There is strength in numbers, the saying goes. And the institutions of the European Union have taken it to heart. The logic is this: the larger the European bloc, the more powerful it is and the better equipped it is to face the geopolitical and geoeconomic upheaval that is underway.
The obsession with unity is real in Brussels and in individual capitals. Any hint of disunity is interpreted as evidence of the sinister decline of which the EU is constantly accused.
The EU's twenty-seven member states have certainly exceeded many expectations since the start of Russia's all-out invasion of Ukraine. Together with the European Commission, they have found creative ways to work around their own divisions to impose sanctions, provide resources, and finance military aid - although the process has often been arduous and lengthy.
But in light of tectonic shifts on the global stage, Brussels’ best chance of preserving what little global power it has left lies precisely in drawing on its own differences to gain room for maneuver. It can no longer prioritize consensus among all twenty-seven members and settle for the minimum levels of emergency measures needed for its own defense, economic strength, and energy security.
The idea of a multi-speed Europe is not new, but it has never been more important than today.
Through the so-called coalition of the willing around Ukraine, a core of more ambitious and determined member states has already emerged. The twelve countries that make up it should be able to move forward together and faster than the EU as a whole. They could become a kind of scouting ship for the rest of the Union, paving the way while the others catch up.
This group has developed a certain coherence thanks to its geography and history. The Nordic-Baltic eight - Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway and Sweden - have had to give up some of their taboos when it comes to defense planning outside NATO and joint defense financing. They also share an assessment that the Russian threat is more urgent than most other countries in less geographically exposed areas consider.
Through the so-called coalition of the willing around Ukraine, a core of more ambitious and determined member states has already emerged. The twelve countries that make up it should be able to move forward together and faster than the EU as a whole. They could become a kind of scouting ship for the rest of the Union, paving the way while the others catch up.
France, the United Kingdom, and to some extent Germany and Poland, complete this group. They bring crucial weight and capabilities, without which the core would not have sufficient firepower.
Together, these countries bring together a critical mass of favorable demographic trends, political will, economic and military strength, as well as the energy and technological resources needed to operate at full capacity in this geopolitical moment.
The focus of such a core must, above all, be defense. But not only in terms of increasing the budget and massive investments in production capacities, crucial as that is. This group must also build a new common strategic culture based on the willingness to conduct military operations independently. In other words: a revival of the practice of hard power.
That still eludes them. It took them almost two years, including a full year of brutally confrontational diplomacy by US President Donald Trump and his wider team, to finally establish an operational command center and develop deployment plans.
What they have not yet managed to do is reach full geopolitical maturity; in other words, the ability to take military action not only without the United States, but also in a manner that Washington may not fully approve of.
The second priority should be a much more coordinated foreign policy that includes strategic communications and information warfare. The E3 group - France, Germany and the United Kingdom - represents only a skeleton on which to build, because even these countries individually no longer have enough power to be normative actors. By acting in much closer harmony and integrating the added value brought by the Nordic-Baltic Eight, especially in the digital and cyber spheres, a much stronger Europe could be shaped.
The first challenge will be overcoming reservations about the UK's inclusion after Brexit. London's return would not be a reward for leaving the EU - on the contrary - it would be a constant reminder of how central and indispensable the European framework has become.
The second challenge will be to overcome the instinctive resistance to diluting individual sovereign powers that have long been considered the exclusive purview of national governments. What is the value of narrowly understood national sovereignty if Europeans are to become individual pawns in a world they can no longer shape or direct?
Once these two major taboos are broken, the group will be able to address the existing - albeit diminishing - differences on ideological and technical issues much more effectively. These include assessing how deep the rift with the United States has really become and how to deal with it. Similarly, topics such as how to link the United Kingdom to EU financial instruments, how to establish the long-promised capital markets union, and the degree of fiscal union that is desirable can be addressed.
And there are other questions: how broadly, by sector, should European products and companies be prioritized, and how to independently produce energy in a way that is sustainable enough to drive the next technological leap.
As significant as they are, these differences are not insurmountable in a narrower, more agile format.
In parallel, it is very possible that another group will have to be formed. Like-minded, capable and willing members can move forward in strengthening the EU's economic strength by deepening the single market, completing the capital markets union and banking union, and consolidating industry.
The formation of specialized subgroups within the whole should no longer be seen as a negativity to be avoided, but as a necessary flexibility without which the European project cannot survive.
It is time for leaders to respond to the moment with a will, flexibility and speed that befits the scale of the earthquake that has shaken the global security architecture on which the EU is built. Such a two-speed Europe is by no means a miracle solution, but in the current context it is the best chance that Europeans have of retaining at least some control over their own destiny in a world that looks set to remain unstable and unpredictable for years to come.
carnegieendowment.org
Translated by A. Š.
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