Andrej Babiš's populist ANO party took power again in the Czech Republic on October 3 and 4, giving him a second chance to reshape Czech politics after his first term as prime minister from 2017 to 2021.
Interestingly, although he is an experienced politician, his initial plan to form a minority government with the tacit support of two smaller right-wing populist parties failed. Such a government would not have survived for long.
Instead, Babiš will now form a coalition with two nationalist-populist parties: Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) and the Motorists. The SPD belongs to French far-right leader Marine Le Pen's group in the European Parliament (EP) and advocates referendums on key issues, including membership in the European Union (EU) and NATO, which Babiš has already ruled out. The Motorists, like ANO, are part of the Eurosceptic Patriots group in the EP, launched by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán.
It might be tempting to conclude that Babiš's victory will strengthen populist parties in Central and Eastern Europe in a way that would give them greater influence in the EU. But things are not that simple.
It is striking that the links between these parties are more ad hoc in nature and that they are not as aligned in policies as they seem. Paradoxically, these political forces avoid forming an influential, unified group within the EU that would try to direct its course of action.
Populist movements in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia do not advocate a common and clear position on the role of the EU as a foreign policy actor, nor on the internal functioning of the bloc. They are divided on a key foreign policy and strategic issue - the relationship with Russia. And Babiš stands out in this regard in the way he has implemented his Euroscepticism.
Nationalist populists in Poland and the Czech Republic are anti-Russian and pro-Ukrainian. Under the leadership of Jarosław Kaczyński’s conservative Law and Justice (PiS) party, Poland became a key logistical hub for military support to Ukraine after Russia’s all-out invasion. And Andrej Babiš’s party has not obstructed deliveries of specialized military equipment from the Czech Republic to Kiev. In contrast, Slovakia’s and Hungary’s far-right populist leaderships openly support Russia and oppose Ukraine.
However, it is precisely on the issue of illiberalism and Euroscepticism that Babiš, at least for now, differs most from his Central and Eastern European colleagues.
While in power in Poland, PiS’s Eurosceptic stance and its attack on the independence of the judiciary weakened its position within the EU. This trend was not fully reversed even after the Civic Coalition (KO) won the 2023 parliamentary elections. President Karol Nawrocki, who enjoys PiS support, for example, obstructed KO’s efforts to repeal illiberal measures that PiS had introduced into the judicial system.
In Hungary, Orban's Fidesz party, in power since 2010, is ideologically Eurosceptic. Orban has successfully built his power on clientelism by taking over the media, appointing judges loyal to Fidesz, and redistributing electoral districts. His party is openly pro-Russia, anti-Ukrainian, and pro-China.
As for Slovakia, the pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian stances of Robert Fico, a four-time prime minister who survived an assassination attempt last year, are well known. Equally well-known is his determination to suppress independent media, bring the judiciary under control, and reduce parliamentary oversight of the Interior Ministry and security services.
"Slovakia is facing a much faster democratic regression than Hungary and Poland," the Verfassungsblog on Matters Constitutional recently reported. "Although this dramatic development is provoking a strong reaction from civil society organizations and the public, Fico's fourth government leaves no room for public debate on these legislative changes."
But Babiš is different. He is first and foremost a transactional politician, similar to US President Donald Trump. He has little tolerance for an independent judiciary and public media services, but he is not an ideological Eurosceptic. He sees the EU through what it can offer him.
However, he shares one essential issue with populist leaders like Navrocki, Orban, and Fico when it comes to the EU - the issue of sovereignty. These leaders do not support further European integration, even though political, security, and defense circumstances demand it.
This aversion to integration is linked to the communist past. The Soviet occupation destroyed the sovereignty of the countries that were under the rule of the USSR. In a way, the current broad action of the EU revives the idea of sovereignty, even though the decision to join the Union itself essentially implied the transfer of certain powers to the European institutions.
This idea of sovereignty is not unique to Central and Eastern Europe. The slogan “take back control” was the very one that led Britain to vote to leave the EU. Other Eurosceptic countries do not advocate such a radical move, but their increasingly strong defense of sovereignty has consequences for the cohesion of the Union. It prevents the EU from moving towards further political and economic integration – both of which are needed more than ever today, given Trump’s tariff-ridden economic policy, his lukewarm support for NATO, and Europe’s inability to defend itself.
Ultimately, integration should lead to a sovereign Europe - which is precisely what populists do not want.
carnegieendowment.org
Translation: A. Š.
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