The 62nd Munich Security Conference, also known as “Davos with guns,” comes at a crucial time. The United States has never demanded more from Europe, and Europe has never expected less from the United States.
The conference, which began yesterday, represents a crossroads for transatlantic relations. Of the two paths before us, one leads to a permanent reconstruction of the NATO alliance, with a strong Europe at its core, capable of defending itself while preserving a healthy, if weakened, partnership with the United States. The other path leads to continued transatlantic conflicts over shared values, national interests, and questions of what constitutes a fair sharing of responsibilities on all sides.
This second path is no longer just a tedious side issue in an otherwise stable alliance. It threatens a messy breakup between the United States and its closest allies, damaging both European and American security. It is in the United States’ interest that Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who is leading the Trump administration’s delegation to the conference, and the accompanying congressional delegations, make as much progress as possible on the first path. Whatever tone Rubio takes, Europe must stand behind substantive reforms.
The American side did not make it any easier. A year ago in Munich, Vice President J.D. Vance declared the end of the transatlantic relationship as we knew it. The immediate cause, he said, was not Russia, China, or any external actor, but what he called “a threat from within: Europe’s retreat from some of its most fundamental values.” According to Vance, European allies had not only neglected their own defense capabilities, but had also abandoned the shared values on which the alliance was founded, embracing liberal immigration policies and restrictions on freedom of expression.
His speech was seen by many on both sides of the Atlantic as interference in favor of the far-right Alternative for Germany party, just over a week before national elections.
As the Donald Trump administration's National Security Strategy for 2025 later showed, Vance's speech was not an impromptu speech, but rather a foreshadowing of American policy. The administration believes that, as it states, the "civilizational erasure" of Europe can be partially countered by supporting "patriotic European parties."
An unpleasant exchange in Davos just a few weeks ago further exacerbated the situation, especially after President Donald Trump complained that Europe was not grateful enough for America's role in rescuing it during World War II, that it has spent too little on its own defense since then, and that it will likely not be willing to shed blood in defense of the United States in the future.
In the meantime, tensions have eased somewhat, but the possibility of a split still hangs in the air. Marco Rubio recently declared that “NATO must be redefined in terms of obligations.” The question is whether Rubio will use his Munich speech to lecture the allies or to present a sustainable vision for continued transatlantic security cooperation.
The United States should continue its cooperation with NATO even as it reduces its involvement in ensuring European security. Washington should remain a key player in joint efforts to end the war between Russia and Ukraine and secure Ukraine's future, strengthen Europe's eastern and northern flanks, and expand arms sales and military-industrial partnerships.
The most important issue is Ukraine. Given the administration's stated goal of shifting the burden of European security to Europe, it would be sensible to establish a clear and ambitious position on Europe's role in preserving any eventual peace.
Building European strategic autonomy and a new, lasting relationship with the United States will require more than three days at Munich's Bayerischer Hof hotel. The worst outcome would be more empty rhetoric without tangible progress.
Europe needs to make some decisions. The idea of a stronger, better integrated Europe, as championed by French President Emmanuel Macron, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and other political leaders, remains painfully theoretical, hampered by the Union’s bureaucratic inertia. Former Italian prime ministers Mario Draghi and Enrico Letta, among others, have already defined goals: a single capital market, a pan-European innovation ecosystem, a defense industrial base that transcends national borders, and governance that is more committed to productivity and investment than to procedures and excessive regulation. There is momentum behind that vision. But “strategic autonomy,” as it has been called, entails political trade-offs—such as defense mobilization, budget deficits, erosion of sovereignty, and uneven gains—that continue to be blocked by the narrow interests of many member states.
The commendable commitment of NATO allies to greater spending is not enough. European countries must overcome their tendency towards fragmented national defense projects and focus on building a continental defense industrial base. They must invest more in recruiting and training armed forces, not just in purchasing weapons. This will require difficult decisions at a time when Europe lacks strong political leadership.
Success would bring its own challenges, not least a continent full of rapidly arming nations. Germany’s military spending for 2025 already exceeds that of any other European country and is the fourth-highest in the world. Britain, France and other countries will have to adapt to a Europe defined by a strong German military – something the founders of the Munich Security Conference could hardly have foreseen.
Building European strategic autonomy and a new, lasting relationship with the United States will require more than three days at Munich’s Bayerischer Hof hotel. The worst outcome would be more empty rhetoric without tangible progress. Otherwise, the conference established in 1963 to coordinate allied containment of the Soviet Union now risks becoming a site not of strengthening shared security but of transatlantic divorce.
The author is president of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)
The text is taken from the "New York Times"
Translation: NB
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