A successful foreign policy requires combining different instruments of national power to achieve the desired positive outcome. Because each state coexists with many others, this means in practice using those instruments to persuade allies and adversaries to behave in a way that will advance that state's interests. Therefore, effective foreign policy depends on a correct understanding of the tendencies of other states and how they are likely to respond to initiatives.
A suitable example is the containment vision of American diplomat George Kennan. Containment correctly identified a critical goal—keeping the industrial power of Western Europe and Japan out of Soviet hands—and Kenan understood that nationalism was a stronger force than Marxism and that states that felt threatened by Soviet rule would have a strong tendency to balance with the U.S. . Kennan also predicted - again correctly - that the USSR would eventually "soften" if denied significant opportunities for expansion. And that's pretty much what happened.
In contrast, the George W. Bush administration's hostile decision to invade Iraq in 2003 was based on a complete misreading of the situation it faced and the likely response of other key actors. Not only did the administration overestimate the ability of the US to reorder a foreign society, it also failed to foresee that other states (and non-state actors) would soon join forces to oppose US efforts. Instead of ushering in the democratic transformation of the Arab and Islamic world - as its architects naively predicted - the occupation became a costly stalemate and exacerbated the problem of terrorism.
The point is that success or failure in foreign policy largely depends on whether strategic choices are based on an accurate view of the world and the key forces at play. If government officials misread the tendencies of others or simply do not understand the forces that will determine how other states will respond to any actions they take, their policies are likely to fail.
Although President Donald Trump's unpredictable and impulsive approach to American foreign policy can be interpreted as a not very entertaining form of rally TV, i.e. constantly introducing changes and uncertainties to keep the viewers' attention, there are two main characteristics of his approach to the rest of the world.
The first is the tendency to view relations with other countries purely from a bilateral and transactional angle, and to judge success or failure only by whether the US has fared better on each occasion. In Trump's head, you're with him or you're against him, and a successful foreign policy is one in which any bilateral relationship benefits the US more than the other side. If both sides do equally well, or both get a lot, but the other side gets a little more than the US, then by definition it's a bad deal, even if America is better off in absolute terms. Like any good businessman, Trump always wants to get something for nothing and be able to tell the American people that he somehow convinced foreigners to make a bunch of concessions without giving them anything in return. Like promising that Mexico will somehow pay for a wall it doesn't even want.
Another and closely related characteristic is the tendency to intimidate. Whether threatening to overturn existing agreements, shower the enemy with "fire and fury" or impose tariffs on both friends and adversaries, Trump's diplomatic methods are based on the belief that the US has an almost infinite capacity to impose its will on other countries through threats. If Trump refuses to ratify Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, other countries will pay the US to defend them. If he doesn't like the NAFTA agreement and threatens to leave it, Canada and Mexico will immediately agree to whatever US negotiators ask for. If he threatens China with a trade war, President Xi Jinping will do whatever it takes to make Trump happy. And if he cancels the Iran nuclear deal, the ayatollahs will not dare to continue their enrichment and move closer to Russia and China. If they treat longtime US allies with contempt, ignore their most earnest pleas regarding the Iran deal, and then impose tariffs on them as well, they will silently accept the humiliation and back down.
There are two obvious reasons why Trump's worldview is wrong. First, a purely transactional and essentially bilateral approach to foreign policy makes it difficult to create larger alliances in favor of common goals. If success is defined as meaningful bilateral deals that are always better for the US than for any of its partners, potential allies are treated as if they were adversaries.
Trump's foolish decision to abandon the Trans-Pacific Partnership damaged US relations in Asia and reduced its ability to pressure China, thereby undermining Trump's stated goals.
Trump repeated this mistake last month when he imposed tariffs not only on China, but on many other US trading partners.
This will not only hurt the US economy by making imported steel more expensive, but will also isolate the US within the G-7 and bring China and Europe closer together.
Former Finance Minister Larry Summers told the Financial Times this Sunday: "The second rule of strategy is to unite your friends and divide your potential opponents. The U.S. seems to be doing the opposite... the result (of U.S. policy) is to get most of the rest of the world to side with China against the U.S."
Another problem is that Trump has overestimated the amount of influence he has at his disposal and is unaware of the strategies that friends and foes can use to curb American power. America enjoys many advantages, but other countries do not have to obey its whims and dictates. Even at the peak of the so-called of the unipolar moment and American power, much weaker states have found ways to deflect, dampen, deflect, contain, exploit, or resist American pressure. States can balance American power by coordinating their positions with others or by creating alternative institutions that bypass Washington, as the remaining members of the TPP are doing. Or they can simply reject whatever the US proposes and drag things out endlessly. Other states and some non-state actors can defy the US not by trying to confront it directly but by some asymmetric responses, such as acquiring weapons of mass destruction. And really smart countries can try to use the power of the US for their own purposes, as Israel, Saudi Arabia and others do.
The more the US tries to exert influence and shows less respect for the "humble opinion of mankind", the more motivated others will be to resist and all these tactics will become more effective. The more fights Trump starts, the more leaders he insults, the more he behaves unpredictably and unpleasantly, the more other countries will begin to ignore the US or offer no more than polite, mostly insincere, support. Even those world leaders who may be inclined to support him will have to think twice if their people increasingly see the US in a negative light. We are already seeing this trend in the decline in the number of people around the world who express confidence in American leadership, the greater respect the world public has for leaders like Xi Jinping (or even Russian President Vladimir Putin) compared to Trump, and the increasing number of once pro-American leaders who they openly talk about taking their destiny into their own hands and ignoring the unguided missile that currently resides in the Oval Office.
In the short term, the results of Trump's mistakes may not matter so much. As long as he doesn't do anything really stupid — like go to war with Iran — and assuming his bluster doesn't trigger an actual trade war, the US will get by pretty well. Trump won't do anything to "make America great again," but did anyone seriously expect that?
Meanwhile, America's rivals will continue to provide additional advantages, America's voice will not be heard as usual, and Americans will not live as well as they could. However, if that decline is moderate and the erosion of the US constitutional order gradual enough, many people may not even notice—which Trump and the Republican Party are undoubtedly counting on.
Just a moment in US history, not a fundamental turning point
One can understand why someone like Trump thinks this way. After all, the US is still very powerful and has the largest and most important economy in the world. The dollar is still the reserve currency, which is why Washington has an extraordinary influence on global financial affairs. No major power wants to be cut off from the U.S. economy — even a little — and no corporation or foreign bank wants to be denied access to the U.S. financial system. The US is also in an extremely advantageous and secure geographical position, with no serious enemies nearby, which means that America needs most of its allies more than it needs them.
There is also the fact that many countries are used to depending on Uncle Sam for their security and fear that they could be left without the protection of the United States. European allies of the US are worried that they will have to defend themselves without much American help, and they are even more worried about the possibility that inter-European rivalries will intensify if the "American conciliator" disappears.
The bottom line is that few countries want to incur the wrath of the US or even engage in a long, bitter and protracted arm-twisting struggle. Like most Americans, the current partners of the US mostly hope that Trump will turn out to be an unfortunate but short-lived moment in US history, rather than a fundamental historical turning point. That would act to lend credibility to Trump's intimidating approach to foreign policy.
Translated and edited by: Angelina Šofranac
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