Emmanuel Macron had to wait a long time for a positive response from Berlin. The French president has already offered to talk to Germany several times about a nuclear deterrent in Europe based on French atomic weapons. So far, he has been rejected.
That is changing now: the chairman of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Friedrich Merz, the likely next chancellor, is ready to talk about it. With Donald Trump in the White House, who could withdraw American military protection from European allies, the situation has changed dramatically. Merz wants to talk to nuclear powers France and Great Britain about nuclear deterrence in Europe. This has met with approval in Paris.
What is "nuclear fission"?
Germany has been under the protective umbrella of American nuclear weapons for decades. Up to 20 American nuclear bombs are stored in Germany. Only the American president has the code to activate them. However, the Bundeswehr provides fighter jets that can deliver the bombs to their target in an emergency. NATO calls this jointly organized deterrence with American nuclear weapons, in which other European countries also participate, “nuclear sharing.”
Security experts do not expect the US to withdraw its nuclear weapons from Europe in the near future. “I don’t think that’s an inevitable scenario, because NATO and sharing nuclear weapons with partners are of great strategic importance to the US for various reasons. However, you can’t completely rule it out,” says Sascha Hach, an expert on European security and arms control at the Frankfurt Institute for Peace Research (PRIF). One of the strategic advantages the US has in stationing nuclear weapons in Europe is the ability to respond quickly to Russian aggression.
Germany must not have its own nuclear weapons.
But even if the American bombs remain in Europe for the time being, the doubts that Trump is sowing about the American promise of support have already caused damage within NATO, because these doubts undermine the credibility of nuclear deterrence. Germany, which has always relied heavily on the United States, now wants to reorient its security policy. The Bundeswehr will be fundamentally strengthened faster than planned, for which special financial funds have already been planned.
The "nuclear umbrella" is also being discussed. The question is whether it is still suitable as a deterrent against the huge Russian nuclear arsenal of more than 5.500 warheads under these circumstances? At the same time, Germany is not allowed to possess its own nuclear weapons. This is stipulated, among other things, in the "Two Plus Four Treaty" on reunification in 1990, signed by the two German states and the victorious powers of World War II, the USA, the Soviet Union, France and Great Britain.
In Europe, only the United Kingdom and France have their own nuclear weapons, and within the European Union, only France. Closer cooperation would therefore be advisable. There are, however, limitations: the British nuclear forces are closely linked to the United States and would be at the disposal of NATO in the event of a conflict. The situation is different in France, which attaches great importance to the independence of its nuclear forces, so they are not subordinated to NATO's joint command structures.
Naval and air nuclear forces
France is estimated to possess 290 nuclear warheads, which can be launched from nuclear submarines or Rafale fighter jets. The nuclear forces, also called the “Force de frappe” (Strike Force), are intended to protect the country’s “vital interests.” According to the French interpretation, they also strengthen European security by making it more difficult for potential adversaries to assess the force.
So what exactly could this cooperation look like? First of all, it is about intensive exchange in this area, according to Paris. Information on the handling and strategic planning of nuclear weapons is very exclusive and sensitive. France has been gathering experience in this matter for decades, which Germany of course does not have.
Joint exercises between the German and French air forces are also possible, says French security expert Camille Grand of the European Council on Foreign Relations think tank. This could include the landing of French Rafale jets in Germany. However, there are no plans to station French nuclear fighter jets or other nuclear infrastructure in Germany, as some media have speculated. “We are still a long way from that,” Grand concludes.
Command remains in the hands of the French president.
For France, however, it is out of the question to allow other countries to directly participate in the disposal of French nuclear weapons, as NATO does. "It is wrong to assume that a French nuclear guarantee would be equal to an American nuclear guarantee," Camille Grand told DW.
The French government has always made it clear that it will not relinquish control over the decision to use nuclear weapons. “Whatever happens, the decision was and will always be in the hands of the President of the Republic, the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces,” Emmanuel Macron stressed in his address to the nation in early March.
What can Europe do?
But it is not only France's nuclear forces that are strongly focused on their own national defense, but also Britain's. Great Britain is the only nuclear state that possesses only one type of nuclear weapon: its nuclear deterrent is entirely naval-based and is based on four nuclear submarines stationed off the west coast of Scotland.
All of this limits the possibilities of putting these weapons at the service of a wider European nuclear defense system in the near future. What is possible is a stronger strategic dialogue or even, as security expert Sacha Hach tells DW, "a political declaration that in an emergency, French and British nuclear capabilities will also be used to defend European territory. But I think it is unrealistic that nuclear forces in France and the UK will develop in a way that is tailored to European defense," Hach concludes.
The number of atomic bombs is not decisive.
Friedrich Merz also emphasizes that British and French weapons are not a replacement for American nuclear weapons in Europe, but only a supplement. The United States is currently considered indispensable in NATO, not only because of its nuclear arsenal, but also because of other mechanisms that only American military forces possess. This includes, for example, direct contacts with Russian command centers and systems for reporting on the launch of ballistic missiles. All this helps to avoid unintended escalations.
“When we in Europe discuss how to proceed without the US, we always focus on whether we have enough bombs,” criticizes Hah. What is overlooked is that other important safeguards could be lost without the US, such as direct military contacts with the other side. “I would say it is in Europe’s interest to build similar structures and mechanisms over which we would also have control,” the analyst concludes.
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