The closer Russia's hybrid war moves to European capitals, the less able EU leaders seem to be to agree on how to respond. At least that was the worrying impression after the discordant EU summit in Copenhagen.
The meeting, convened last week to build consensus on key priorities for European rearmament, turned into an uncomfortable display of the conflicts over competences, political squabbles and vested interests that are hampering efforts to build a coherent European defense. The leaders argued not only over who should lead Europe’s military buildup, but also over how to finance Ukraine’s continued resilience to Russian aggression and how to advance Kiev’s bid for EU membership.
They have expressed concern about the repeated violations of European airspace by drones flying over airports and military bases, as well as overflights by Russian fighter jets across the border - but they seem unsure how to respond. Shoot them down? Escort them out of the territory? Keep calm and carry on as before? Or retaliate by using frozen Russian assets to secure a large loan to Ukraine, taking more aggressive steps to stop Russian oil and gas exports, and giving Kiev long-range missiles to strike deeper into Russian territory?
No consensus was reached in Copenhagen - and decisions will have to be made soon.
Russian President Vladimir Putin is probably laughing at the cacophony in the Danish capital and could draw the conclusion that Europe is weak and divided in its response to his increasing provocations. That would be dangerous for all sides.
The leaders of the EU's largest member states used an informal summit to reject European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen's proposal to build a multi-layered "anti-drone wall" for Eastern Europe, following a series of incidents in which Russian drones violated airspace and events related to Russia's "shadow fleet" of dilapidated tankers that violate sanctions.
The clash in Copenhagen was not about drones, but about power. National leaders suspected that behind the defense initiatives was an attempt by the European Commission to expand its powers, and they wanted to reinstate Ursula von der Leyen within her powers.
In a document distributed to leaders, von der Leyen proposed four flagship European defense projects: a European anti-drone wall, an eastern flank surveillance network, an air defense shield, and a space defense shield. She also said the EU executive would monitor member states' progress in meeting the 2030 readiness targets through a new reporting and assessment process.
French President Emmanuel Macron has rejected the concept of a “drone wall,” saying something “more sophisticated and complex” is needed. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has sharply criticized excessive regulation from Brussels and, behind closed doors, has fiercely attacked the anti-drone plan. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has complained that Brussels is focusing exclusively on protecting eastern countries while neglecting the southern flank. She has also hinted at another objection: that, in her opinion, should be the job of NATO, not the EU.
The conflict was not about drones, but about power. National leaders suspected that behind the defense initiatives was an attempt by the European Commission to expand its powers, and they wanted to return Ursula von der Leyen to her authority.
It is fine for Brussels to offer member states €150 billion in loans for joint military procurement projects and to relax fiscal rules to allow for greater borrowing for defense. But the big European governments want to keep control in their own hands, with groups of countries focusing on developing different capabilities to meet their NATO obligations.
Such conflicts over competences have existed since the EU took on a role in defence 25 years ago. Now they have resurfaced, and with even greater intensity, as defence increasingly becomes a new area of European integration.
Brussels cannot be blamed for insisting that member states use growing defense budgets more efficiently through joint projects, rather than duplicating capabilities and thus preventing the building of a stronger European military-industrial and technological base. This, however, implies harmonizing military needs and reducing dependence on purchasing American equipment.
However, political leadership will remain in the hands of the major European military powers, partly because the EU is constrained by the fact that it includes neutral states (Austria, Ireland, Cyprus and Malta) as well as countries that are pro-Russian (Hungary, Slovakia and, soon, perhaps, the Czech Republic). In addition, the United Kingdom remains an indispensable player in European defense, despite leaving the Union.
The “Coalition of the Willing,” which operates under Franco-British leadership to provide security guarantees to Ukraine, could serve as the core of a European rearmament process. However, industrial rivalry among its key members threatens to undermine the joint defense effort.
France and Germany are at odds over a future fighter aircraft system project, which they launched in 2017, and which Spain later joined. The concept, which included sixth-generation fighters, advanced drones and a “combat cloud,” was intended to be Europe’s alternative to its reliance on the U.S. F-35 and its successors. However, “air battles” between the main contractors, Dassault Aviation and Airbus, over design leadership and division of labor have brought the project to the brink of collapse. Meanwhile, a competing global fighter aircraft program, led by the United Kingdom, Italy and Japan, is advancing.
Underlying all of these disputes is a lack of mutual trust among Europeans, which further deepens uncertainty about America's commitment to European security under the Donald Trump administration. When states are unsure how much they can trust each other, their instinct is to rely on their national military industries and armed forces.
This weakens Europe at the very moment when it needs to show strength and resolve against Russia. European leaders must stop blaming the European Commission and urgently act together - as if Europe were under attack, because it is.
The text is taken from "The Guardian"
Translation: NB
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