a European Policy Center (EPC) panel on the battlefield situation in Ukraine, Davis said Washington had overestimated the likelihood that Putin would escalate the conflict, which is why it continued to provide enough aid to keep Ukraine "afloat" but not and the means to win. "We don't want 'as long as it takes,' but 'whatever it takes,'" Davis added.
EU officials see a parallel between the reluctance to provide decisive aid to Ukraine and the stubborn resistance of major European powers to joint borrowing and collective arms purchases to strengthen the defenses of Ukraine and Europe itself. Many European countries have emptied their already meager stockpiles of ammunition to supply Kiev and are now scrambling to expand national military industries or find supplies abroad.
"There was some momentum towards greater European defense integration earlier this year when the Commission published its Defense Industrial Strategy," one senior official told me. "However, that momentum weakened after the European elections, due to political problems in key capitals". Now, a "political earthquake" like the return to power of NATO-sceptic Trump may be needed to restore energy and provide more funding for the EU's defense efforts. If Kamala Harris wins, there is a risk that European capitals will relent and return to relying on American protection, as some did after Biden defeated Trump in 2020.
Ukraine cannot afford to wait for such a "second shock" to wake up Western governments, while its forces are bleeding daily in a war of attrition imposed on them by a larger enemy. "You cannot expect Ukraine to last another 30 months when our country has been turned into a battlefield and is under attack every day," said Mykola Beljeskov, a senior analyst at the National Institute for Strategic Studies of Ukraine, at the same European Policy Center panel. "What we don't see is a long-term strategy of sustainable support. Otherwise, the Russian victory scenario will advance."
For European governments, regardless of their domestic problems, the choice should be clear: provide Ukraine with more decisive support now, including the capacity for deeper strikes, or face a much worse strategic situation next year, with a strengthened Putin arming himself for the next war conquests.
Text taken from "The Guardian"
Translation: NB
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