Russian Sabotage in Europe: How to Make Moscow Pay Without Going to War

Russia's campaign of sabotage across Europe is heating up again, confronting governments with a problem they have been trying to solve since the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine: how to impose a serious price on Moscow for attacks that deliberately fall below the threshold of conventional war.

Over the past month, a new series of suspected sabotage, explosions and fires have been reported at facilities linked to support for Ukraine across Europe.

The attacks vary in scale and sophistication, but they have one thing in common: they are often difficult to unambiguously link to Moscow, writes The Guardian. The newspaper says that this is partly due to the way the operations are organized. Russian intelligence services are increasingly relying less on professional operatives they send to Europe, and are increasingly recruiting perpetrators remotely, including via Telegram, and paying them in cryptocurrencies for individual tasks, while the Russian intelligence officers who direct them remain in Russia.

The rise in the number of attacks and the increasing willingness of European governments to publicly blame Moscow for them indicate a change in mood. After the incident at Leipzig airport, Berlin publicly blamed Moscow within days, much more quickly than in previous cases. German Interior Minister Alexander Dobrint said investigators had evidence that the drone operators were acting “on behalf of Russian state structures.”

This, according to the Guardian, indicates greater confidence in identifying Russian operations and decreasing patience with the sabotage campaign. However, Germany's response remains cautious.

Berlin's response to the failed drone attack in Leipzig was carefully measured to avoid escalation, but it raised the more difficult question of what Europe can do beyond imposing sanctions and expelling diplomats without risking direct military conflict with Russia.

The Guardian writes that Europe's space for retaliation is further limited by the powers of its intelligence services and that, unlike the CIA, many European services primarily collect intelligence and have significantly fewer capabilities for covert operations abroad.

This leaves governments with few options between diplomatic and economic measures on the one hand and overt military action on the other. To bridge this gap, some EU member states are proposing to expand the powers of their intelligence services.

Critics warn that sanctions, expulsions of diplomats and other measures so far are not enough to deter Moscow.

“Since they haven’t been adequately deterred and Moscow hasn’t paid the price, Putin is interpreting that as a signal to continue,” Julianne Smith, a former U.S. ambassador to NATO, told The New York Times.

Poland and the Baltic states are the ones calling for a tougher policy.

“Hybrid warfare is not just online harassment,” said Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski. “It includes death squads, arsonists, attempts to blow up trains, and violations of airspace with drones and cruise missiles.”

"We need to convince Putin that such moves are not free," said Sikorski, adding that Poland had responded to previous suspicious Russian operations by closing consulates, but that it had "run out of consulates to close."

The New York Times warns that the failed Russian drone attack on a German airport is part of a dangerous pattern of escalation that, according to experts and officials, could provoke an open confrontation with NATO, regardless of whether the Kremlin wants it.

Russia has been pretty lucky so far. At some point, someone will get hurt, and that will present the Alliance with a whole different dilemma.

The attacks have become more frequent and intense in recent months, and along with reports citing Western intelligence suggesting that Russia may be planning a military incursion or provocation along NATO's eastern flank, they have added to the nervousness in Europe and left officials scrambling for answers.

According to experts, the increase in attacks could be partly a result of Putin's dissatisfaction with the situation on the front, where Russia is making slow progress with heavy losses, while Ukrainian long-range strikes are placing an additional burden on the Russian economy and military logistics.

Putin, they say, sees the war not only as a conflict with Ukraine, but also with the "collective West," which he accuses of providing Kiev with weapons, intelligence, and technology. The Russian president denies Moscow's involvement in sabotage in Europe.

No one has been killed or seriously injured in the attacks so far, but possible casualties, as the Times reports, could cause a serious crisis for NATO, which was created to deter and respond to a ground invasion, and does not have the appropriate instruments for a conflict that is gradually escalating.

"Russia has been pretty lucky so far. At some point, someone will get hurt and that will present a whole different dilemma for the Alliance," said former Ambassador Smith.

The question is how far Putin is willing to go and whether he could directly test Article 5, NATO's fundamental principle according to which an attack on one member is considered an attack on all.

Few Western intelligence officials believe an immediate Russian attack on a NATO member is likely, especially not with ground forces tied up in the war in Ukraine. However, experts say Putin, faced with Western support for Kiev, may feel compelled to bring the conflict to Europe, at least in a limited form, according to a Times analysis.

"I don't think they want World War III, but they need to show everyone that this is not the time to engage in conflict with them," said Piotr Krawczyk, former director of Poland's foreign intelligence service.

The New York Times writes that the West also has secret responses at its disposal, including stronger intelligence support for Ukraine, cyberattacks, and undermining Russian interests in other parts of the world. In August, the German government passed a bill that would allow its intelligence services to take active measures, including sabotage and cyberattacks, for the first time in the country's post-war history.

An additional challenge for NATO is maintaining unity among its 32 members. After Germany accused Moscow, allies expressed support for Berlin, but the US ambassador to NATO did not mention Russia in his statement.

The Times cites this as an example of the unwillingness of the Donald Trump administration to impose a price on the Kremlin for its actions and recalls that the US president has repeatedly hinted at possible measures against Putin, but has rarely implemented them.

Western officials believe the Kremlin is restrained by the threat of a unified response from allies, and that Putin is testing that unity with each new attack. For now, they argue that NATO continues to have a deterrent effect, but the Trump administration's indecisiveness raises uncertainty about whether it will remain so.

"Our assessment is that Vladimir Putin currently understands both what Article 5 means and what its real consequences would be," said Kaupo Rosin, head of Estonia's Foreign Intelligence Service.

"Our main concern is the future. We need to ensure that in six months, a year or five years, Russia is still aware that NATO deterrence is working," he added.