All dictators need loyal elites to stay in power and rule effectively. High officials and other powerful figures can help an authoritarian ruler stay in power. These officials also help implement policies, collect revenue, win elections, and punish opponents.
On the other hand, most dictators tend to value loyalty more than ability, rewarding more loyal officials. For example, autocrats often reward those who can secure more votes for the ruling party. In this sense, most dictators pay relatively less attention to whether such officials also achieve adequate political results.
Research on bribery can help to better understand how autocratic regimes work. As many observers have noted, Vladimir Putin's decision to invade Ukraine in 2022 may in part be the result of being surrounded by wobblers and not being adequately informed about the potential risks of such an operation.
Although our recent research can neither confirm nor reject this hypothesis, it has shown that widespread servility flourished in Putin's Russia - even long before the war.
According to recent research I conducted with two other academics, for authoritarian officials, showing loyalty goes beyond simply securing high turnout in elections. For many, this implies the daily practice of flattery, that is, the use of flattery and praise of the ruler.
When many people think of authoritarian policies, they imagine Soviet or Chinese party members enthusiastically praising leaders like Joseph Stalin or Mao Zedong during party congresses. In fiction, flattery is often presented as the primary activity of officials, as is the case in Mario Vargas Ljosa's novels The Feast of the Dragon (2000) and Ismail Kadare's The Heir (2003).
However, until now, the logic of political sycophancy has remained rather unclear. Does it actually pay off for the officials who practice it?
New tools in data science are helping to advance understanding of the language used in policy. Our research, published in the American Journal of Political Science, draws on thousands of speeches given by Russian governors during Putin's rule, as well as speeches by important officials in Stalin's Soviet Union (1924-53).
We analyzed the choice of words the governors used, including the ways they referred to their leaders and their policies. The research came to an interesting conclusion that may be counter-intuitive. Contrary to our expectations, high levels of sycophancy were not common among all dictatorial officials.
Why some people behave differently
There were significant differences in how officials referred to the ruler and his policies in their speeches. These differences were noticeable even during the Great Terror in the Soviet Union, the purges when Stalin used brutal measures to get rid of anyone he considered enemies or threats.
According to our analysis, there is surprising variability in who will overpraise an autocrat, when, and how. Liking is practiced mostly by those who feel vulnerable due to the actions of the rulers.
In modern Russia under Putin, officials approaching the moment of their re-appointment or coming from economically weaker regions are much more likely to exhibit sycophantic behavior.
They do this in public addresses or comments, routinely exaggerating their praise of the autocrat. They also mimic his rhetoric, including Putin's obsession with Ukraine policy. Officials who have had alternative careers are less prone to open flattery.
Thus, pandering to a leader is largely motivated by cost-benefit assessments. After all, one local or regional official, councilor or minister can easily be replaced by another. History shows that even influential officials can be easily replaced.
In modern Russia under Putin, officials approaching the moment of their re-appointment or coming from economically weaker regions are much more likely to show lecherous behavior. They do this in public addresses or comments, routinely exaggerating the autocrat's praise, and also mimicking his rhetoric. Officials who have had alternative careers are less prone to open flattery
Our research also shows that licking generally pays off. Officials who get snubbed stay in office longer and are more likely to be promoted.
It is unlikely that autocrats themselves routinely monitor whether their officials overpraise or ignore them. However, it is possible that dictators generally recognize and value fawning as a public signal of loyalty and select and reward such loyalists.
Our finding that poltroons are rewarded for flattery raises new questions about why not all officials practice this behavior. Further, possibly experimental, evidence is needed to fully investigate this. However, our research suggests that there are significant psychological and other motivational differences between individuals.
Such differences affect individual attitudes towards licking. Even in authoritarian regimes, lying makes people uncomfortable. This probably means that, unless the level of repression is extremely high, as was the case during the Great Terror of 1937-38. year, not everyone will be half-hearted.
Indulging in Putin's Russia, as in other autocracies, can mean that leaders don't always get the policies and results they want, but only the political supporters who flatter them the most.
The author is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Dublin
Translation: A. Š.
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