For the fourth time since US President Donald Trump returned to the White House, his stance on Russia's invasion of Ukraine has sent his European partners into a state of shock and dismay.
What is particularly striking this time is that his stance was not accompanied by the usual series of boastful statements, nor by a new group trip across the Atlantic in an attempt to salvage even a minimal - if only apparent - transatlantic unity on the issue of European security.
Perhaps the more muted reaction of European leaders shows that they had already anticipated Trump’s renewed inclination not to increase pressure on Russia but to pressure Ukraine – the country under attack – to give up its territorial integrity. But a more realistic explanation is that it is yet another indication of the lack of grand strategic vision that has long plagued the Union.
The European crisis goes deeper than a mere inability to imagine security outside the NATO framework dominated by the United States.
For the bloc to avoid sinking into insignificance in a “post-rules-based order” world, twenty-seven countries with very different, sometimes conflicting strategic cultures and threat perceptions must agree to completely reshape the only common security framework. And they must do so while most of them are undergoing political fragmentation of unprecedented depth and breadth. A lack of political will – or courage – to take bold security decisions quickly and on a large scale is therefore almost inevitable. What must not happen, for the EU’s survival, is for these obstacles to become insurmountable.
Moreover, illiberal, pro-Russian parties are currently on the rise – precisely at a time when Moscow is stepping up its hybrid warfare operations against the EU and its member states.
To achieve the Union's geopolitical ambitions, EU member states must first respond to the everyday concerns of their citizens.
A long line of fettered minority or caretaker governments stretches across the Union. Liberal-democratic parties no longer govern the political life of their countries; instead, they are largely on the defensive and trying to catch up with the confident alternative and far-right parties whose ideas have permeated the public sphere.
In two key European Union countries - France and Germany - nationalist populists now represent more than a quarter of the electorate. In Germany, the far-right Alternative for Germany is the second-strongest political force, just one point behind Chancellor Friedrich Merz's Christian Democratic Union. In France, the National Rally not only leads the polls with a solid 33 percent of the vote, but also has a double-digit lead over the second-place party.
In both countries - although far more dramatically in France than in Germany - governments are struggling to effectively address the issues that citizens perceive as most important: the cost of living, security, as well as technological, economic and environmental transitions - or to make any progress with their programs at all.
In seven other member states, far-right parties are either part of ruling coalitions or support governments: in Croatia, Finland, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Slovakia and Sweden.
In Poland, a key country for European defense, conservative Prime Minister Donald Tusk is constrained by cohabitation with President Karol Nawrocki, who has the support of the far right.
In Austria, the far right - although in opposition - is the dominant party and continues to consolidate its influence on the public agenda.
Both the Netherlands and Spain have dysfunctional governments. The former has had a caretaker government since June after the far-right Party for Freedom left the coalition, while the latter has failed to pass a budget for the third year in a row.
When all this is considered together, it is no wonder that Europe has failed to reorganize its strategic position quickly enough, with the necessary industrial and financial strength, to keep pace with the disintegration of the order in which it had existed until now.
However, while time is running out, it is not yet completely over. Since 2022, the European Union - despite the aforementioned difficulties - has managed to make certain advances that would have been considered revolutionary, had they not been cut short by the geopolitical context.
Trump could prove to be an opportunity. A key strand of his political base - the so-called "restrainers" - welcomes European strategic autonomy, both military and industrial. This cannot be said of any previous US administration, which simultaneously berated Europeans for not taking greater responsibility for their own defense, behaving like "slobs," as former US President Barack Obama once put it, while aggressively encouraging Europe to continue buying American weapons en masse.
On the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Trump has, by his own standards, shown surprising consistency. He has never reversed his decision to withhold arms from Ukraine. Instead, he has agreed to send the weapons to Kiev only if the Europeans buy them—the clearest possible sign that he sees no strategic interest in the Ukraine situation. He does not consider Ukraine to be a core strategic interest of the United States, nor is he interested in supporting its struggle to restore its territorial integrity.
Where Trump is more deeply destabilizing the current political moment in Europe is through his movement's active support for nationalist conservative leaders across the continent - as opposed to the existing political forces in power.
However, if these forces finally seriously commit to implementing the reports by Mario Draghi (former Italian Prime Minister and former President of the European Central Bank), Enrico Letta (former Italian Prime Minister and author of a report on the future of the EU single market), and Sauli Niinistö (former Finnish President and author of a report on the civil and military preparedness of the European Union) - which together form a roadmap for European renaissance - they could trigger enough industrial, technological, and security turnaround to reinvigorate the political energy of the major parties among voters.
Essentially, it is about going back to basics. The European Union and national governments must get serious about providing rapid and effective solutions to the everyday problems of their citizens, concerning jobs and economic growth, economic empowerment, and physical and cultural security in relation to immigration. This is the only way to ensure support for the inevitable budgetary sacrifices needed to launch a “defense revolution” to respond to the current geopolitical challenge.
The EU's geopolitical engine cannot operate at full power if its internal political mechanisms are constantly blocked.
carnegieendowement.org
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