Felix Karte, a seasoned disinformation expert, is a senior adviser to Reset, a London-based NGO that researches the impact of social media on democracy.
Previously, Karte worked at StratCom, the strategic communications department of the diplomatic service of the European Union (EU), where he participated in the creation of policies to combat digital threats.
In an interview with the Tatar-Bashkir newsroom of Radio Free Europe (RSE), Karte talks about the tactics that autocratic regimes, such as Russia's, use to spread disinformation on a global scale. He particularly highlights the recent activities in Moldova during the presidential elections and the referendum on integration into the European Union.
RFE/RL: You've detailed how suspected Russian actors allegedly bribed politicians, bought votes and spread fake videos targeting Moldovan President Maja Sandu during the recent vote and referendum. Sandu called it "an unprecedented attack on democracy." Can you share details about this Kremlin-backed campaign?
Map: There are many reports in the world media describing these tactics. For example, weeks before the election, Moldovan authorities discovered large amounts of cash on passengers returning from Moscow on indirect flights. The sums were suspicious because of their frequency and scale. One day, authorities seized $1,5 million, suspecting that the funds were intended for political influence.
Moldova's police chief told the BBC that, by early October, almost 130.000 Moldovan voters had received payments linked to the scheme, making up about ten percent of the country's active electorate. The chief anti-corruption prosecutor has also been tracking suspicious money flows linked to fugitive and oligarch Ilan Shor, currently living in Russia. She pointed out that Shor channeled funds to influence voters to oppose Moldova's pro-EU referendum and its path to European integration.
Sources linked to the Kremlin have also infiltrated social media in Moldova. For example, they spread dipfakes – artificially generated videos that are now cheap and easy to produce.
In one of those videos, Sandu allegedly mocked the poverty of the citizens. In another fake video, which Sandu had to publicly deny in her New Year's speech, she was falsely shown banning Moldovans from drinking berry tea, a drink that many Moldovans love.
These are classic cases of disinformation – tactics designed to sow distrust and fuel anger against democratic governments.
RFE/RL: You wrote about the "mirror tactic" that autocratic regimes like Russia use in their disinformation campaigns. Can you explain how that tactic works?
Map: Of course, "mirror politics" is a tactic in which a propagandist accuses opponents of behaviors or strategies that they themselves pursue. The Kremlin often uses this tactic to confuse the public and deflect blame. For example, Kremlin propaganda often accuses Ukraine and the West of "Nazi" behavior and attempts to destabilize Russia, when in fact it is the Kremlin that is trying to destroy democratic governments of foreign countries, destabilize and subjugate societies.
Similarly, the Kremlin constantly accuses the West or certain groups, such as LGBTIQ communities, of "meddling" in Russia's internal politics, while it is obvious that Russia itself is interfering in the elections and media of other countries. This is an example of the mirror tactic in action - the goal is to blur the lines between truth and lies, right and wrong, and eventually make people indifferent to who rules them, because they can no longer see the difference between democracy and autocracy.
This tactic is effective, in some countries more than in others. For example, in Slovakia, public support for NATO membership fell from 72 percent to 58 percent. According to Slovak think-tank GLOBSEC, most people in Slovakia no longer attribute primary responsibility for the war in Ukraine to Russia.
RSE: How does Russia use its war against Ukraine in disinformation campaigns?
Map: As I mentioned, the Russian invasion of Ukraine (in 2022) was previously accompanied by a comprehensive disinformation campaign aimed at portraying Ukraine as a "Nazi regime" and creating false pretexts for the invasion. The key goal of Russian disinformation was to weaken public support for Ukraine in Western countries such as the USA or Germany.
For example, the so-called "Doppelganger" campaign spreads pro-Russian narratives through fake websites and social media accounts, even impersonating credible media to gain attention. Key topics include questioning the effectiveness of sanctions against Russia, increasing negative feelings towards Ukrainian leaders and spreading fear of Ukrainian refugees in Europe.
RFE/RL: How does conservative rhetoric match Russia's disinformation efforts?
Map: Russian propaganda often uses conservative rhetoric, focusing on themes such as "wokeism", family values and the rights of the LGBTIQ community to resonate with conservative citizens in Europe who feel that social change threatens traditional norms. A prominent example is the "Gayropa" narrative, which portrays European tolerance as a moral decline and a threat to family values.
In this context, (President of Russia) Vladimir Putin presents himself as a strong figure who can "save" Europe from the so-called "woke virus", which echoes the way individuals like (President-elect) Donald Trump are presented in the United States of America .
Of course, the Kremlin's interest in these conservative values is purely strategic. The Russian government and its illiberal allies across Europe, far from actually defending traditional values, pose a threat to fundamental conservative pillars like the European peace order, free markets, and even Christian values like honesty, compassion, and humility.
The Kremlin's strategy is aimed at manipulating socially conservative audiences, relying on a sense of being overwhelmed by social change, while at the same time blurring the lines between traditional center-right parties and far-right movements.
The Kremlin appeals to common conservative themes to win over a center-right audience, then feeds them content that incites anxiety and hostility. Ultimately, Russia's goal is to strengthen extremist political parties with a pro-Russian agenda – at the expense of traditional conservative parties. RSE: How crucial is technology, especially artificial intelligence, in disinformation campaigns today?
Map: I think we often overestimate the role of new technologies like artificial intelligence (AI) in disinformation. Take the example of the US election: according to US authorities, Russia interfered in the election process by sponsoring domestic influencers on YouTube to spread pro-Russian content, particularly supporting Trump.
While these influencer operations are expensive and effective, they do not rely primarily on AI tools like ChatGPT. The real damage comes not from AI itself, but from Russia's bad intentions and the significant resources it invests in disinformation.
RSE: How ready is Europe to fight disinformation campaigns? What could be done better?
Map: The EU has taken significant steps to combat disinformation, including establishing a special task force in its diplomatic service more than a decade ago, supporting independent media and researchers, and regulating social media platforms.
However, Russian propaganda remains one step ahead by hiding its origins through intermediaries and commercial entities, making it difficult to identify the source. In addition, some political parties within the EU actively spread pro-Russian narratives, which further complicates effective countermeasures and indicates the complexity of the fight against disinformation within the EU's borders.
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